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ABSTRACT
PATRIARCHAL IDEOLOGY AND VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: A 
THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTION USING LONGITUDINAL, INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL
ANALYSES
Jesse Robert McKee 
Old Dominion University, 2013 
Director: Dr. Dianne C. Carmody
Feminist researchers have recently highlighted the need to revive patriarchy as a 
theoretical tool in regards to violence against women. Patriarchy is typically considered 
to be a structural concept, but a theory of patriarchy for violence against women must 
also include an individual-level component of patriarchal ideology. Patriarchal ideology 
has not been clearly conceptualized and is rarely operationalized. Very little research has 
assessed patriarchal ideology as a dependent variable and almost none has done this 
longitudinally. This research aims to fills these gaps. The current study also seeks to 
identify significant predictors of change in patriarchal ideology, an issue of tremendous 
importance for a theory of violence against women. Stronger theories that can 
appropriately incorporate patriarchy may lead to more effective proactive policies rather 
than the existing reactive policies based on poor theoretical understanding.
The data used for this dissertation comes from the Longitudinal Study of Violence 
against Women: Victimization and Perpetration among College Students in a State- 
Supported University in the United States, 1990-1995 (White, Smith, and Humphrey 
2001). Since the data was from a sample of college men, the first wave of data is just 
before individuals transitioned into college. This was followed by three subsequent 
waves of data assessing patriarchal ideology after the first, second, and third years of 
college. Because of the various challenges posed by longitudinal data and specific
challenges posed by this data, two major analyses were performed. The main goals o f 
these analyses were to: come up with reliable operational measures of patriarchal 
ideology, determine their measurement invariance over time, assess predictors of 
patriarchal ideology, evaluate the change/stability in patriarchal ideology, and account for 
the predictors of change/stability. The first major analysis operationalized individual 
patriarchal ideology using attitudinal measures over two waves of data in a traditional 
test/re-test panel design. The second major analysis operationalized patriarchal ideology 
using vignettes that were proxy measures of patriarchal ideology over three waves of 
data. Latent growth-curve modeling was used in order to assess the intra-individual and 
inter-individual changes in patriarchal ideology over time.
The analyses were the first of their kind to assess patriarchal ideology as an 
outcome variable overtime. Overall, findings suggest patriarchal ideology is a 
multidimensional concept that can be measured using attitudinal measures and vignettes, 
with some support suggesting vignettes may be preferred. During the transition from pre­
college to the end of one’s freshman year, patriarchal ideology was stable. After this 
time period, over the next three years of college patriarchal ideology declined for the 
sample as a whole. Interestingly, there was inter-individual change but no intra­
individual change in patriarchal ideology. The means that regardless of one’s initial 
levels of patriarchal ideology, everyone’s levels declined over these three years. These 
results are discussed further regarding their theoretical, methodological, and policy 
implications. Suggestions for future research assessing the role patriarchal ideology 
plays in theories of violence against women are discussed.
VThis dissertation is dedicated to my mom and dad who have allowed me to live my
dream, I love you guys.
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1CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
PATRIARCHY AND VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
Although a variety of perspectives attempt to explain violence against women and 
intimate partner violence, there are two specific perspectives that have gained popularity 
over recent decades. The first perspective claims that violence between intimate partners 
is committed equally amongst men and women (for a recent review of this literature see 
Straus 2011), while the second perspective argues that intimate partner violence is largely 
the product of patriarchy, with most serious forms o f violence being male perpetrated 
(Brownmiller 1975; DeKeseredy 201 la; DeKeseredy and Dragiewicz 2007; Dobash and 
Dobash 1977, 1979; Ferraro 1988; Johnson 2008, 2011; Koss et al. 1994; Kurz 1989; 
Tjaden and Thoennes 2000; Websdale 1998; Yllo 1990, 1993).
Those perspectives based on the assumption of “gender symmetry” include the 
“family violence school” (e.g. Straus and Gelles 1990) as well as the psychological 
perspective (e.g. Dutton 2006). There are several differences between these two 
perspectives, however, one major point o f congruence is that both see violence between 
intimate partners as gender neutral. In the same sense that there are multiple schools o f 
thought regarding a psychological approach to studying intimate partner violence (see 
note 1), there are numerous feminist theories o f intimate partner violence, or the more
appropriate term- violence against women1. Prior to discussing the specifics o f this 
current research, it is important to note the mounting evidence showing that “intimate 
partner violence” is indeed a gendered phenomenon. While this may seem redundant to 
anyone familiar with the field o f violence against women, it is necessary since a large 
number of researchers and anti-feminists in general continue to ignore, minimize, or 
purposefully misrepresent this research (DeKeseredy 1999, 201 la; Dragiewicz 2011).
Current research clearly shows that intimate partner violence is a gendered 
phenomenon. The National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) found that roughly 
85% of all intimate partner violence involves female victims (Rennison and Welchans 
2000). When women use violence against male partners, it is often in self-defense 
against male-initiated violence or threats of violence (Allen, Swan, and Raghavan 2009; 
Daly and Wilson 1988; Dasgupta 2002; Dobash and Dobash 2004; Hamberger and 
Potente 1994; Saunders 1986; Swan et al. 2008; Walby and Allen 2004). Self-defense 
also applies in some extreme cases where a woman may kill an intimate partner. In these 
cases, women have killed after suffering years o f abuse or in response to immediate lethal 
threats (Browne 1987; Websdale 1999). Within intimate relationships, women are also
1 Terms like this or “wife abuse/assault”, “woman abuse/assault”, “woman battering”, or 
similar concepts are preferred in this dissertation. Generic, gender-neutral terms such as 
“partner abuse”, “family violence”, or “spouse abuse” are inconsistent with reality and 
fail to contextualize men’s use of violence against former or current partners (Bograd 
1990). The actual term “domestic violence”, is used at times when referring to specific 
phrases like the “domestic violence movement” or “domestic violence policing.”
3significantly more likely to be victims of more severe forms o f violence including rape 
and homicide (Dobash and Dobash 1990; Dobash, Dobash, and Cavanagh 2009; Dobash 
et al. 2007; Russell 1990; Stark 2007; Yllo 1990; Websdale 1999) as well as violence 
likely to result in serious injuries (Feder and Henning 2005; Stark and Flitcraft 1991; 
Walker 1979). The violence extends beyond adult relationships. Adolescent girls in 
dating relationships are more likely to experience severe violence both physically and 
emotionally than married or cohabitating adults (Molidor and Tolman 1998).
“Gender symmetry” proponents also utilize narrow definitions of violence that 
fail to capture the various ways that men control, or attempt to control, their partners 
through nonviolent means. This can include threats, intimidation, manipulation, or 
financial control (Johnson 2008; Miller and Smolter 2011; Pence and Paymar 1993; Stark
2007). These nonviolent control measures can affect a victim’s physical and mental 
health (White et al. 2000). In short, a substantial body of empirical research produced 
over the past 40 years shows that “partner violence” is overwhelmingly men’s violence 
against women.
The domestic violence movement o f the 1970s is well known for shifting the 
dominant ideology of domestic violence from a private matter to a social problem 
affecting many that requires significant societal attention (Sherman 1992). Yet the most 
substantive outcome of the domestic violence movement over the past four decades is 
arguably this ideological shift producing more public awareness (Nixon and Humphreys 
2010). Public awareness, however, has not necessarily translated into the safety and 
empowerment of women in regards to their intimate relationships. The main reason for 
this has been a myopic focus on criminal justice interventions regarding violence against
4women. Similar to the largely ineffective criminal justice policies regarding crimes in 
general over the past four decades (see Chambliss 2001; Pratt 2009; Senjoy 2010; Tonry 
1995), domestic violence policies have failed to lead to widespread reductions in men’s 
use of violence and control of their intimate partners. This failure can be linked to weak 
theoretical explanations of violence against women.
Domestic Violence Policy
Prior to the domestic violence movement in the 1970s, domestic violence policy 
could be described as what Lutze and Symons (2003:320) have called, “male privilege 
and the right to discipline.” The violence directed against women during this time period 
was not significantly different from current types of victimization, but law did little to 
protect victims from the abuse suffered at the hands of their male partners. This was the 
era when domestic violence was viewed as a private, non-criminal matter, requiring 
almost no formal interventions (Raphael 2004; Sherman 1992). As support for the 
domestic violence movement grew, pressure from women’s advocates was placed on the 
state to do something to assist the millions o f women victimized by male intimate 
partners. Pressure was also placed on social scientists to develop theoretical and 
empirical studies regarding domestic violence. Eventually, policy makers responded to 
the increased attention given to domestic violence by relying on empirical research and 
political rhetoric.
The major contributing empirical research was the Minneapolis Domestic 
Violence Experiments (MDVE) by Sherman and Berk (1984). Using a quasi- 
experimental research design, these researchers found support for the notion that arresting
domestic batterers significantly reduced the chances of re-offending, more than 
separation or mediation2. The subsequent policies adopted by lawmakers were 
mandatory and pro-arrest policies where officer discretion was largely removed. In most 
cases, police officers were told that they must arrest the primary aggressor when 
responding to domestic violence calls. The goals of these policies were to provide safety 
for women, deter abusers, and reduce victim intimidation by shifting responsibility for 
the arrest decision to the police (Dasgupta 2002; Phillips and Sobol 2010).
Some victim advocates and feminists have been receptive to criminal justice 
policies that hold perpetrators accountable and take domestic violence seriously (see 
Humphries 2002; Stark 2007). After all, one way to empower marginalized groups is 
through formal institutions such as the criminal justice system. However, others argue 
that mandatory arrest and pro-arrest policies are ineffective and should not be considered 
the primary policy for combating violence against women. Specifically, empirical 
research regarding the effectiveness of these policies find that: 1) officers do not always 
make arrests even when they are required to (Avakame and Fyfe 2001; Buzawa and 
Austin 1993; Chesney-Lind 2002; Websdale 1998), 2) they are often ineffective for
2 Despite significant changes in the original research design, subsequent studies were still 
considered “replications” as part of the Spouse Assault Replication Program (SARP) 
(Maxwell, Gamer, and Fagan 2002). These replication studies produced mixed results 
from the original Sherman and Berk research (see Gamer, Fagan, and Maxwell 1995), 
calling into question the original findings regarding the universal effectiveness of arrest 
for cases of wife assault.
6marginalized men who have minimal stakes in conformity (Chesney-Lind 2002; Klein et 
al. 1997; Sherman 1992), 3) they can result in the arrest o f the victim or “dual arrests” 
(DeLeon-Granados, Wells, and Binsbacher 2006; Martin 1997; Miller 2001; Simpson et 
al. 2006), 4) they can lead to further victimization, or “backlash”, if the man’s job suffers 
from the arrest (Buzawa and Buzawa 2003) and 5) they likely will not work without an 
effective court system (Fleury-Steiner et al. 2006; Mills 1998; Ptacek 1999; Stark 1993). 
Despite the research suggesting policies adopting a one-size-fits-all approach of 
mandatory or pro-arrest policies are weak at best, they remain the most significant policy 
response to domestic violence since the movement began in the 1970s (Paterson 2009; 
Dobash and Dobash 2011) as well as the most researched (Belknap et al. 2001; Ptacek 
1999).
It may be ironic to some that the most profound policy since the domestic 
violence movement has been one that relies so heavily on state interventions. After all, 
women and feminists have had legitimate reasons to distrust the state. Thus, for 
ideological reasons regarding the relationship between women and the state and/or the 
continual, widespread amount of violence against women, many researchers have 
reassessed domestic violence policies, especially policies based on mandatory arrest or 
pro-arrest (e.g. Ferraro and Pope 1993; Lutze and Symons 2003; Mills 2003; Peterson
2008). These policies may merely displace rather than alleviate the problem. This 
displacement of the problem is a reactive approach to domestic violence, an inherent 
weakness of any social policy based on deterrence theory.
Other reactive policies that have been given much less attention than policing 
policies (and are focused on change and reform, rather than deterrence) include: batterer
7intervention programs (e.g. Pence and Paymar 1993; Saunders 2008), domestic violence 
fatality reviews (e.g. Websdale 2003), restorative justice (e.g. Gaarder and Presser 2006; 
Presser, Gaarder, and Hesselton 2007; Miller 2011; Ptacek 2010), safety planning (e.g. 
Goodkind, Sullivan, and Bybee 2004) and domestic violence shelters3 (e.g. Lyon, Lane, 
and Menard 2008). These policies and programs, used holistically, offer much more in 
terms of providing safety and empowerment for women than policing strategies alone. 
Yet, no matter how well-intentioned these reactionary policies may be, they do not 
provide proactive solutions that specifically target the incipient factors that are present 
before men use violence against their female partners.
Reactionary policies have been criticized for ignoring the etiology of men’s 
violence against women, yet research noting the exact etiological factors involved has 
been inconclusive. Despite this, the work of many feminist researchers and activists has 
been instrumental in providing a safer world for millions o f women today. The exact 
degree to which these policies have been effective, however, is debatable. Recent reports 
of a decline in intimate violence against women have also been challenged. Whether or 
not one attributes these declines to the women’s movement or shifting demographics (see 
Stark 2007), the amount of violence that remains is still extensive (Belknap and Potter 
2005; Chancer 2004). The policies developed since the domestic violence movement
3 Both safety planning and domestic violence shelters are not entirely reactive. That is, 
they can also be conceptualized as proactive in preventing future abuse. Nonetheless, 
they are still reactive in the sense that they are not utilized until after one has been a 
victim.
8have not led to a widespread or drastic decrease in women’s victimization for various 
reasons. Chief among these is the fact that most feminist researchers and activists have 
operated under a platform that is largely atheoretical (Hunnicutt 2009; Yllo 1993). 
Widespread pro-arrest policies are based on the simplistic theory of deterrence. The 
major problem with these and other “silver bullet solutions” (Mears 2007) to social 
problems is that they are often based on weak theoretical understanding (Barlow 1995; 
Mears 2007; Simon 2007). Blalock (1994) made note of how simplistic theories can be 
used to motivate policy-oriented research, but that they will fail to have strong 
explanatory power across the board. A likely reason for this lies in the fact that the key 
concept in all feminist theories, patriarchy, is often underdeveloped, ignored, simplistic, 
essentialist, or reified in theories of violence against women (Hunnicutt 2009; 
Messerschmidt 1995; Ogle and Batton 2009).
“RESURRECTING PATRIARCHY”
Hunnicutt (2009) challenges feminists to “resurrect” patriarchy in theories of 
violence against women. She notes that past feminists (specifically radical feminists) 
have failed to understand the complex role patriarchy plays in violence against women. 
She is also critical of simplistic applications o f patriarchy as an explanatory concept for 
violence against women. These simplistic explanations assume that all men are powerful 
due to the gender hierarchy and men that engage in violence towards women do so in 
order to maintain their patriarchal positions. Such explanations obviously do not explain 
why all (and in fact, most) men are not violent towards women. They incorrectly assume 
that all men are powerful, ignoring other intersecting inequalities such as race, class, or
9sexual orientation. In short, the simplistic and essentialist explanations of patriarchy in 
the past have led some researchers to challenge feminist explanations o f what they claim 
is a non-gendered phenomena (see Dutton 1994, 2006, 2010; Mills 2003, 2005). These 
critics have attacked feminist perspectives for being based on a “single-causal factor” 
(Straus 2006:1086) in that feminists’ answer to why violence against women exists and 
persists is simply “patriarchy.” These critics are either reducing feminist theories of 
violence against women because o f their own biased agendas or they have incorrectly 
interpreted the feminist perspective. Either way, a brief review of feminist theory should 
dispel these weak interpretations.
In reality, there are a multitude of feminist theories (Chafetz 1997, 2004; Daly 
and Chesney-Lind 1988; Jaggar 1983; Martin 1990; Meyer and Post 2006; Ogle and 
Batton 2009; Tong 2009). There are also many feminist theories o f violence against 
women (DeKeseredy 201 la; O’Neill 1998), including many with stark disagreements.
The commonality amongst the feminist theories lies in the centrality placed on hierarchal 
gender relations (i.e. patriarchy). Thus, patriarchy remains at the forefront o f feminist 
discussions, albeit in different ways depending on the specific feminist theory. For 
example, despite psychological researchers’ critiques of feminist explanations of violence 
against women (e.g. Dutton 2006; 2010) very few feminist researchers assume that 
individual men engaging in violent behavior do so to maintain their patriarchal privilege. 
This type of logic makes the false assumption that all men are benefactors o f patriarchy 
and all women are subordinate victims of patriarchy, thus, what is called the myth of 
patriarchy’s “false universalism” (see Schwartz 1988). The reality is, many men and 
women face subordination both within and outside their familial or intimate settings,
10
particularly lower class individuals and racial minorities (Connell and Messerschmidt 
2005). This type o f false universalism may have been applied by early feminist theorists 
since the relative exclusion of racial minorities and lower-class women from the women’s 
movement was an issue (hooks 2003). Yet feminist scholarship eventually has come to 
understand the “matrix of domination” (Collins 2000) in which race, class, and gender 
can intersect with one another (Danner 1991). Basically, men who hold a considerable 
amount of power in their familial settings often lack any power in other institutions such 
as their places of employment. For example, Websdale’s (1998) ethnography showed 
that although white men in rural Kentucky had almost no power in their daily jobs (in the 
economy), they clearly dominated the lives of the female partners they abused (in the 
family).
In contrast, some men may use violence because they do not dominate in their 
familial settings (Fox 1993; Websdale 2010). In this way, violence is used as an attempt 
to gain power and control over a partner- not as a way of maintaining power and control 
(Websdale 2010). These examples highlight the complexities involved in explaining the 
specific role patriarchy plays in violence against women. The key here is to recognize 
that many feminist perspectives may use patriarchy as an explanatory concept, but not all 
do so as part of a formal theory of violence against women.
Hunnicutt states that her work is not a formal theory o f violence against women, 
nor is it a formal feminist theory. Instead, her work intends to “lay some foundations for 
a more fully developed theory of violence against women” (2009:554). She does this by 
providing five essential components to a theory of violence against women. These are 
summarized as: 1) accounting for the fact that patriarchy is variable across different
cultures, 2) understanding that men’s violence is structural and accounting for the fact 
that different men are marginalized in different ways, 3) accounting for the potential 
divergence between structural conditions and ideological components o f patriarchy, 4) 
understanding other structural forms of oppression in relation to patriarchy (i.e. matrix of 
domination), and 5) understanding that there are “labyrinths of power dynamics in 
patriarchal systems” [emphasis in original], in which power is variable for women and 
men (Hunnicutt 2009:554-555).
It is not the intent of this dissertation to develop a formal theory of violence 
against women. The purpose of this dissertation is to provide a much-needed 
understanding of the ideological components of patriarchy (number 3 above) in relation 
to violence against women. While the goal is not to discourage the development of all 
five of Hunnicutt’s theoretical components, this is a daunting task for one research 
project. Focusing on one of these five components will provide an in-depth 
understanding of this underdeveloped component regarding a theory of violence against 
women. Furthermore, as the following chapters will show, perhaps the least developed 
theoretical component of patriarchy is the ideological one. Before moving on to an 
outline of the whole dissertation, conceptual clarity is needed.
DEFINITIONS
Violence against Women
It is important to clarify the types of “violence against women” addressed in this 
research. The global concept “violence against women” can include many types of
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violence against women such as genocidal rape. However, “violence against women” is 
used throughout this dissertation to refer to various types of relationship violence. Most 
of the previously reviewed literature has focused on domestic violence rather than dating 
violence, but these two concepts overlap. Typically, “dating violence” is conceptualized 
as violence during high school or college, whereas domestic violence is thought to occur 
between married or cohabitating couples. While relationship violence can occur between 
cohabitating couples (married or not), “dating violence” is usually used in the research 
literature to define violence in relationships between young adolescents in high school or 
young adults in college. “Domestic violence” is violence that occurs in more serious 
relationships (e.g. cohabitating, married). These definitions are distinguished largely by 
the seriousness of the relationships involved. This does not mean the most serious 
relationships that have violence always involve the most serious forms of violence.
Overall the two concepts fit within the same general theoretical framework and can often 
be used interchangeably. However, important distinctions should not go unnoticed.
There are two important distinctions between dating violence and domestic 
violence. First, dating violence occurs frequently enough and can produce many negative 
outcomes that although there is evidence to suggest it serves as a precursor to domestic 
violence, it still warrants attention as a significant social problem by itself. Second, there 
is evidence to suggest that relationship violence against women occurs on a continuum 
where many cases of domestic violence are preceded by dating violence that occurs 
earlier in one’s life. In short, dating violence and domestic violence can both be 
researched as unique social problems, but both occur within the broader context of
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violence against women, with dating violence often acting as a precursor to domestic 
violence.
It should be noted that researchers that focus primarily on “dating violence” are 
much more likely to adopt “gender symmetry” arguments, framing the issue as a problem 
with young people rather than a problem perpetrated by boys and young men (Reed et al. 
2010). Amongst non-cohabitating dating partners, the National Violence against Women 
Survey (NVAW) found women were more likely than men to be victims of physical 
aggression, forced sex, and stalking (Slashinski, Coker, and Davis 2003). Research from 
Molidor and Tolman (1998) found frequencies o f violence between male and female 
dating partners to be similar, yet they discovered consistencies with the NVAW in that 
women’s victimization was much more severe. Not all research in this area supports the 
“gender symmetry” frame, but many focus on specific psychological correlates o f young 
boys’ violence (e.g. Boivin et al. 2012; Foshee, Reyes, and Ennett 2010), in a way that 
decontextualizes the violence. This is because the psychological factors are often not 
contextualized within a system o f gender stratification.
A plethora of studies have found that dating violence, like domestic violence, is 
gendered (for a review see Jackson 1999), and those that claim “gender symmetry” in 
dating violence are using the same de-contextualized measures of violent acts as the 
family violence school (Slashinski et al. 2003). In a study from Bethke and Dejoy 
(1993), a sample of college students viewed men’s use of violence as much more 
consequential than women’s use of violence. Thus, the individuals that are likely to be in 
dating relationships do recognize the different degrees of seriousness when it comes to 
male perpetrated vs. female perpetrated dating violence.
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There are many negative consequences girls and women face as a result o f their 
victimization in dating relationships. Some researchers have found negative 
psychological outcomes (i.e. post-traumatic stress, dissociation) for young girls (13-19) 
as they experienced increased levels of dating violence (Callahan, Tolman, and Saunders 
2003). Others have discovered links between dating violence victimization and post- 
traumatic stress disorder and depression (Wolitzky-Taylor et al. 2008). Many similarities 
between dating and domestic violence are found regarding types of intimate partner abuse 
used by violent male adolescents (Crooks et al. 2011). One extreme (although atypical) 
difference is that serious dating relationships are often at a greater risk of intimate partner 
homicide than married couples (Dobash et al. 2009). Overall, dating violence shares 
many similarities with domestic violence regarding the frequency and seriousness of the 
violence.
Many studies have found that adulthood domestic violence is often preceded by 
adolescent dating violence (for a review see Shorey, Cornelius, and Bell 2008; see also 
Slashinski et al. 2003). Data collected from a college sample found women that 
experienced dating violence in high school were more likely to be victimized in college 
than women that did not experience high school dating violence (Smith, White, and 
Holland 2003). Also, adolescent dating violence can occur within the context o f ongoing 
child abuse for both victims and perpetrators. More specifically, Laporte et al. (2011) 
found that young women victimized in adolescent dating relationships often have had 
abusive parents and some young men that perpetrated violence experienced violent 
discipline from their fathers.
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In short, “violence against women” is used throughout this dissertation to refer to 
relationship violence against women. Compared to domestic violence, dating violence 
often involves less serious forms of relationship violence between less serious couples 
(usually adolescents or young adults). Although dating violence is a social problem in 
and of itself, theories of violence against women should note that dating violence is often 
a precursor to domestic violence. The data used in this research comes from a sample of 
college students, whose experiences are most likely limited to dating violence. However, 
their patriarchal ideology is measured from items related to domestic violence.
Patriarchy
Literal definitions of patriarchy state that it is a system where the father is the 
head of the household. However, patriarchy as a social concept has been defined by 
social scientists in far different ways. These definitions are much more descriptive than 
the literal translation but there remains a large amount o f variation in the literature in 
regards to patriarchy’s meaning (Barrett 1988; Fox 1988; Gonzalez et al. 2010; Hunnicutt 
2009; Stacey 1993). This lack of a clear definition has limited theoretical developments 
related to patriarchy (especially in criminology, see Ogle and Batton 2009). When 
defined, patriarchy is sometimes defined too simplistically (Barrett 1988). In order to 
develop patriarchy as a theory at any level, it is important to use a holistic definition that 
is explicit and meticulous.
There is no doubt that patriarchy is a system in the same way that capitalism and 
racism are systems. A system where men dominate and control women has never had an 
equal counterpart in history where women dominated and controlled men (Crane-Seeber
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and Crane 2010; Eller 2000). Even anthropological research that notes a pre-history of
matriarchal societies (what Cynthia Eller, 2000, calls a “myth”) appears to really be
describing matrilineal societies. These societies are ordered around female kinship and
female decision-making but female dominance over men is lacking (Figes 1986).
Uncertainty concerning the history and definition of patriarchy has led to many that use
the term in such a general sense “it is redolent of a universal and trans-historical
oppression” (Barrett 1988:14). Chafetz (1994) notes that unclear constructs and concepts
have further complicated sociologists’ use of the term patriarchy.
Various feminist theorists use the term ‘patriarchy’ to refer to ideology (secular 
and/or religious), to properties of the family, economy or polity, or to some 
combination thereof. Because the term has entered the popular feminist idiom, it 
has been rendered even more broad and vague than might otherwise have been the 
case. Clearly, it is heavily laden with ideological and pejorative meaning. To the 
extent that it refers to more than one of the several institutions listed above, it is 
truth-asserting. [...] ‘Patriarchy’ refers to an abstract property distilled from 
human behaviors and utterances. It is therefore reification to use any active verb 
with it. Yet throughout the gender literature one finds patriarchy ‘requiring,’ 
‘producing,’ ‘creating,’ ‘causing,’ ‘needing,’ ‘encouraging,’ and so on. In this 
way, it sounds like a profound explanation is being offered when in fact nothing 
concrete is being uttered. (Chafetz 1994:144)
Often, it appears, social scientists have used the term patriarchy in such a general, vague,
and undefined manner that it is presented as a system that is omnipresent, influencing
anything and everything. If this is the case, then patriarchy is an invariant concept that
explains nothing. Many problems arise when viewing patriarchy as only a system.
Failing to see that patriarchy is not just social or structural, but that it also has ideological
components has been the shortcoming of many feminist conceptualizations in the past
(Fox 1988).
There are, however, feminist researchers that have found patriarchy to vary in a 
variety of ways and they have contributed to a clearer understanding both conceptually
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and theoretically. A useful conceptualization will provide a term that accurately 
describes the domination of women by men (Stacey 1993). Specific to a theory of 
violence against women, an accurate conceptualization will help explain the origins and 
persistence of violence against women.
Hunnicutt (2009) provides one of the more inclusive and precise (as well as 
current) definitions of patriarchy, which will be used for this dissertation. She states 
that„”[...] it means social arrangements that privilege males, where men as a group 
dominate women as a group, both structurally and ideologically-hierarchical 
arrangements that manifest in varieties across history and social space” (557). This 
definition is similar to others that have noted that patriarchy is not static (Beechey 1979; 
Chafetz 2004; Fox 1988; Pateman 1988, 1989; Walby 1990; Zajicek and Calasanti 1998). 
Hunnicutt goes on to note that there are variants to patriarchy that exist at the structural 
level, called social patriarchy, and the private domain, called familial patriarchy 
(discussed below). Perhaps the most crucial component of Hunnicutt’s definition for 
future theoretical developments is that it acknowledges male privilege and male 
domination exist institutionally and ideologically (see also Dobash and Dobash 1979;
Fox 1988; Grana 2010). In this dissertation, I argue that the ideological component of 
patriarchy is one of the least understood and least developed components of patriarchy in 
regards to a theory of violence against women.
Dichotomies o f Patriarchy. Patriarchy is often conceptualized to have two major 
components. The first is usually called either public patriarchy or social patriarchy. The 
second is usually referred to as private patriarchy or familial patriarchy. Some have 
used all of these terms as four distinct concepts (Dobash and Dobash 1979), but Hearn
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(1992) considers public patriarchy and social patriarchy to be similar concepts as well as 
private patriarchy and familial patriarchy. In the literature, public patriarchy/social 
patriarchy is typically conceptualized to mean patriarchy within organizations or 
institutions whereas private patriarchy and familial patriarchy exist within domestic 
settings (see Dobash and Dobash 1979; Hearn 1992; Walby 1990). At times it is 
acceptable to substitute these terms with one another, but there is some confusion when 
researchers use them. The major confusion lies in the fact that public/social patriarchies 
exist in “institutions”, yet the family is a social institution. Specificity is needed. For the 
current project, public patriarchy/social patriarchy refers to patriarchy within institutions 
outside of the family. However, these terms are avoided. The broader issue with these 
four concepts is that they create distinct divisions between the family and other social 
institutions. While this may be useful at times, it contributes to the false perception o f the 
family as an autonomous unit outside of other social institutions. While Chapter 2 
discusses this in more depth, for now, it should be noted that the family is a social 
institution and conceptualizations of private and public forms of patriarchy should be 
used having an understanding that they cannot be easily separated from one another. 
Moreover, these varieties of patriarchy are mutually reinforcing (Chowdhury 2009; 
DeKeseredy 201 la; DeKeseredy and Schwartz 2009; Hearn 1992; Smith 1990).
Institutional Patriarchy. The concept institutional patriarchy is used throughout 
and is broader than the terms social patriarchy or public patriarchy. It refers to the 
macro-level forms of organized patriarchy in all social institutions, including the family. 
Hence, familial patriarchy is also present under this broader rubric of institutional 
patriarchy. This conceptualization of institutional patriarchy does not negate the
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importance of distinguishing between familial and social patriarchy. However, 
dichotomized terms like public patriarchy/private patriarchy and social 
patriarchy/familial patriarchy can be perceived as supporting the bifurcated view of 
“separate spheres” (Ferree 1990). The current concept o f institutional patriarchy notes 
macro-level forms of male domination regarding the five major social institutions, 
including the family. The idea behind separate spheres is that the family is separate from 
broader social institutions, free from their influence. Instead, institutional patriarchy 
acknowledges that structural patriarchy operates within and between social institutions, 
reinforcing wide-scale male domination (Epstein 2007). Chapter 2 notes the varying 
ways in which male dominated social institutions reinforce patriarchy through various 
practices (e.g. criminal justice laws, subjective equal employment legislation). Outside 
of these institutional actions, there is an ideological component of patriarchy that exists 
structurally and individually.
Institutional and Individual Patriarchal Ideology
Patriarchal ideology was first introduced by Kate Millett (1970). Millet saw 
patriarchal ideology as the justification for societal-wide male domination. She believed 
that the etiology of patriarchal ideology was rooted in the family. She argued that these 
ideologies were important to the overall sustainability of societal patriarchy. Most 
importantly, Millett and others have discussed how changes in societal patriarchy can 
occur with little to no change in the ideological component o f patriarchy or other micro­
level variables concerning gender equality (Ferraro 1988; Hunnicutt 2009; Meyer and 
Post 2006; York 2011). Clarity in the use of the term “patriarchal ideology” in this
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dissertation, from this point forward, is needed. The first point of clarification is that 
patriarchal ideology used throughout refers to individual-level ideology. Second, 
specification is needed in that patriarchal ideology is a specific to patriarchal ideology 
about violence against women.
Regarding the use of patriarchal ideology as an individual-level concept, it is 
important to note that this can include individual attitudes, beliefs, and values. This is not 
to suggest that social institutions do not or are unable to have ideologies, let alone 
patriarchal ones. For example, Belcher (1997:62-63) discusses “The Maleness of 
Organizational Life” in which companies as well as the law operate a male value system. 
Similarly, Acker (1990, 1992) shows how “gendered organizations” create symbolic 
images regarding ideal types of men and women and these male-dominated organizations 
work to reproduce these images over time. But it is also important to note that these 
“images” can be preexisting and their exact origins could come from sources outside of 
singular organizations (Acker 1990, 1992; Britton 2003).
Despite the fact that various institutions themselves can hold certain ideologies, 
patriarchal ideology and the micro/macro distinction is best understood through an 
understanding of Gramsci’s (1971) concept of hegemony. Hegemony can help explain 
institutional patriarchy, which often contextualizes individual-level patriarchal ideology. 
Moreover, an explanation of hegemony will help in understanding how patriarchy is 
maintained at the institutional level.
The term hegemony was used by Gramsci when analyzing the historical 
contingencies of the state (i.e. “political society”). Gramsci (1971:14) notes that the state 
comes into power and maintains its power over social groups (i.e. “civil society”) in two
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ways: direct coercion (i.e. “direct domination”) and through hegemony. Put simply,
through hard power and soft power. Hegemony involves, “internal control” and this:
[...] refers to an order in which a common social moral language is spoken, in 
which one concept of reality is dominant, informing with its spirit all modes of 
thought and behaviour. It follows that hegemony is the predominance obtained 
by consent rather than force of one class or group over other classes. And 
whereas ‘domination’ is realized, essentially, through the coercive machinery of 
the state, ‘intellectual and moral leadership is objectified in, and mainly exercised 
through ‘civil society’, the ensemble of educational, religious and associational 
institutions. Hegemony is attained through the myriad ways in which the 
institutions of civil society operate to shape, directly or indirectly, the cognitive 
and affective structures whereby men perceive and evaluate the problematic social 
reality, [emphasis in original] (Femia 1981:24)
Hegemony can comprise ideologies, norms, or different modes of socialization. It should
not be reduced to just ideology (Buci-Glucksmann 1982). The point is that patriarchal
ideology should not be thought of strictly in terms of some sort of patriarchal hegemony
or hegemonic patriarchy that is entirely structural. While Gramsci uses the term
hegemony primarily to discuss dominant ideologies, he does this by focusing primarily
on how social institutions play a role in developing, legitimizing, and maintaining these
ideologies. Thus, Chapter 2 discusses patriarchy and social institutions but more
importantly, it discusses the hegemonic nature of these social institutions when it comes
to their patriarchal character. The macro-level patriarchal ideology is embedded into
multiple social institutions and is called institutional patriarchal ideology. These
ideologies operate to maintain the dominance of these institutions.
It is also important to discuss various concepts that refer to male cultural values
and beliefs (also called cultural scripts). In Heise’s (1998) ecological theory, she
conceptualizes cultural values related to men’s violence against women (e.g. male
supremacy, dominance, male honor) as “macrosystem factors.” It is important to note
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that these cultural values or cultural scripts are embedded into social institutions. This 
does not mean, however, that every man will adopt these scripts at the individual-level.
A focus on ideologies solely at the institutional level might lead to simplistic 
understandings of micro-level ideologies. The focus on individual ideology and not 
culturally-based or institutionally-based patriarchal ideology avoids conceptualizations of 
the concept in a top-down, structurally deterministic way.
The specification of patriarchal ideology regarding violence against women is 
necessary. Referring to patriarchal ideology in the manner Millett (1970) did may be 
useful if one were interested in individual’s rationalizations of male dominance in 
general, which clearly relates to violence against women. However, the connections 
between this broader concept of patriarchal ideology and violence against women are 
very indirect and may be difficult for one empirical study to uncover. In Chapter 3, 
Smith’s (1990) definition of patriarchal ideology is used. He distinguished between 
patriarchal beliefs and patriarchal attitudes. Essentially, both center on male dominance 
in the family with the latter supportive of the use o f violence against women that 
violate/challenge an individual man’s ideal authority. In short, patriarchal ideology may 
be explored in future research studies interested in male dominance in general and not 
specifically male violence. My focus on violence against women means that from this 
point forward, patriarchal ideology is used to refer to patriarchal ideology about violence 
against women.
M en’s Individual Patriarchal Ideology. The current research focuses solely on 
the patriarchal ideology of men. This does not imply that women do not or cannot have a 
patriarchal ideology, nor does this suggest that their ideologies are unimportant.
23
However, for a theory of violence against women, understanding men’s patriarchal 
ideologies separately is crucial. Since men comprise the dominant group in society, 
focusing on their ideologies should hopefully help in understanding ways these 
ideologies change. Additionally, most of the early research on violence against women 
has focused almost exclusively on victims (Dobash and Dobash 2011). While the 
insights gained from women as advocates and victims have been extremely beneficial, 
the dearth of research focusing on men’s actions and ideologies give further evidence for 
the narrowness of past research and theories o f violence against women.
PURPOSE OF DISSERTATION
This dissertation addresses Hunnicutt’s (2009) call for feminist theories of 
violence against women to bring back the concept of patriarchy and use it as a theoretical 
tool. It also responds to challenges presented by Ogle and Batton (2009) to show the 
utility of patriarchy as a useful concept for criminologists. Research on patriarchal 
ideology has often been plagued with poor conceptualizations and operationalizations 
and/or has taken the concept for granted as a static independent variable. This study uses 
feminist conceptualizations of patriarchal ideology with consistent operationalizations of 
this concept. It also treats patriarchal ideology as a dependent variable in order to assess 
the micro-level origins and changes related to it. The careful attention given to 
patriarchal ideology will expand our understanding of its place in a larger theory of 
violence against women. The goals of this dissertation are summarized as follows:
1) To accurately conceptualize patriarchal ideology.
2) To explore the reliability o f operational measures o f patriarchal ideology.
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3) To investigate potential etiological variables related to patriarchal ideology.
4) To better understand how patriarchal ideology changes over time.
5) To uncover how patriarchal ideology fits in feminist theories of violence 
against women.
6) To consider potential social policies that might effectively target patriarchal 
ideologies.
Although Chafetz (2004:964) states, “The goal of the social and behavioral 
sciences is to develop explanations (theories) [...]” this should not be the primary focus of 
research. Responding to this quote from Chafetz, Baber (2004:979) more accurately 
noted that social scientists should use theory to guide scholarly work, but from that point, 
the goal should be, “improving the opportunities and well-being of women and other 
silenced groups.”
DISSERTATION OUTLINE
Chapter 2 focuses on institutional patriarchy. Specifically, it shows how 
patriarchy is widespread in the major social institutions of society, so much that they can 
be described as patriarchal institutions. This helps show how violence against women is 
part of the broader gender hierarchy while also helping to show the various actions 
regarding the maintenance and reinforcement of institutional patriarchy. Chapter 3 
begins with a review of some social science concepts that relate to patriarchal ideology.
A brief discussion of the “gender symmetry” researchers that claim patriarchal ideology 
is irrelevant in explaining domestic violence is discussed. These perspectives are easily 
discredited and dismissed. The argument is then made that patriarchal ideology is
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important in explaining violence against women, especially when conceptualized in ways 
these critics have failed to consider. Moreover, the argument is made that their direct 
predictive power in explaining individual men’s violence is less important than their 
overall presence as a reflection of male culture. There are two major analyses performed. 
Chapter 4 provides the methodology for the first major analyses (results in Chapter 5) 
assessing attitudinal measures of patriarchal ideology with two-wave panel data. Chapter 
6 describes the methodology for analyses that use the same original data source described 
in Chapter 4, but uses latent growth curve modeling over three waves of data, while 
operationalizing patriarchal ideology with vignettes (with results in Chapter 7). The final 
chapter, Chapter 8, includes a discussion of the findings from the two major analyses 
using a holistic approach.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has provided a broad overview of the gendered nature of violence 
against women that is rooted in patriarchy. The increased attention placed on violence 
against women since the domestic violence movement has been remarkable, but current 
levels of violence against women likely indicate a stalled revolution (Stark 2007). For 
too long researchers have accepted simplistic theoretical explanations for violence against 
women. Hunnicutt (2009) argues that feminist theories of violence against women can be 
reinvigorated through a better understanding of patriarchy. Specifically, individual 
patriarchal ideology is one of the most underutilized and least understood aspects of 
patriarchy in a theory of violence against women.
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CHAPTER II
INSTITUTIONAL PATRIARCHY AND INSTITUTIONAL PATRIARCHAL
IDEOLOGY
“A theory of violence against women has to account for varieties in patriarchal 
structures.” [emphasis in original] (Hunnicutt 2009:554)
PATRIARCHY AS A THEORY
While this dissertation follows Hunnicutt’s lead and uses patriarchy as a 
“theoretical tool” or as a “theoretical concept”, this current work is not a formal theory of 
patriarchy or a formal theory of violence against women. Theories o f patriarchy are 
fairly rare. Instead, it is feminist theories that prioritize patriarchy. A discussion of the 
work of Walby (1990) shows some of the ways patriarchy has been used as a theoretical 
concept.
One of the earliest attempts to theorize patriarchy came from Walby’s (1990)
book, Theorizing Patriarchy. Walby claimed that patriarchy is composed of six main
structures: women’s unpaid household work, women’s paid work, the patriarchal state,
male violence, sexuality, and cultural institutions. Most notably, she made the distinction
between private and public forms of patriarchy.
Private patriarchy is based upon household production, with a patriarch 
controlling women individually and directly in the relatively private sphere o f the 
home. Public patriarchy is based on structures other than the household, although 
this may still be a significant patriarchal site. Rather, institutions conventionally 
regarded as part of the public domain are central in the maintenance of patriarchy. 
(Walby 1990:178)
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Walby provided excellent historical and current, for its time, accounts of patriarchy’s 
many manifestations. Unfortunately, her work falls short as a practical, formal theory of 
patriarchy that could be used in explaining violence against women for two main reasons. 
First, Walby failed to pose theoretical questions. She also failed to provide clearly 
defined concepts related to social institutions. These two central problems with formal 
theory construction exist within all o f “gender sociology” (Chafetz 1994).
Walby’s research question is unclear in her work'. She merely provided a rich 
context of useful examples of patriarchal practices throughout her six structures of 
patriarchy, yet often relied on existing feminist theories for explanations. For example, 
she did pose questions at the beginning of her chapter on paid employment regarding why 
women earn less than men, why women are excluded from certain jobs, and why women 
are excluded from paid work more than men. Her answer to all of these questions in 
regards to the economy is that after first-wave feminism gave women the right to work, 
the historical years of patriarchy at the hands of their husbands (private patriarchy) was 
replaced by a new form of oppression (public patriarchy) in economic institutions. The 
private/public shift explanation is confusing when applied to other “structures”, 
especially violence against women. Walby described how first-wave feminists were
1 While not all research requires formally stated research questions (e.g. this dissertation 
does not), they should at least state what it is they are trying to better understand (e.g. the 
goals laid-out in Chapter 1 of this dissertation). Because of this, the chapters in which 
Walby does not pose questions or goals are unclear regarding what theoretical 
propositions/assumptions she is attempting to address.
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influential in bringing violence against women to the forefront of the state where it could 
no longer be seen as a private matter (see also Sherman 1992). The explanation, again, is 
that patriarchy shifts from private patriarchy produced by violent men to public 
patriarchy where the state (which is patriarchal) is called on to protect women. When 
Walby’s work first came out in 1990, it was not clear whether or not this shift was going 
to be a positive change for women (Walby frames it as negative). Even after Walby’s 
work, it is unclear how the public to private shift in patriarchy should be viewed. Some 
have argued state intervention in domestic violence is beneficial for victims (Mirchandani 
2006; Sherman and Berk 1984; Stark 1993, 2007) while others disagree (Presser et al. 
2007). The question Walby’s theory is fit to answer is unclear regarding her “structure” 
of patriarchy- violence. Is it, “what causes violence against women?” If so, her answer 
appears to be her thesis throughout the book: the shift from private forms of patriarchy in 
the family to public forms of patriarchy in the economy. The problem is violence within 
intimate settings is inherently a form of private patriarchy, in the same way male partners 
and fathers that control a family’s finances is. Because of this, it is confusing to explain 
violence against women as a social problem that results from the shift from private to 
public patriarchy.
Another shortcoming of Walby’s work lies in the obscurity and confusion 
surrounding her definition of the structures of patriarchy. Three of her six structures, or 
what one reviewer of her book calls “practices” o f patriarchy (Maynard 1992:311) are 
directly related to social institutions: the economy (“paid work”), polity (“the state”), and 
the family (“house work”). She then attempted to explain the other components of 
patriarchy (i.e. “violence against women”, “culture”, “sexuality”). If she developed her
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“theory” as an explanation for the existence or persistence o f patriarchy at the macro­
level as well as those at the interactional level, her theory might suffice. Unfortunately, 
her work reads as examples o f how some institutions are patriarchal, followed by 
examples of patriarchal practices. This is related to critiques from Jaggar (1983) about 
radical feminists’ inability to differentiate between “description and explanation”
(Sprague and Zimmerman 1989:79).
The unclear nature of Walby’s six main concepts, however, should not distract 
from the significance of her book for future theoretical developments of patriarchy. Her 
discussion of the historical shift from private to public patriarchy is extremely important 
in noting the various levels of patriarchy and how these shifts have shaped (and continue 
to shape) social institutions. A formal theory of patriarchy can build on Walby’s work in 
developing structural concepts of patriarchy and historical shifts within them, which can 
also lead to a better understanding of ideological changes (see Stacey 1993 for similar 
criticisms).
Walby’s public patriarchy and private patriarchy overlap considerably with the 
terms social patriarchy and familial patriarchy. To better understand both social and 
familial patriarchy, we must consider how each variety of patriarchy operates separately 
but keep in mind that they are mutually reinforcing (Chowdhury 2009; DeKeseredy 
201 la; DeKeseredy and Schwartz 2009; Ferree 1990; Hearn 1992; Smith 1990). Because 
of this, the concept institutional patriarchy was introduced in Chapter 1 to describe 
institutional forms of patriarchy within and between social institutions. The “varieties of 
patriarchal structures” that Hunnicutt (2009) mentioned can be further explored in future 
formal theories of patriarchy at the macro-level. What follows is not an exhaustive
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description of each form of institutional patriarchy, but is used to demonstrate some 
examples of their variations and their interactions. Such examples should help 
contextualize the individual-level concepts of patriarchal ideology.
INSTITUTIONAL PATRIARCHY
Dominant and Subordinate Institutions: Contextualizing Patriarchies
Since patriarchy presents itself in all social institutions (Acker 1992; Britton 
2003; Danner 1991; Johnson 1997), institutional patriarchy is best understood using the 
institutional taxonomies of C. Wright Mills. Wozniak (2009) summarized the major 
works of Mills (1956, 1959) to describe Mills’ societal institutions. These are the 
“dominant institutions” (i.e. the economy, political order, and the military order) as well 
as the “subordinate institutions” of society (i.e. the family, education, religion, and mass 
media). A review of the literature will show the many manifestations o f institutional 
patriarchy, but first the classifications used by Mills must be abbreviated and clarified.
Although the military has been shown to be a patriarchal institution (Hopton 
2003; Howard and Prividera 2004), researchers have made convincing arguments to not 
include it as one of the dominant institutions in sociology. Domhoff (2006) shows how 
large corporations have taken over the role of defense contractors and the military should 
be considered subordinate to the corporate community (i.e. the economy). Similarly, 
Scimecca (1995) argues that the military is also a subsidiary social institution but that it is 
encompassed under the government (i.e. polity). Regardless of which dominant 
institution claims the military or how patriarchal it may be, it is no longer a dominant 
institution in the way Mills considered it during his time.
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Mass media is also not considered a social institution in this current work. The 
media has been shown to be patriarchal (e.g. Carmody 1998; Meloy and Miller 2009; 
Websdale 1996), but its close relationship to dominant institutions (i.e. economics and 
polity) make it more a manifestation of these two institutions (Cushion and Lewis 2009; 
Esser 2008; Hickey 1998). It appears that the primary, dominant institutions to focus on 
for understanding institutional patriarchy and institutional patriarchal ideologies are the 
economy and politics.
Mills’ “subordinate institutions” for this dissertation are reduced to the family, 
religion, and education with the utmost attention given to the family. Although education 
and religion may indeed operate as independent institutions, the evidence related to 
patriarchy shows them to have tremendous overlap with the primary institutions of the 
economy and politics. Keep in mind that such a conceptualization does not treat familial 
patriarchy as “separate” from other social institutions. Lastly, clarification on the naming 
of one institution is needed. Throughout this research, the dominant institution Mills 
referred to as the “political order” and others as “politics” will be referred to as polity. 
Polity usually implies the organizational structure, whereas politics involves the social 
interactions related to polity. With that, it should also be mentioned that the duality of 
socialist feminism is used in primarily focusing on the economy and the family, but does 
not imply these are the only societal institutions that relate to patriarchy.
In short, the two dominant institutions discussed in relation to institutional 
patriarchy are the economy and polity. Understanding how patriarchy operates through 
social institutions helps in understanding individual patriarchal ideology (see Chapter 3). 
The following sections focus primarily on past socialist feminist theories that have given
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the utmost attention to the economy and the family. These two social institutions fit 
nicely with previous conceptualizations of patriarchy that emphasize connections 
between public and private patriarchy. The importance of education and religion are 
briefly discussed. The former is discussed primarily in relation to the economy and the 
latter, primarily in relation to the family. The discussion on institutional patriarchal 
ideology is provided to highlight the fact that ideology can be embedded into social 
institutions. These examples will show how institutional patriarchal ideology is 
important to study further, but they often manifest themselves as descriptions of these 
institutions. That is, they are embedded into the culture of the institutions, making them 
difficult to conceptualize and operationalize. Related to this, it is often difficult to 
conceive of structures as having ideological components. This closely falls into the trap 
of reifying the term “institutional patriarchal ideology.” Nonetheless, they are briefly 
mentioned in acknowledging that individual patriarchal ideology might be contextualized 
within larger structural ideologies but individual agency is assumed to have the greatest 
influence on individual ideologies.
Institutional Patriarchy and the Economy
Institutional patriarchy operates within the economy at various levels. Tilly
(1998) and later Massey (2007) explained how stratification is generated and maintained 
through exploitation and opportunity hoarding. The aforementioned definition of 
patriarchy references male domination of women. When referring to this domination in 
regards to the economy, one can substitute male domination with male exploitation, a 
term that implies material interests (Wright 1984).
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Exploitation. The exploitation of women in the economy is clearly reflected in 
wage differentials between men and women. Even after the first wave of feminism, 
women were almost entirely excluded from the paid workforce. However, with the 
progressive second wave of feminism, women gained some ground in regards to their 
employment status and income relative to men. Despite these changes, disparities still 
remain. Wage differentials exist for women that work the same jobs as men, even in the 
instances that women hold prestigious positions (Shin 2012). What is more alarming is 
the little ground that women appear to have gained since the second wave of feminism 
may actually be the result of men’s wages decreasing during this time period (Massey 
2007). Although access into the economy has been difficult to say the least, wage 
differentials have been a staple of gender stratification in the economy.
Other institutions (i.e. polity) have been used to address women’s exploitation in 
the economy. The Equal Pay Act of 1963 set out to eliminate the exploitation of 
women’s work by making it a requirement, by law, for employers to pay women the 
same wages as men for the same exact work. This legislation has failed to combat 
patriarchal exploitation in the economy due in large part to large-scale ideologies on the 
relative value of men and women as workers. Thus, the legislation allows for 
discrimination against women in regards to wages based on “seniority, merit, differences 
in quantity or quality of production, and ‘a differential based on any other factor other 
than sex’” (Bacchi 1999:78). The first three variables allow for discrimination since men 
have far more opportunities to accumulate seniority, merit, and higher amounts o f work 
at higher qualities. Other “differentials” outside o f sex is such vague terminology that it 
makes legal cases involving discrimination difficult to win (Burstein 1979). Blau and
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Ferber (1992) along with Blau and Kahn (2004) have shown compelling evidence to 
suggest gender wage disparities are the result o f discrimination (not the lack of qualified 
women) since wage differentials remain after controlling for important variables such as 
education, experience, and job location. Related to this, Coleman (2003) noted that 
blatant racial wage discrimination is a stronger predictor o f wage differentials than job- 
skill disparities. It is reasonable to assume that gender and racial discrimination continue 
to be strong determinants of wage differentials and that this is widespread, rather than the 
result of just a few prejudiced individuals. Case in point, as recently as March 2011, 
women in the United States still earn around 75% of what men do (Jansen 2011).
The wage differences have been even greater for black women compared to white 
women. This is partially due to the exclusion of black women from the early women’s 
movement (Collins 2000; Stark 2007). The early women’s movement was myopic in 
regards to women in the paid workforce and incorrectly assumed the social status of all 
women was the same (hooks 2000). When this middle-class, white women’s movement 
urged women to “get to work”, many black women were excluded. This was due to the 
fact that black women had been historically exploited for cheap labor and were already 
working, albeit for low wages. After the civil rights and women’s rights movements, 
however, little ground may have been gained for black women’s wages. This is reflected 
in recent research reporting that since the 1980s, the gap between black women’s wages 
compared to white women’s wages has widened significantly (Pettit and Ewert 2009).
Opportunity Hoarding. Institutional patriarchy in the economy also occurs 
through opportunity hoarding (Massey 2007; Tilly 1998). The wage differentials 
mentioned should be alarming, but it cannot be emphasized enough that this form of
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exploitation occurs when women do the same jobs as men- something that rarely takes 
place (Acker 2006; Hesse-Biber, Nagy, and Carter 2000; Petersen and Morgan 1995). 
Prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and subsequent executive orders in 1965 and 1967 
(Albelda, Drago, and Shulman 2004), women had been discriminated against in the 
economy since industrialization through outright exclusion (Fox and Fox 1986; Hartmann 
1979). Since the second-wave of feminism, exclusion has remained regarding prestigious 
positions.
Denying women access to jobs, especially prestigious ones, is a common practice 
of economic institutions. Some researchers have argued that women’s denied access to 
power and decision-making within the family transfers to the paid workforce (Kanter 
1977; Messerschmidt 1986) a point emphasized further in the section regarding familial 
patriarchy2. Thus, women are almost entirely excluded from positions of worth, and this 
is especially the case for women of color (Wilensky 1968; Zweigenhaft and Domhoff 
1998) as well as for mothers (Benard and Correll 2010). Prestigious positions are 
redefined as ubiquitously male in that they require masculine characteristics. Successful 
companies are defined by how male they are. Even if women do somehow gain entrance 
into positions of power within these companies, they are still expected to act in a manner
2 This relationship has also been hypothesized reciprocally in that as women’s entrance 
into the paid workforce increased along with the entrance into higher paying jobs, this 
would translate into more decision making within the family. However, Tichenor (2005) 
has found through her qualitative research that even women making significantly higher 
wages are less likely to make decisions within the family or control familial finances.
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consistent with being male or masculine (Cockbum 1991; Kanter 1977; Wajcman 1998). 
In the rare exception that women do obtain membership on corporate boards, they are 
usually placed on committees dealing with “soft governance issues” whereas men are 
typically dealing with “hard governance issues” (Bilimoria and Piderit 1994:1465).
These patriarchal institutions resist promoting or hiring females, with the exception of a 
few token individuals, and they justify their discriminatory actions by claiming they are 
in the best interests of their shareholders3 (Belcher 1997). Equal opportunity legislation 
has failed to level the playing field regarding opportunities since the practices by men 
involve adaptively devaluing women’s work (Hartmann 1979; Reskin 1988).
Previously it was noted that polity can be used to institutionally combat economic 
exclusion and discrimination (e.g. Equal Pay Act). Education is seen by some as another 
institutional equalizer (Codd 1988). One can see the obvious issue, however, with 
encouraging women into education if  this institution itself is patriarchal. Despite decades 
of harsh patriarchal practices in education (e.g. outright exclusion, curriculums aimed at 
helping them be “better wives”), the passage of Title IX in 1972 helped women 
tremendously (Grana 2010). As the previous section showed, however, education has not 
been the great equalizer. One reason for this lies in the areas of study women typically 
“choose.” Thus, women are typically discouraged from joining “male fields” o f study 
such as engineering, medicine, or law. This is reflected in data showing that although 
women’s enrollments in college have increased, during the academic year 1996-1997
3 As a result, challenges to these practices are seen as impeding with the ffee-market o f 
capitalism.
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women’s percentages in the following traditionally male fields were: law (44%), 
medicine (41%), dentistry (37%), physical science (37%), computer science (27%), and 
engineering (17%) (United States General Accounting Office 2000:11). More direct 
forms of patriarchy in education are seen in the research on violence against college 
women.
Koss, Gidycz, and Wisniewski (1987:166) discovered through a nationally 
representative survey of more than 3,000 U.S. college women that more than half 
(53.7%) had experienced some form of sexual victimization. DeKeseredy and Kelly 
(1993a:148) found that among female Canadian college students, almost half (45.1%) 
had been victimized since high school. There is no doubt that the prevalence of male 
violence towards women in such large numbers is evidence enough of direct patriarchal 
practices by individual men, but the response to the violence from educational institutions 
demonstrates how macro-level institutions sustain the violence (Humphrey and Kahn 
2000; DeKeseredy and Schwartz 1998; Sanday 2007; Schwartz and DeKeseredy 1997).
In other words, enrolling in college does not simply produce violent men (Chapter 3 
discusses how patriarchal ideology may be present in some college men prior to college 
enrollment). Although the institutions may not breed violent men, they do very little to 
deter this violence through inaction or extremely weak punishments levied against 
individual males and college-based organizations that encourage violence against women.
For illustrative purposes, Sanday’s (2007) work on fraternity gang rape on college 
campuses (originally published in 1990) highlighted the patriarchal nature o f college 
institutions. Her in-depth case studies painted a portrait of horrific and coercive sexual 
assaults against women perpetrated by members o f college fraternities. In what is called
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fraternity gang rape, several fraternity brothers “bond” with one another through the rape 
and humiliation of young college women (see also Boswell and Spade 1996; Martin and 
Hummer 1989). Sanday showed how some fraternities support and operate within a 
culture that reinforces and even encourages such criminal behaviors. In this sense, they 
are arguably the most explicitly patriarchal organization within the confines of college. 
Sanday made note that colleges and universities do little to condemn, deter, or punish 
such violent crimes. She presents cases where very lenient sentences are handed out to 
the fraternities as well as to the individual men that are involved in the rapes. She notes 
that fraternity members are usually privileged males that are well-off financially and their 
fraternities receive large endowments from past alumni. This translates into economic 
resources that can be used to defend the rapists in these cases. Thus, according to 
Sanday, the educational institution works in unison with a very lax legal system along an 
economic system of privileged men to create a haven for sexual predators to act with 
almost complete impunity. Here the institutional overlap is overt between education, 
polity, and the economy.
Individual patriarchal ideology is used by individual men in these fraternities.
The individual men within these organizations collectively engage in tactics that discredit 
the female victims in these cases. They do this through the reaffirmation o f the ideology 
of what an “ideal victim” is (i.e. reproducing and accepting rape myths). While the legal 
system may have changed since Sanday’s original research in 1990 to where fraternities 
and individual members are more likely to face criminal and institutional sanctions for 
involvement in sexual assaults, not enough research has been done on the institutional 
response to these crimes. One recent case suggests that while the institutional response
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may have progressively changed, individual ideologies trivializing rape persist. In 
December 2011 at the University of Vermont, a survey handed out to fraternity pledge 
members included the question, “If I could rape someone, who would it be?” The 
fraternity was suspended by the university as well as by its national chapter. Also, a rally 
of 200 students and an on-line petition were formed calling for the removal o f the 
fraternity entirely from the university (Dorell and DiBlasio 2011). This example shows 
the potential shifts in the institutional ideologies surrounding rape, but it also suggests 
that individual men’s ideologies may lag in their progressive shifts. Unfortunately, few 
academic studies have researched fraternities and gang rape in recent years to where we 
would have a reliable understanding of the exact institutional and individual patriarchal 
ideology divergences.
These few examples should be seen as illustrations o f how patriarchy operates in 
the dominant social institution of the economy through the subordinate institution of 
education. While institutional patriarchy exists in the economy in various ways besides 
the connections with education, these examples are used since the subsequent data 
analyses are drawn from a sample of college students. Both the economy and education 
reaffirm patriarchy through exploitation and opportunity hoarding. Thus, institutional 
patriarchy in the economy operates in a manner that maintains women’s subordinate 
positions in less prestigious positions and ensures that they earn less in jobs where they 
do the equivalent amount o f work as men. Opportunity hoarding is seen when women 
are excluded from prestigious positions in the economy and also when they are excluded 
from prestigious fields of study that are traditionally male dominated. This occurs 
despite the attempts through polity to gain equal access to education and jobs (e.g. Equal
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Pay Act, Title IX) because many of these policies are written in such a way that they 
create more symbolic change rather than any real, systemic change.
Institutional Patriarchal Ideology. Gramsci’s (1971) concept o f hegemony has 
great applicability here, but hegemony should not be reduced entirely to an ideology. 
Historically, men dominated economic institutions through outright exclusion and 
opportunity hoarding (i.e. direct control). But these tactics were eventually challenged 
through legal reforms that were due in large part to feminist activism. Women’s 
exclusion remains because the legal “equalizer” fails to acknowledge gender differentials 
in the ability to obtain seniority or merit, which are accumulated over time. Women are 
not likely to obtain seniority or merit if  their work during that time is devalued since 
“acting male” is considered an indicator of success. This devaluation is consistent with 
the hegemony of male-dominated economic institutions that actively redefine the ideals 
surrounding the characteristics of a worthy worker. Similarly, educational exclusion that 
was at one point coercive in its exclusion has shifted as polity has become more 
hegemonic. Specifics of hegemony might include the ideological production and 
reproduction of “male” fields o f study as those most functional in the economy. In sum, 
and in a very broad overview o f patriarchal ideology in the economy, gender inequality is 
legitimated (and sustained) through large-scale ideologies imbedded into economic 
organizations. These ideologies are centered on the premise that stratification is not the 
result of exploitation or opportunity hoarding, but instead the result of unforgiving 
economic systems and/or individual deficiencies (Acker 2006).
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Familial Patriarchy/Private Patriarchy
Familial patriarchy or private patriarchy is found within the family. The family is 
defined here as either a heterosexual couple that lives together (Vaughan 2002) (married 
or not, with or without children) as well as estranged couples that remain in contact 
because they have children together. Homosexual couples can certainly form familial 
institutions as well as have children, but are not included in this definition because the 
current research focuses on men’s use of violence against former or current female 
intimate partners. Patriarchy within the family is much more explicit in nature than 
patriarchy within other social institutions. Whereas economic organizations may 
commonly exclude women from jobs that they deem to be masculine, male patriarchs are 
much more likely to have direct control over women and children through the means of 
physical force or the threat of force.
Socialist feminists have contributed greatly to helping understand the interactions 
between the economy (production) and the family (reproduction) (polity too has 
considerable overlap at the macro-level, but the economy plays a much larger role for 
socialist feminists). Socialist feminists use traditional Marxian analysis to critique the 
exploitive nature of capitalist economies but they fill the gaps left by Marxism’s neglect 
of gender to include an analysis of reproduction in families (see Barrett 1988). Socialist 
feminists see both institutions as mutually reinforcing, giving equal weight to both in 
helping describe patriarchal capitalism (Andermahr, Lovell, and Wolkowitz 1997;
Danner 1991; Hartmann 1979; Messerschmidt 1986). Perhaps the overlap between the 
dominant institutions and the family is best exemplified by Danner (1991:53), “The well- 
known feminist phrase ‘the personal is political’ can be extended to better reflect socialist
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feminist analysis as: the personal is political and economic and the political and 
economic is personal.”
The sexual division of labor in the economy that excludes women from positions 
of power and worth contributes to their economic dependence on men in the family. For 
example, the aforementioned practice of devaluing women’s work while praising men’s 
leaves few financial alternatives for women outside of marriage. This, of course, remains 
even after the second wave of feminism (illustrated earlier by the gender-gap in earnings, 
exploitation, and opportunity hoarding). Women often have to sacrifice in one avenue 
over the other regarding work and the family, much more than men (Britton 2003; Hesse- 
Biber et al. 2000). This is reflected by the many women that work the “double shift” of 
full-time employment (for less wages than men in equal positions) and full-time work in 
the family (e.g. childrearing, housework, cooking). As previously mentioned, some 
women do, on rare occasion, earn more than their male partners. Women in this situation 
are still less likely to be involved in decision making within the family while also having 
little control over familial finances (Tichenor 2005). The lack of autonomy in both the 
family and the economy limits the autonomy of women, especially those in violent 
relationships. In extreme cases, the constraining interactions of the family and the 
economy create difficult choices regarding leaving these relationships because such 
actions increase the likelihood of lethal violence (Campbell et al. 2003; DeKeseredy and 
Schwartz 2009).
Polity also plays an important role regarding women’s marginalization in the 
family. This is perhaps best highlighted through a discussion of the relationship between 
the law and the criminal justice system’s response to violence against women. In Chapter
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1, the issues surrounding mandatory arrest, pro-arrest, and no-drop prosecution policies
were discussed. These policies look good on the surface but can neglect the fact that
many women have legitimate reasons for not pursuing prosecution4 (Ford 2003). Ptacek
(1999) has also revealed that women may experience a form of revictimization in the
courtroom, leading many to avoid using the courts in response to any subsequent
violence5. The failure by many to understand the complex realities o f women’s
victimization can lead to victim blaming regarding what is perceived as “irrational”
behavior like refusing to pursue charges against one’s male partner. Hence, polity has
been largely unsuccessful at social justice with both the liberal and welfare reforms of the
law regarding domestic violence policies. Sorial (2011:30) summarizes these two models
of the law adequately in that:
[T]hey place the onus on women to assimilate to existing institutions that have 
traditionally served the interests of men, but do little to challenge the nature o f the 
institutions themselves. By treating men and women as the same, the liberal view 
ignored genuine physical and social differences in a way that disadvantaged the 
majority of women. By treating women as different, the welfare view risked 
perpetuating the traditional stereotype of women as biologically domestic and 
dependent. (Sorial 2011:30)
4 Reasons for not wanting to pursue prosecution can include fear o f backlash from the 
perpetrator, loss of wages if  the perpetrator is the primary breadwinner of the family, and 
facing the embarrassment of reliving the violent experiences.
5 Fortunately, some research has found that state courts (i.e. domestic violence courts) are 
not always patriarchal when they are progressively organized to benefit female victims of 
domestic violence (Mirchandani 2006).
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Essentially Sorial is saying “equality” treatments of gender with liberal ideologies o f the 
law fail to see structural gender inequalities, thus women’s shortcomings or failures are 
explained as the failures of these individual women since the opportunities for their 
success are assumed to be “equal” with those of men. Welfare views merely reinforce 
the widespread ideology that women are dependent. In the area of violence against 
women, many legal reforms that strive for “equal protection” (i.e. mandatory/pro-arrest 
policies, no drop prosecution) ignore that broader institutions are gendered. Laws based 
on mandatory arrest produce an overreliance on a gendered institution for “protection.” 
More specifically, the criminal justice system does not define violence in gendered terms 
and fails to relate to victims by ignoring their subordinated statuses in the family and the 
economy (Ferraro 1993; Hearn and McKie 2010). Polity, in relation to the family, 
reproduces power-dependent relationships with gender-blind policies aimed at “equality” 
(Britton 2003; Vaughan 2002).
Many gender-blind domestic violence policies are rooted in philosophical 
traditions regarding the public/private dichotomy. Kelly (2002) discusses the inherent 
contradictions of many liberal theorists (mainly John Locke) that idealize the family (see 
Acker 1992) as a source of individualism (and peace), free from public infiltration. At the 
same time, the primary function o f the family is developing connections to the public 
sphere (see also Fineman 2005). Kelly notes that domestic violence policy appears to 
impede on women’s individualism/autonomy by requiring public infiltration from the 
state. This occurs despite the fact that the state, she feels, is better suited to resolve 
conflicts between people in the public (although informal social sanctions can also be 
effective at resolving public crimes as well as domestic violence, see Sampson 2008;
Carmody and Williams 1987). Additionally, state intervention that relies so heavily on 
the criminal justice system gives women only one real option for resisting the violence- 
leaving (Crocker 2010; Hearn and McKie 2008; Paterson 2009,2010). Yet, some women 
may receive harsh criticisms for leaving because they are framed as failed wives for not 
willing to “work it out” for the good of the family (see also Elshtain 1981). Furthermore, 
gender norms typically frame individualism as a male characteristic and women that 
leave these relationships are violating these norms. This is highly problematic for women 
since notions of individualism have grown tremendously over the last few decades. 
Women’s identities are far less autonomous than men’s, being linked much more closely 
to the family than men’s (see also Nicholson 1986; Pateman 1986; Raskin 2006).
Institutional Patriarchal Ideology and the Family. It was previously noted that 
many institutional patriarchal ideologies o f the family contribute to violence against 
women. One such institutional ideology is found in the construction of the family as 
private. Thus, the overall cultural ideal that the family is autonomous from state 
intervention is a patriarchal ideal when such ideologies create the opportunity for 
violence and the illusion of immunity for perpetrators of violence. Macro-level analysis 
is needed to further expand on the connections between the family and the economy (see 
the work of Vaughan 2002), but they are discussed here to briefly show how patriarchal 
ideology is not solely the product of individuals.
Another common institutional patriarchal ideology related to the family is 
reflected in ideologies about male patriarchs. The major ideology is that men are entitled 
to be the “head of the household” or head of the family. This authority can involve the 
disciplining of children, decision-making, and the accepted use of violence when threats
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to such authority are challenged. Because the family is conceptualized as a subordinate 
institution, the structural sources of institutional ideology often have tremendous overlap 
with individual patriarchal ideology. It is important when trying to distinguish between 
the two that one is aware of the overlap of the family with dominant social institutions. 
The institutional overlap makes the embedded institutional patriarchal ideologies within 
the family difficult to comprehend if one conceptualizes the family as isolated from other 
institutions. For example, patriarchal ideologies about the family at the macro-level, such 
as the ideology about women’s dependence, exist through a reciprocal relationship with 
polity that serves to “support” women when they act in ways consistent with the 
ideology.
CONCLUSION
This chapter provides clarification on two important macro-level concepts, 
institutional patriarchy and institutional patriarchal ideology. The dominant social 
institution of the economy is where the exploitation of women and the opportunity 
hoarding by men has had a tremendous impact on the autonomy of women. The 
subordinate institution of education also exploits women and limits their opportunities in 
a way that directly impacts the broader institution of the economy. The family is where 
additional constraints on women’s autonomy are seen through idealized characteristics of 
womanhood and manhood. These are similar to those idealized notions o f women and 
men embedded within the economy. Polity, in theory, has the ability to act as a great 
equalizer regarding women’s subordination. Yet many policies have failed to create 
equality because they seek equality through gender-blind policies, thus failing to
recognize the patriarchal nature o f social institutions. Institutional patriarchal ideology 
differs from the next chapter’s discussion on individual-level ideology in that it largely 
centers on the ideologies of institutions embedded, produced (sometimes), and 
maintained within these institutions. The next chapter examines patriarchal ideology at 
the micro-level, and discusses its origins, manifestations, and changes.
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CHAPTER III 
INDIVIDUAL PATRIARCHAL IDEOLOGY
The discussion of patriarchy, thus far, has largely focused on institutional 
manifestations of patriarchy and institutional patriarchal ideology. Individual patriarchal 
ideology exists at the micro-level, within individuals. Before discussing the 
conceptualization of individual patriarchal ideology, this chapter reviews two areas of 
research regarding similar concepts: sex/gender role ideology and hegemonic 
masculinities. Next, patriarchal ideology is conceptualized and past operationalizations 
are discussed. Research that has empirically assessed patriarchal ideology in relation to 
violence against women is then reviewed and critiqued. This leads to a final discussion 
of the need for more research concerning the etiological factors of individual patriarchal 
ideology.
Two of the main areas of focus for this chapter revolve around sex/gender roles 
and hegemonic masculinities. Much of the research regarding these two concepts has 
been empirically valid and reliable in a general sense. However, when explaining 
violence against women, or ideologies regarding violence against women, these two 
perspectives are fairly weak. The criticisms should not be seen as attacks on the concepts 
in their totality but as critiques o f their relevance for a theory of patriarchy. Conceptual 
clarity is needed since these terms overlap with individual patriarchal ideology.
SEX/GENDER ROLE IDEOLOGY
Sex is typically thought o f as the biological differences between men and women. 
Sex roles are viewed as biologically-driven behaviors that are natural, fixed, and
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unchanging (Pleck 1987; Udry 2000). Common examples of biological sex roles are that
women are predetermined to be emotional, irrational, and nurturing whereas men are
predetermined to be rational, reasonable, and aggressive. Recognizing the non-
explanatory nature of this biological essentialism, feminist sociologists used the term
“gender roles” to help identify the social construction of gender between men and women
in an effort to address structural gender inequality (Messerschmidt 2009; Messner 1998).
Sex roles and gender roles often get classified under the title “role-theory.” Sociologists
may use both terms interchangeably even if they describe the way roles are learned,
whereas psychologists are less likely to rule out biological factors that they believe may
determine roles (Lisak 2000). Therefore, psychological researchers may use “sex-role”
terminology more frequently than sociologists. Distinctions in the terms sex and gender
do not always translate into conceptual clarity regarding the terms sex roles and gender
roles. These distinctions are confounding, as Judith Lorber (1993) notes:
Neither sex nor gender are pure categories. Combinations of incongruous genes, 
genitalia, and hormonal input are ignored in sex categorization, just as 
combinations of incongruous physiology, identity, sexuality, appearance, and 
behavior are ignored in the social construction of gender statuses. (Lorber 
1993:569-570)
Although sex role and gender role concepts may not always be distinct, within the 
sociological research both describe the way in which males and females, men and 
women, are socialized into accepting a given set o f traits in the creation of their 
respective identities. This review of the literature will use the term “role analysis” in the 
way that Komarovsky (1973) does, rather than “role theory” which implies a 
manifestation within a formal theory regarding social roles. Keep in mind, prior 
researchers and theorists have incorrectly used the terms sex and gender as if they were
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interchangeable (DeKeseredy and Schwartz 2010). Since role analysts are guilty of 
doing this, this section reviewing their research uses the terms interchangeably, albeit 
incorrectly, since the distinctions are often not drawn by many of these theorists.
Early role analysis on gender was heavily influenced by Talcott Parsons 
(Carrigan, Connell, and Lee 1985; Kimmel 2000). Prior to this, gender differences and 
gender inequality were largely accepted and justified as natural. Parsons (1947; see also 
Parsons and Bales 1953) saw society divided into two major spheres: the economic (i.e. 
“production”) and the family (i.e. “kinship”). In order for society to function properly, 
people needed to be socialized into one of two roles: instrumental roles and expressive 
roles. He saw that these roles were socialized within the family and passed down through 
generations. Thus, males fulfilled instrumental roles since economic functions were 
assumed to require, “rationality, autonomy, and competitiveness” (Kimmel 2000:82). 
Female roles were regarded as expressive, “which required tenderness and nurturing” 
(Kimmel 2000:82). Parsons assumed that although these roles were learned in the 
family, their etiology was natural. Role analysis eventually gave way to the androgyny 
movement. Here, theorists acknowledged gender roles as learned and not biologically 
determined. However, gender was conceptualized as an individual-level construct (i.e. 
not socially constructed) and like Parson’s theory it was essentialist (Smiler 2004). 
Nonetheless, role analysis dominated the historic sociological literature and later 
psychological literature on sex and gender role ideology.
A slight divergence within the sex/gender roles framework emerged in the 1950s, 
a byproduct of the early Parsonian sex role theory. With the early developments of 
feminism, the 1950s brought about a time when men’s behaviors and attitudes were first
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critically assessed. This research highlighted “male role strain” l- mainly the difficulties
men faced in trying to live up to cultural ideals of being a male (Pleck 1981; 1995). Also,
“masculinity” was conceptualized by many under this framework as something inherent
and natural2. Many researchers, politicians, and activists at this time claimed that
feminism created a “crisis of masculinity” (for a review, see Whitehead 2002). These
men claimed to support the empowerment of women while simultaneously arguing that
women’s liberation was detrimental to men. They speculated that women’s new roles
created many depressed, solitary men who found it difficult to cope with their newly
established roles (Whitehead 2002). Stephen Whitehead sums up this “crisis”:
That is, across many societies, most notably but not only in the Western world, 
the idea that men are facing some nihilistic future, degraded, threatened and 
marginalized by a combination of women’s ‘successful’ liberation and wider 
social and economic transformations has become a highly potent, almost 
common-sense, if at times contested, understanding o f men at this point in 
history. (Whitehead 2002:50-51)
Those that acknowledged the “crisis” use it as an explanation, if not justification, for the
backlash against feminism, a manifestation of the “men’s movement” (Beal 1997;
Dragiewicz 2008).
1 Similar concepts are still used in psychology such as: “gender role conflict” (Galligan et 
al. 2010; O’Neil, Good, and Holmes 1995) and “masculine gender role stress” (Jakupcak, 
Lisak, and Roemer 2002).
2 As recent as 2002 researchers still see this as physiological in explaining men’s violence 
with their intimate partners as the result of “higher levels of internal arousal” or increased 
“heart reactivity” (Jakupcak, Lisak, and Roemer 2002).
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The major difference between sex/gender role-strain and sex/gender role-identity 
is that strain theorists believe men’s behaviors are the result of structured socialization 
(i.e. naturalistic responses to real or perceived social change created by the feminist 
movement), whereas identity theorists believe men’s behaviors are in their “masculine” 
nature, irrespective to changing social conditions. Essentially, both explanations allow 
men to neutralize their negative behaviors towards women by blaming women, biology, 
or both.
Operationalizations o f Sex/Gender Role Ideology
Empirical measurements of sex/gender role ideologies are often highly variable 
based on sex/gender role analysts’ differing conceptualizations of the term. As a result, 
sex and gender roles are assessed in a variety of ways. One of the most common 
measurements, at the individual level, is through questions regarding attitudes or beliefs 
about appropriate roles for women and men. This is not to imply that any researcher 
using a scale regarding sex or gender roles should be classified a role analyst or role 
theorist in line with Parsons. However, as will be made clearer in the section regarding 
individual patriarchal ideology, some o f these measurements share many of the same 
theoretical assumptions regarding gender as role theorists. The main measurement issue 
that is detrimental to a theory o f patriarchy emerges when dynamics of power, 
domination, or inequality are not the primary measures (e.g. items from the General 
Social Survey, see Ciabattari 2001; Mason and Lu 1988). Although some scales do have 
useful indicators of patriarchal ideology, the totality of the scales often includes measures 
inconsistent with the concept.
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A plethora of scales have been used or developed to measure ideologies of or 
attitudes about sex/gender roles. These scales include: “Attitudes Toward Gender Roles” 
(Baxter and Kane 1995; Cassidy and Warren 1996), “Attitudes Toward Women”
(Spence, Helmreich, and Stapp 1973), “Attitudes Toward Women’s Roles” (Ciabattari 
2001; Mason and Lu 1988; Wilkie 1993), “Conformity to Masculine Norms Inventory” 
(Mahalik et al. 2003), “Gender-Role Attitudes” (Carter, Corra, and Carter 2009; Dugger 
1988; Rice and Coates 1995), “Gender Ideology” (Vespa 2009), “Hypermasculinity 
Inventory” (Mosher and Sirkin 1984), “Liberal Attitudes Towards the Role of Women” 
(Gibbins, Ponting, and Symons 1978), “Male Attitude Norms Inventory” (Luyt 2005), 
“Sex-Role Egalitarianism” (Beere et al. 1984), “Sex Role Attitudes” (Ross 1987), “Sex- 
Role Inventory” (Bern 1974), “Sex-Role Ideology” (Kalin and Tilby, 1978), “Traditional 
Male Ideology” (Wu et al. 2011) and “Traditionalism” (Atkinson, Greenstein, and Lang 
2005). It should be noted that some of these scales share common names yet they can 
have completely different measures from one another. For example, Carter et al. (2009) 
and Rice and Coates (1995) each measure “Gender-Role Attitudes” but different 
measures can be found in each scale. This list is provided to merely show the multitude 
of scales attempting to measure attitudes or an ideology of “sex/gender roles”. This list is 
not exhaustive as any search through the peer-reviewed social science literature will 
return hundreds of different measurement scales o f sex/gender role behaviors as well as 
attitudes/ideologies.
For illustrative purposes, Spence et al.’s (1973) “Attitudes toward Women Scale 
(AWS)” is detailed since it is one of the more common measurement tools of patriarchy
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ideology when assessing its relation to domestic violence. Many indicators on this 25-
item scale could be used as reliable measures o f patriarchal ideology. A few o f these are:
Both husband and wife should be allowed the same grounds for divorce.
Under modem economic conditions with women being active outside the home, 
men should share in household tasks such as washing dishes and doing the 
laundry.
It is insulting to women to have the “obey” clause remain in the marriage service. 
There should be a strict merit system in job appointment and promotion without 
regard to sex.
A woman should be as free as a man to propose marriage.
Sons in a family should be given more encouragement to go to college than 
daughters. (Spence et al. 1973:219)
These are all indicators that could be used in a measurement of patriarchal ideology
because they are all consistent with the current conceptualization of individual patriarchal
ideology (see later in this chapter). Each indicator above either relates to power and
control and/or has a direct relationship to a social institution of power (i.e. the family, the
economy). However, other indicators within this scale include:
Telling dirty jokes should be mostly a masculine prerogative.
Intoxication among women is worse than intoxication among men.
A woman should not expect to go to exactly the same places or to have the same 
freedom of action as a man.
Women should be encouraged not to become sexually intimate with anyone 
before marriage, even their fiances. (Spence et al. 1973:219-220)
The first indicator listed here this is not an appropriate indicator of patriarchal ideology
because it is not clear whether or not “masculine prerogative” is referring to a biological
condition of being male or a socialized property o f men. If an individual defines
“masculine” in a way that is similar with many sex/gender role analysts as a biological
characteristic, then this is problematic. That is, the very use of the word “masculine” as a
biological characteristic is essentialist, since behaviors that men overwhelmingly engage
in (i.e. telling dirty jokes) are seen as indicators o f “maleness” or “masculinity.” Thus,
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masculinity is conceived as a biological trait but operationalized with socially constructed 
indicators (e.g. being aggressive, being independent, telling dirty jokes). Does 
disagreeing with this statement mean one holds a negative attitude toward women or does 
agreeing with this mean one considers this is an appropriate indicator of masculinity? 
Additionally, the next statement about women’s intoxication is also inconsistent with 
patriarchal ideology. It is unclear what this statement is trying to measure. One might 
hold very pro-feminist views and think intoxication is worse for women because socially- 
constructed norms about drinking put women in difficult situations when they violate 
these norms. Thus, it is unclear what is meant by the word “worse”. Worse in what 
regard? The confusion concerning wording could also hold true for the third statement.
A pro-feminist individual may recognize that women should not expect the same 
freedoms of men in social settings because they are aware o f public patriarchy. 
Recognizing public patriarchy one would probably agree with this statement since they 
recognize that women do not enjoy the same freedoms as men because o f gender 
discrimination, not because they are not entitled to the same freedoms o f  men. Finally, 
the last statement may not provide an appropriate measure of patriarchal ideology even 
when the institution of the family is noted. This is because many people may feel 
strongly against sexual activity before marriage for both men and women. Whether it is 
for religious reasons or concern over sexually transmitted diseases, there are many 
reasons why people may support abstinence from sex before marriage for women, but 
also for men. Not including a measure o f men’s pre-marital sexual activity makes it 
unclear whether or not supporting this statement is related to a misogynistic identity. Yet 
despite potential issues with the Spence et al. (1973) scale, this scale is still considered to
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be a measure of “patriarchal attitudes” by some (see Obeid, Chang, and Ginges 20103), 
when its measures are more consistent with a more global concept of gender role 
attitudes.
Clarity between ideologies about femininity and ideologies about feminism are 
also important to discuss. Wilkinson (2004) measures “masculine gender-role beliefs” 
and has an anti-femininity subscale. The anti-femininity scale has an item that states, “I 
might find it a little silly or embarrassing if a male friend of mine cried over a sad love 
scene in a movie” (Wilkinson 2004:124). In contrast to this, an item from a different 
scale, the “attitudes toward feminism and the women’s movement” contained a measure 
regarding survey participant’s response to, “The women’s movement is too radical and 
extreme in its views” (Fassinger 1994:395). Notice the difference between an anti­
femininity measure and an anti-feminist measure. The former is often associated as a 
role or trait and the latter is measuring attitudes about the political movement regarding 
women’s equality, much more consistent with an individual patriarchal ideology scale. 
The feminist movement itself is a political movement, therefore, attitudes about it are
3 These authors did include a dependent variable o f “Beliefs about wife beating”, which 
included measures consistent with how patriarchal ideology should be measured. 
However, the fact that these researchers considered patriarchal attitudes as a predictor of 
beliefs about wife beating is problematic since patriarchal attitudes and ideology are 
operationalized with measures of attitudes about violence against wives/partners (see 
Smith 1990; later in this chapter).
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more appropriate than attitudes about femininity, which is more conceived as a biological 
trait.
Before moving on, a brief mention of the potential relationship between one’s 
gender-role identity and their attitudes towards women should be discussed. In other 
words, if one agrees with the assumption that gender roles produce masculine or feminine 
traits (which is best to think of as a continuum rather than a dichotomy) then it is possible 
that one’s level of femininity or masculinity could predict their patriarchal ideology.
Suter and Toller (2006) found more feminine men and more masculine women were 
more likely to self-identify as feminists and more likely to support the feminist 
movement. This research demonstrates how self-identification with specific gender roles 
can influence one’s attitudes towards women or the women’s movement (see also 
Gallagher and Parrott 2011; Renzetti 1987). Rather than using a psychometric measure 
of gender role attitudes (which would need to include separate measures from patriarchal 
attitudes), individual’s self-identification with a particular gender role may have 
relevance in explaining individual patriarchal ideology.
The validity and reliability of many sex/gender role attitudinal scales such as 
those used by Spence et al. (1973) appears to be strong. However, as the examples above 
show, many sex/gender role attitudinal measures are invalid and unreliable as a measure 
of patriarchal ideology. This is due to inconsistencies between the concepts sex/gender 
role ideology and patriarchal ideology. A discussion of the major criticisms of 
sex/gender role analysis will further help make the case for the salience of patriarchal 
ideology.
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Critiques o f Sex/Gender Role Ideologies
There are many obvious problems with the simplistic explanations o f gender 
differences that come from role analysis. Such explanations: 1) ignore macro-level 
power differentials by focusing too much on individuals, 2) normalize male roles in a 
way that any male that is not middle-class, white, and heterosexual is considered deviant, 
(i.e. ignoring multiple inequalities) and 3) assume these roles are static (Carrigan et al. 
1985; Connell and Messerschmidt 2005; Kennedy and Lorber 2001; Kimmel 2000; 
Komarovsky 1973; Messner 1998; Risman 2001).
The first and perhaps most important criticism is that role analysis fails to 
acknowledge power differentials that exist outside of individual men and women (Stacey 
and Thome 1985). The micro-level dynamics involved with the construction of male 
identities (Pleck 1995) are meaningless without proper contextualization. Role analysis 
ignores larger patriarchal institutions of power that could perpetuate gender inequalities 
and gender differences. Thus, role analysis blindly accepts the socialization process that 
occurs in the primary group of the family, while failing to critique the social institutions 
that can structure the socialization processes. Families, after all, do not exist in a vacuum 
separate from other social institutions. Along these same lines, role analysts fail to 
discuss how individual agency can influence social structures (see Garfinkel 1967).
The second major criticism of role analysis is that it takes for granted “multiple 
inequalities” (Daly 1993; 1997). This is the acknowledgement that class-race-gender, or 
“intersectionality”, are three interacting statuses related to stratification. Thus, role 
analysis that classifies certain “traits” of being masculine or feminine ignore the “matrix 
of domination” (Collins 2000) where gender roles intersect with other oppressive statuses
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(see also hooks 2000). Outside of race, role analysts also neglect the fact that 
inequalities exist regarding class and sexual orientation.
The third important criticism of role analysis is that it assumes individual’s sex 
roles are static, or downplay potential change in them (Komarovsky 1973; Schilt and 
Westbrook 2009). Even the more sociological gender socialization theories assume that 
after around age five these roles are invariable to change (West and Zimmerman 1987). 
Role analysts that refuse to acknowledge change in individual’s sex/gender roles are 
assuming that these roles are identities for individuals. Towards the end of this chapter, 
empirical research is cited that has shown how variations of the concept patriarchal 
ideology or gender role ideologies have not remained static.
HEGEMONIC MASCULINITIES
One perspective that has been especially critical of sex/gender role analysis is the 
area known as hegemonic masculinities. Hegemonic masculinity theorists fill many of 
the gaps left by sex/gender role analysts in explaining gender inequalities. This concept 
also notes the complex nature of patriarchy as being more than just structural male 
domination. It acknowledges the complexities of gender regarding masculinities and 
femininities (Demetriou 2001).
The concept hegemonic masculinity emerged in response to role analysis in an 
attempt to more accurately explain gender inequality. Raewyn Connell is the most 
notable scholar that contributed to the development of this concept. She and her 
colleagues state that hegemonic masculinity is, “a question of how particular groups of 
men inhabit positions of power and wealth, and how they legitimate and reproduce the
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social relationships that generate their dominance” (Carrigan et al. 1985:592). 
Additionally, “culturally constructed relations are presented to appear natural to justify 
present social positions” (Lusher and Robins 2009:388). Lastly, DeKeseredy and 
Schwartz (2010) provide a solid overview of the main components o f hegemonic 
masculinity as:
living up to the culturally defined role o f ‘breadwinner’ in heterosexual 
marriage/cohabitation; avoiding things societally defined as feminine; severely 
restricting emotions; showing toughness and aggression; exhibiting self-reliance; 
striving for achievement and status; exhibiting non-relational attitudes toward 
sexuality; and actively engaging in homophobia. (DeKeseredy and Schwartz 
2010:159-160)
Hegemonic masculinities encourage and justify male dominance over women and operate 
at individual and institutional levels (Connell 1995, 2002, 2008). This concept also 
acknowledges that some men dominate not only women, but other men (e.g. homosexual 
men, lower-class men, racial minorities). Hegemonic masculinity perspectives recognize 
social institutions as settings for various masculinities. These perspectives note that 
hierarchies of masculinities exist within different social institutions (see Carrigan et al. 
1985; Connell 1995, 2008; Connell and Messerschmidt 2005; Donaldson 1993; Hearn 
and Collinson 1994; Messerschmidt 2008).
An important emphasis made by Connell and colleagues is that hegemonic 
masculinities are not individual-level traits that remain static (Connell 1995; Connell and 
Messerschmidt 2005). The distinction is that hegemonic masculinities are relational 
rather than attributes or character types. This is clarified in the work o f Lusher and 
Robins (2009:390), “For example, concepts such as power and independence are 
promoted as attributes of hegemonic masculinity that reside within the individual, when 
both terms are better understood as relating to social relations between individuals.”
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They are seen as behaviors that are produced through structured social interaction
“associated with membership in particular social categories” (Daly 1997:37; see also
Connell and Messerschmidt 2005; Messerschmidt 1997).
Hegemonic masculinities are contextualized historically and institutionally, which
are both important components of an adequate theory of patriarchy (Hunnicutt 2009;
Walby 1990). They are also important for an adequate conceptualization of patriarchy.
They are historically contextualized with an emphasis on individual-level change as well
as various macro-level historical shifts. Institutionally, hegemonic masculinities operate
primarily in most social institutions through “gender regimes” (Connell 2008).
Demetriou (2001) elaborates:
Within this framework, hegemonic masculinity is understood as a configuration 
of practice but it is also seen as being institutionalized in large-scale gender 
regimes, that is, as a process that involves both social structure and personal life. 
Demetriou (2001:341)
Theoretical explanations for gender stratification in social institutions help explain how
micro-level relations contribute to the continued subordination of women within
dominant institutions. In this regard, hegemonic masculinity is based on “[...] actual
social practices rather than discussion of rhetoric and attitudes” (Carrigan et al.
1985:553). Similarly, West and Zimmerman (1987) developed the concept o f “doing
gender” to explain how gender is not based on rigid sex categories but is performed
through structured interaction. Using this same framework, researchers have argued that
when “doing masculinity”, the components of hegemony related to masculinities involves
persuasion (mostly through gender stereotypes), the sexual division of labor, and the state
(Carrigan et al. 1985). To re-emphasize, role analysts completely ignore the fact that
actions can be structured or that individuals can shape larger institutions. In addition,
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some feminists have been so focused on structure that they reify patriarchy. Hegemonic 
masculinity perspectives are instrumental in going beyond the dualistic agency/structure 
dichotomy.
Operationalizations o f Hegemonic Masculinities
Hegemonic masculinities are often measured using qualitative methodologies. 
Connell (1995) specifies ethnographies and ethnomethodologies as appropriate research 
tools in the study of hegemonic masculinities. Also employing qualitative research 
methods, Bird (1996) used in-depth interviews and field observations to examine how 
hegemonic masculinities are sustained through the suppression of non-hegemonic 
masculinities and femininities. While Connell (1995) never explicitly says “quantitative 
methods”, she takes a strict stance against positivism. While Connell’s critiques of 
positivism are noteworthy, it is a mistake to interpret this to mean hegemonic masculinity 
(or individual patriarchal ideology) cannot be researched using quantitative methods, 
which are not automatically “positivist” (see “Quantitative Analysis and Patriarchal 
Ideology”). Few studies have measured hegemonic masculinities through quantitative 
research designs (for exceptions see Lusher and Robins 2009; Wilkinson 2004).
Hegemonic masculinities are thought to be less essentialist than macro-level 
patriarchal theories in that they specifically focus on the power of individual interaction. 
The focus is not so much on patriarchal structures influencing behavior as it is on how 
hegemonic masculinities are reproduced and legitimated through social interaction.
While behaviors may be influenced by ideologies and may sustain and reproduce 
ideologies, it is unclear the exact importance of ideologies in the concept. Thus,
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empirical research regarding hegemonic masculinity focuses almost exclusively on 
behaviors.
Critiques o f Hegemonic Masculinity
Various aspects of hegemonic masculinity aid in developing patriarchal ideology, 
but the entirety of the concept may not always be useful in explaining violence against 
women. This lies in the fact that hegemonic masculinity was developed to explain men’s 
dominance over women and not strictly men’s violence against them (Connell and 
Messerschmidt 2005). Thus, substituting hegemonic masculinities for patriarchal 
ideology is problematic. The overlying theoretical perspectives have different 
postulations and assumptions (see Gouldner 1970). There are four main reasons why 
hegemonic masculinity cannot be incorporated directly in a theory of violence against 
women: 1) the lack of conceptual clarity regarding behaviors and attitudes, 2) the fact 
that hegemonic masculinity was originally conceived to explain broader forms of 
women’s subordination rather than specific forms of oppression like violence against 
women, 3) the failure to elaborate on the psycho-dynamics o f hegemonic masculinity, 
and 4) weak discussions concerning the appropriate operationalization of the term.
Perhaps the greatest criticism of hegemonic masculinities is the conceptual 
confusion between whether or not hegemonic masculinity is based on men’s behaviors 
(“actual social practices”, Carrigan et al. 1985) or cultural ideals (“hegemonic 
principles”) (Coles 2009; Hearn 2004; Howson 2008). As previously mentioned, the 
original hegemonic masculinity theorists take a realist approach when they assert 
hegemonic masculinities are based, “[...] on actual social practices rather than discussion
of rhetoric and attitudes” (Carrigan et al. 1985). Here, the theorists are trying to 
differentiate the term from role analysts’ non-contextualized accounts of gender 
identities. These identities largely involve men who hold attitudes about appropriate 
gender roles. Yet the focus on agency was also used to avoid structural determinism in 
showing the reciprocal relationship between structures and individuals. This is the notion 
that structures constrain behaviors while at the same time behaviors serve to reproduce 
structures (see Giddens 1984). While this reciprocal relationship is important for 
understanding hegemonic masculinity, it does not make clear the role o f ideals.
The “hegemonic model” appears to “express widespread ideals, fantasies, and 
desires” (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005:838), or what can simply be called cultural 
ideals of what it means to be a man. With these ideas and beliefs, Connell and colleagues 
do acknowledge that cultural constructions are an important factor in hegemonic 
masculinities, particularly in addressing Collier’s (1998) critiques of the concept. Collier 
suggests that hegemonic masculinities are really cultural ideals and that the construction 
of hegemonic masculinities cannot be solely relational. Responding to these criticisms, 
Connell and Messerschmidt (2005) note that research (although none is cited) has found 
discrepancies between cultural ideals and actual practices in the daily lives of men and 
boys. The authors argue that hegemonic masculinities can be constructed that are rarely 
practiced by any real men, what they call complicit masculinities (Carrigan et al. 1985; 
Connell and Messerschmidt 2005). Confusion lies in whether or not the (in)action of 
men is a form of hegemonic masculinity since the authors insist hegemonic masculinity 
must be based on men’s actual actions. The argument is also tautological in that the 
authors are basically saying: hegemonic masculinities are sustained by complicit
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masculinities, which sustain hegemonic masculinities. The theorists, themselves, note the 
overlap between the two can be expected, especially in social environments where 
hegemony is effective (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005). The failure o f the theorists to 
make explicit cultural ideals in the theory is perhaps the reason why the authors believe 
their apparent tautology is really just an “overlap” of two key concepts. Demetriou 
(2001) concludes that complicit masculinities are cultural ideals since they are not based 
on “actual social practices” that Connell and colleagues believe define hegemonic 
masculinities. Overall, the lack of conceptual clarity and the contradictions regarding 
ideals and practice show why hegemonic masculinity is inappropriate to use as a theory 
of violence against women in general or as a premise for patriarchal ideology 
specifically.
Connell and colleagues make a valid point in that common cultural scripts of what 
it means to “be a man” can produce a variety of different actions. There are problems, 
however, in looking at cultural scripts as predictors of men’s behaviors. Such an 
approach assumes that the cultural regimes are known by the men performing 
masculinity. While social scientists have often noted that behaviors do not always 
coincide with “cultural ideals”, perhaps these theorists should distinguish between 
aggregate-level ideals and individual-level ideals. Chapter 2 discussed many different 
institutional patriarchal ideologies, what hegemonic masculinity theorists would call 
“gender regimes.” Whether or not social actions (which define hegemonic masculinities) 
are determined by these gender regimes, or what I call institutional patriarchal ideology, 
is never made explicit. At one point the gender regimes (e.g. cultural scripts, institutional 
patriarchal ideology) are part of hegemonic masculinity and at another they are not, since
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they are not based on actual social practices. Perhaps individual patriarchal ideology 
explains social actions (or inaction) better than the links between aggregate gender 
regimes and individual behaviors. The individual ideological components to hegemonic 
masculinity, however, are not made explicit and at times the whole cultural scripts-to- 
social actions link is contradictory. Additionally, the authors’ claim that masculinities 
take on different meanings based on varying social structures have led some to claim the 
concept is structurally deterministic (Whitehead 2002). Such conceptualization allows 
any and all forms of men’s behaviors to be hegemonic masculinity, with institutions 
determining what behaviors are or are not consistent with the concept.
The second major reason why hegemonic masculinity is not compatible with 
patriarchal ideology is related to the first criticism in that hegemonic masculinities was 
conceived in an attempt to explain men and masculinities and not specifically violence 
against women (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005). When attempting to explain violence 
against women, hegemonic masculinities appear essentialist. For example, men’s 
violence towards intimate partners is explained as men “doing” masculinity. Yet most 
men do not engage in violence or control tactics against their intimate partners.
Hegemonic masculinities are at play here for these non-violent men since they benefit 
from other men’s use of violence in the broader patriarchal order. Essentially, violence 
against women is a form of one type of masculinity that is maintained by a different type 
of masculinity- thus masculinity is used to explain all varieties of violence and non­
violence against women. The issues here fall back on the theorists’ inability to 
effectively establish the role of ideologies in relation to behaviors in their 
conceptualization of hegemonic masculinities. This is essentialist in the same way many
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conceptualizations of masculinity are essentialist. All male behavior is seen as masculine 
when masculinity (hegemonic or not) is supposed to “distinguish being masculine from 
being a man” (Clatterbaugh 1998:39). If hegemonic masculinity differentiated between 
ideals and actions (as well as between institutional ideals and individual ideals) it would 
be a more viable concept for a theory of violence against women.
The two components of hegemonic masculinity that may counter the claim that 
hegemonic masculinity is not deterministic are individual psychologies and history. This 
implies that individual psychologies are not fixed character types in the way role analysts 
propose. To elaborate, examinations o f individual ideologies regarding hegemonic 
masculinity or what it means for an individual to agree with broader cultural scripts about 
“being a real man” do not assume that the men who hold these ideals are defined by 
them- especially when analyzed over time. What is most problematic with hegemonic 
masculinity theorists is that they assume men’s social actions that differentiate from 
cultural scripts that define how they “should” act are not important to their theory. That 
is, by focusing too much on social actions, cultural scripts (e.g. gender regimes, 
institutional ideologies) and individual attitudes (i.e. individual patriarchal ideology) 
become trivialized. This is perhaps the most reasonable explanation for why individual- 
level empirical research showing specific attitudes regarding hegemonic masculinities 
(even contextualized within institutions) is scarce (see Lusher and Robins 2009). Even 
Connell (2002) discussed the importance of psychic dimensions of hegemonic 
masculinity but she quickly reduced their importance by limiting the ways in which these 
psychic dimensions can be operationalized. Connell notes that psycho-analytic positions
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should only be assessed with case-study methods. This leads into the overall myopic 
treatment of research methodologies by Connell.
Connell (1995, 2002) limits the tools of any social scientist with her strict 
adherence to qualitative methods. The main argument Connell makes is that positivistic 
conceptualizations of gender assume that individuals do not change regarding their 
masculinity. Basically, Connell believes positivism fails to see how “culture and context 
actively shape how masculinity is performed and experienced” (Moller 2007:267). To 
Connell, positivists that seek to describe different patterns o f men’s behaviors in a 
particular setting and then go out and find these pre-defined patterns are reductionistic.
At the same time, these theorists are assuming, inaccurately, that these patterns they have 
defined, and then found, are stable. They are assuming stability because they fail to 
recognize that those behaviors are particular to that point in time and that particular 
context. Additionally, like many post-structuralists (Hood-Williams and Harrison 1998; 
Kessler and McKenna 1978; West and Zimmerman 1987; Whitehead 2002), Connell is at 
odds with positivistic definitions of masculinity that claim objectivity yet use “common 
sense typologies of gender [male/female dichotomies]” (1995: 69) when conceptualizing 
gender.
Connell is right in that positivistic accounts of masculinity assume gender 
relations are static when only looking at specific cultural contexts during specific time 
periods. In a broader context, Connell might be right in that existing positivists do 
assume traits and behaviors are static when they are conducting cross-sectional research. 
However, Connell is wrong if she is closing the door on all quantitative methods because 
she thinks they only focus on specific ideals at one point in time or that cross-sectional
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research is the only type of research quantitative methodologists conduct. Connell is 
ignoring quantitative longitudinal research. Social scientists should use concepts that can 
be measured, explored, and explained through any of the scientific tools they have at their 
disposal as long as the methodology is appropriate in regards to conceptualization.
Connell also disagrees with positivists’ conceptualizations of masculinity. Moller 
(2007:267) summarizes this criticism, “Masculinity is understood as referring to a 
specific and already known set of qualities or attributes: for example, a greater access to 
power, an exaggerated competitive ethos, etc.” Connell then argues that such definitions 
lead to determinism since researchers define patterns of masculinity and then “find” these 
patterns in a deductive manner. Yet Connell’s theory has also been accused of 
determinism in that her theory also “sees” pre-defined patterns of masculinity (Moller 
2007). The patterns that hegemonic masculinity theorists attempt to look for derive from 
past research (from specific historical and cultural contexts) (Moller 2007). This shows 
the contradictions in Connell’s own attacks against positivism since her 
operationalizations of hegemonic masculinity follow many of the same guidelines that 
“positivist”, or really any deductive methodology does. It appears that a rigid resistance 
towards non-qualitative methodologies makes hegemonic masculinities incompatible 
with a theory of patriarchy for violence against women. After all, a variety of reliable 
methodologies are used by feminist researchers (DeKeseredy 201 la, 201 lb).
PATRIARCHAL IDEOLOGY
The focus on patriarchal ideology in this dissertation lies in the need to compile a 
better understanding of patriarchy so that this concept can be utilized in a theory of 
violence against women. The argument is not that ideologies are any more important
70
than behaviors in explaining violence against women or that individual patriarchal 
ideology holds more significance than institutional patriarchal ideology. The reality is 
many have failed to fully develop the concept patriarchal ideology. Researchers have 
been myopic in past discussions of the topic. That is, many have reduced patriarchal 
ideology’s importance to whether or not individual men that are violent towards female 
partners have a strong patriarchal ideology. This section of the dissertation presents the 
argument that individual patriarchal ideologies are important in explaining violence 
against women, beyond their significance for individual perpetrators o f violence against 
women. The conceptualization and operationalization of the concept is discussed, as well 
as a brief review of past research examining patriarchal ideology in relation to violence 
against women.
Ideologies, Attitudes, Values, Beliefs
Before moving on, it is important to discuss four concepts related to ideals about 
patriarchy: ideologies, attitudes, values, and beliefs. Maio et al. (2003) compare and 
contrast these concepts using perspectives from psychology. They state that attitudes are 
“tendencies to evaluate an object positively or negatively” (2003:284). Values are 
“abstract ideals that function as important guiding principles” (284). And, “ideologies 
are systems of attitudes and values that are organized around an abstract theme” (284). 
While beliefs are not a specific area o f focus, the researchers elude to beliefs the most 
when discussing values. Essentially, attitudes and values are subcomponents of 
ideologies. Using this framework, individual patriarchal ideology consists o f patriarchal 
values like egalitarianism or misogyny. Patriarchal attitudes would be more specific and
71
tangible such as attitudes towards the feminist movement or attitudes about the use of
violence against a female intimate partner. Thus, it is important to note that while
patriarchal ideology is the broader concept of focus, the dimensions of this concept
contain attitudes and values. Ultimately, researchers should obtain measures for both
dimensions, but because these concepts overlap considerably, not all operationalizations
need measures of both. Maio et al. (2003) summarize that all of these concepts are
individual biases, they can exist without individuals being aware o f them, and most
importantly, none exist separate from the other.
One of the few attempts to conceptualize patriarchal ideology in a practical
manner comes from Smith (1990). Smith conceptualizes patriarchal ideology in the same
way that Millett (1970; see also Dobash and Dobash 1977) did:
(a) a set of beliefs that legitimizes male power and authority over women in 
marriage, or in a marriage-like arrangement, and (b) a set o f attitudes or norms 
supportive of violence against wives who violate, or who are perceived as 
violating the ideals of familial patriarchy. (Smith 1990:263)
“Marriage-like arrangements” could include cohabitating couples. Smith’s definition
should be expanded slightly. Ideologies about male power and authority over wives
and/or women in similar arrangements (e.g. fiances) should also include male power and
authority over women in dating arrangements. This inclusion provides a
conceptualization that is consistent with the conceptualization of violence against women
in this dissertation that includes dating relationships. Not surprisingly then, “(b)” in
Smith’s definition should include violence against not just wives, but girlfriends as well
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as former partners4. The inclusion of former partners is important since violent 
husbands/boyfriends may continue to stalk, harass, and/or physically assault former 
partners.
Unlike gender-role ideology/attitudes that focus on attitudes about “natural” ways 
of doing things, patriarchal ideology is explicit in attitudes or beliefs about power and 
control. Thus, it is assumed that many men hold fairly egalitarian attitudes about 
women’s roles in the family and the economy. But with the focus placed on power in a 
concept like patriarchal ideology, it is argued that this is far more important than simply 
looking at ideologies about certain “roles.” For example, Cockbum (1991:73) states, 
“Having more women in management, even women ‘doing things in womanly ways’ is 
not the same thing as having feminists in control.” Cockbum further notes how 
economic institutions are unlikely to change if women are placed in roles where they 
have very little power and are merely tokens. This is relevant for the current study since 
the argument being made is that institutional and individual power are what sustain
4 This creates a broader definition than Smith’s, meant to be inclusive of patriarchal 
ideologies about men’s control of any intimate female partner, whether married or not. 
Chapter 4 notes the methods in this study that use measures consistent with ideologies 
about husband’s control of wives and Chapter 5 notes the methods that use measures 
related to ideologies concerning rape of a dating partner. Keep in mind that an 
individual’s patriarchal ideology about male control in marriage, relationships, or both 
can exist regardless of one’s relationship status (although relationship status might 
influence these ideologies).
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violence against women. If changing individual ideologies can indeed change the 
broader culture and broader social institutions that support violence against women, then 
they should hold far more relevance for a theory of violence against women than 
sex/gender roles that ignore power.
Direct Tests o f  Individual Patriarchal Ideology
Feminist researchers have been at odds with many “gender symmetry” proponents 
who claim empirical tests of the relationship between patriarchy and violence against 
women is weak at best. Many researchers that support a “gender neutral” approach to 
studying domestic violence frame the feminist perspective as: “patriarchy is a direct 
cause of domestic violence” (e.g. Bell and Naugle 2008; Dixon and Graham-Kevan 2011; 
Dutton 1994, 2006). The truth is, most feminist researchers did not and do not, say 
patriarchy directly causes violence against women. Most agree that patriarchy creates the 
environment that allows violence against women to occur and persist.
A handful of studies have looked at structural patriarchy (aggregate variables 
related to women’s status in dominant institutions) and rates of domestic violence. For 
example, Hunnicutt (2009:561-562) reviewed some 21 studies that analyzed the 
relationship between structural patriarchy and rates of violence against women and 
obtained mixed findings. Thus, as new research techniques and new theoretical insights 
emerge, hopefully the structural relationships can reach more definitive conclusions.
Researchers like Dutton (1994, 2006) suggest feminist researchers are committing 
the ecological fallacy since patriarchy is a structural variable that cannot predict 
individual behaviors. Although Dutton is right in his interpretation of the ecological
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fallacy, he is wrong in his conceptualization of patriarchy, which makes his critique of 
feminist research unfounded5. More recently, Corvo and Johnson (2010:304-305) 
discussed that many state-sponsored policies regarding domestic violence operate under 
the assumption that patriarchy causes domestic violence and they even cite "The State o f  
New York Standards for Interventions with Men Who Batter” to support this. Yet they go 
on to read part of these state standards, “Domestic violence is rooted in a patriarchal and 
sexist society that structurally and systematically discriminates against women based on 
their gender, with the imbalance o f power between women and men as its foundation.” 
Like Dutton, Corvo and Johnson are misinterpreting or misrepresenting the relationship 
between patriarchy and woman abuse. By saying this policy is based on the simplistic 
assumption- patriarchy causes domestic violence- these researchers are confusing 
causality with context. Thus, saying the structure o f patriarchy allows for violence 
against women or that violence against women is “rooted” in patriarchy is not the same
5 Dutton (1994) stood by this, even after reviewing Smith’s (1990) research, which he 
gives little value to since more than half of Smith’s sample o f women reported that their 
husbands were not patriarchal. He also discredited Smith’s research since he “only” 
explained 20% of the variance in his regression model for his study, whereas Dutton’s 
own research (Dutton and Starzomski 1994) that included psychological variables 
explained 50% of the variance. Besides the fact that Dutton is placing far too much 
weight on variance explained (see Lieberson 1985), comparing the amount of variance 
different variables are capable of explaining holds little value when the research is from 
entirely different data.
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as saying it directly causes it. Corvo and Johnson note that researchers are “often” 
confused as to the exact definition of patriarchy. Ironically this is something that 
confuses these researchers since they assume patriarchy as a contextual factor in domestic 
violence is the same thing as a causal factor.
This dissertation has consistently referenced empirical research that 
conceptualizes patriarchy as a multi-level concept, existing structurally, ideologically, 
and individually. This conceptualization is consistent with numerous researchers’ 
conceptualizations used in the past (see DeKeseredy 201 la, 201 lb; DeKeseredy and 
Schwartz 1993; Dobash and Dobash 1977, 1979, 1992; Hunnicutt 2009; Millet 1970;
Ogle and Batton 2009; Smith 1990). While patriarchy may be a contributing factor to 
men’s violence against women, feminist researchers do not assume patriarchy causes 
violence against women. Even at the individual level, it is not assumed that individual 
patriarchal ideology causes domestic violence, but instead they are seen as motivating 
factors, risk factors, or correlates of men’s violence. Causal relationships are often very 
difficult (if not impossible) to determine in the social sciences. However, a criterion for 
any causal analysis is that there must first be a correlation. Additionally, causal 
relationships may hold true for less than half of all individuals from a sample. That is, a 
causal relationship can exist when there are exceptional cases, even when the number of 
exceptional cases (non-causal cases) makes them the norm. Because of these two 
important requirements of causality, it is important to review past research that has used 
both bivariate and multivariate statistical techniques assessing individual patriarchal 
ideology as a predictor of men’s violence.
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Literature Reviews Assessing the Relationship between Patriarchal Ideology and Female 
Partner Assault
There are four major systematic reviews that have assessed the empirical 
literature’s findings regarding numerous variables as predictors of men’s use of violence 
against a female partner. In chronological order, the reviews are: Hotaling and Sugarman 
(1986), Sugarman and Frankel (1996), Holtzworth-Munroe et al. (1997), and Stith et al. 
(2004). Each of these has a section regarding the significance of patriarchal ideology6 as 
a predictor of male-perpetrated partner violence. Table 3.1 provides a summary of the 
research reviewed within all four of these reviews. As the table shows, some of the 
research in these reviews overlaps and appears in multiple reviews. Overall, 29 studies 
have examined the relationship between patriarchal ideology and men’s violence. Table 
3.1 shows each of the 4 systematic reviews’ overall findings regarding the key concepts 
related to patriarchal ideology and men’s use of violence. These numbers are explained 
more fully when discussing each individual review below.
6 Each review is different but often the concept “patriarchal ideology” is used 
interchangeably with concepts like “gender-role attitudes.” In the ensuing paragraphs 
discussing each individual review, the exact concept used by the reviewers is noted.
Table 3.1. Aggregate Results of 4 Major Systematic Reviews Assessing the Relationship between Men’s “Patriarchal Ideology” and 
Violence against Women
Review
Concept Reviewed 
(Number o f Studies)
Studies 
finding 
Significant 
Relationship 
with VAWe Author’s Conclusion
Peer-Reviewed
Studies
Peer-Reviewed 
Studies Actually 
Measuring 
Patriarchal 
Ideology
Peer-Reviewed, 
Measuring Patriarchal 
Ideology and 
Significant with 
VAWe?
Hotaling and
Traditional Sex-Role 
Expectations (8)
2/8 = 25% The only consistent non-risk 
marker
3/8 0/3 N/A
Sugarman
(1986) Acceptance of 
Violence Toward 
Women (2)
1/2 = 50% Insufficient data 1/2 0/1 N/A
Sugarman 
and Frankel 
(1996)
Violence Attitudes (5) 
Gender Attitudes (10)
3/5 = 60% 
3/10 = 30%
Abusive men more likely to 
have violent attitudes
Mixed findings
3/5
7/10
3/3
1/7“
3/3 = 100% 
1/1 = 100%
Holtzworth-
Munroe
Attitude Toward 
Women/Sex-Role 
Attitudes (8)
5/8 = 63% Mixed findings 8/8 2/8b 1/2 = 50%
(1997) Attitudes Toward 
Violence (5)
5/5 = 100% Significant relationship with 
VAWe
5/5 2/5 2/2 = 100%
Stith et al. 
(2004)
Attitudes Condoning 
Violence (5)
Traditional Sex Role 
Ideology (7)
4/5 = 80% 
5/7 = 71%
Strong effect sizes 
Moderate effect sizes
5/5
7/7
4/5
l/7d
3/4 = 75% 
1/1 = 100%
Notes: “There were 5 studies that included consistent items with patriarchal ideology but combined these with items inconsistent with patriarchal 
ideology. 'There were 2 studies that had patriarchal ideology items but combined these with items inconsistent with patriarchal ideology. There 
was 1 study that had patriarchal ideology items combined with other items inconsistent with patriarchal ideology. Tour studies had patriarchal 
ideology items combined with other items inconsistent with patriarchal ideology and 1 study had behavioral items that could be considered 
patriarchal, but not consistent with patriarchal ideology.eVAW = violence against women.
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Hotaling and Sugarman (1986) provided the first study that systematically 
reviewed the research on bivariate associations related to domestic violence. This study 
assessed a wide-variety of variables related to domestic violence, which was feasible 
since empirical research on domestic violence was still in its infancy during the time this 
study was published. The two most relevant predictors for the current research are 
“traditional sex-role expectations” and “acceptance of violence toward women.” Overall, 
2 out of 8 studies found “traditional sex role expectations” were predictive of wife 
assault. Hotaling and Sugarman concluded that this was, “the only consistent nonrisk 
marker among male characteristics” (114). In other words, 75% of the reviewed studies 
found “traditional sex role expectations” were not predictive of men’s use o f violence. 
Hotaling and Sugarman’s research is actually the weakest o f the 3 reviews. Taking out 
the non-peer reviewed research, just three studies assessed the correlation of “traditional 
sex role expectations” with men’s partner violence perpetration. Of these, one showed a 
measure entirely consistent with sex-roles (Coleman, Weinman, and Hsi 1980). Another 
study combined measures of patriarchal ideology and gender roles into the same 
dimension (Rosenbaum and O’Leary 1981). The last of the three used original measures 
to form their “Sex-Role-Stereotype Scale”, but never disclosed the individual items that 
make up the scale. Since not one of the three peer-reviewed studies actually looked at a 
concept of patriarchal ideology, it is not possible to determine whether or not this is 
significantly related to men’s use of violence.
There were just two studies in the Hotaling and Sugarman (1986) review that 
assessed “acceptance of violence toward women” as a significant variable related to 
men’s use of violence. This concept might appear to represent patriarchal
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attitudes/beliefs better than “traditional sex-role expectations”, but it too is undefined.
One of the two studies, by Browning (1983), was not from published research. The 
second study that assessed the acceptance of violence toward women (Dibble and Straus 
1980:73) had an item that referred “to respondent’s attitude towards couples slapping 
each other.” This measure, however, was not consistent with patriarchal ideology.
The biggest inconsistency with these measures is the lack of identification as to 
who in the relationship is the primary aggressor. It is o f the utmost importance in 
measuring patriarchal ideology one’s agreement or disagreement with men's violence 
against a partner is present. While one’s acceptance of other forms of violence may also 
be important including female perpetrated violence, an approach that is non-gendered is 
likely to have weak or null findings with gendered concepts (i.e. domestic violence). On 
a lesser note, it is important that measures that ask about the approval o f violence note 
situations where it may or may not be acceptable. If the violence was in response to a 
woman violating her “traditional role”, then this would be consistent with patriarchal 
ideology. If it was more vague, such as Kantor, Jasinski, and Aldarondo’s measure 
(1994:212), “Are there situations that you can imagine in which you would approve of a 
husband slapping his wife?” then it would not be less-consistent with patriarchal ideology 
due to a lack in precision (i.e. context). Hence, one could justify violence for any 
situation against any person. Specificity is needed to assess the context for the assault of 
an intimate partner.
In short, this systematic review of “52-case comparison studies” (Hotaling and 
Sugarman 1986:101), when examined closely, only contained three studies that assessed 
“traditional sex role expectations” in relation to men’s use of intimate partner violence.
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Of these, none included measures consistent with patriarchal ideology/attitudes.
Regarding “acceptance of violence toward women”, only one of two studies were from 
published research and it included measures inconsistent with patriarchal ideology. In 
fairness to Hotaling and Sugarman (1986), the inclusion of fairly weak or unreliable 
research was most likely a reflection of the year the review was conducted, since 
domestic violence research was really just starting to get underway in the early to mid- 
1980s. However, these researchers failed to acknowledge the weakness o f using non­
peer-reviewed research in their review and failed to differentiate conceptual discrepancies 
between their concepts and between each reviewed study. In short, not a single study 
reviewed by Hotaling and Sugarman (1986) could conclude anything about the 
relationship between patriarchal ideology and men’s use of violence. The basic criteria 
of a study that should be included in such a review is that it should be: 1) peer-reviewed 
and 2) it should include items actually consistent with patriarchal ideology. Related to 
the second criterion, these studies need to not combine measures of patriarchal ideology 
with concepts containing clear distinctions (i.e. Rosenbaum and O’Leary 1981).
Hotaling and Sugarman (1986:119) equated “sex role inequality” with 
“patriarchal beliefs” as well as the desire for “power and control.” While they reviewed 
research that lacked measures of attitudes or beliefs specific to patriarchy, the researchers 
still used these terms interchangeably. The equal status given to patriarchy beliefs and 
sex roles is problematic. For example, Bell and Naugle (2008) failed to critically assess 
this review when they cited Hotaling and Sugarman as empirical evidence against 
feminist theories of domestic violence. The failure to acknowledge that Hotaling and 
Sugarman’s research was dated, used a majority of non-published research, and failed to
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include any studies that even measured patriarchal ideology, are points that are clearly 
overlooked by Bell and Naugle. Epistemological progression for the domestic violence 
field is likely to fall to the wayside if researchers blindly accept the current state of 
knowledge in this field.
A decade after the Hotaling and Sugarman (1986) review was published, a more 
rigorous review (i.e. meta-analysis) was conducted by Sugarman and Frankel (1996).
This review was directly related to the current topic as evidenced in its title, “Patriarchal 
Ideology and Wife-Assault: A Meta-Analytic Review.” These researchers noted, “Three 
distinct sets o f measures are used to assess patriarchy ideology: attitudes toward violence, 
gender attitudes, and measures of gender schema” (15). Overall, they found that men’s 
attitudes toward violence were strongly and significantly related to men’s violence in 3 
out of 5 studies. However, if one were to look at just the peer-reviewed studies (3), 3 out 
of 3 peer-reviewed studies had measures consistent with patriarchal ideology and all 3 of 
these found patriarchal ideology to be significantly related to VAW. The significant 
relationships were found in: Eisikovitz et al. (1991), Saunders et al. (1987), and Smith 
(1990)7.
Regarding what they called “gender attitudes”, only 1 of 10 studies measured a 
concept with items strictly related to patriarchal attitudes, which was the research from 
Smith (1990)8. Seven studies that were reviewed under the rubric “gender attitudes” used 
broader measures of gender-role attitudes that had some specific items consistent with
7 Smith’s patriarchal beliefs dimension.
8 Smith’s patriarchal attitudes dimension.
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patriarchal ideology, but these items were combined other items that were not consistent 
with patriarchal ideology. A study that contained items entirely inconsistent with 
patriarchal ideology was from Crossman, Stith, and Bender (1990). The review, overall, 
had the same issue as Hotaling and Sugarman (1986) in that it included non-peer 
reviewed research (i.e. conference presentations, doctoral dissertations). This made it 
difficult to know the exact measures and/or specific findings from each. The last 
concept, gender schema, was focused on individuals’ gender identities, something that 
has been shown to be inconsistent with the current conceptualization o f patriarchy 
(because of this, the studies they reviewed specific to this concept are excluded from 
Table 3.1 and are not discussed).
Regarding attitudes towards violence, three studies (Eisikovits et al. 1991; 
Saunders et al. 1987; Smith 1990)9 included measures consistent with patriarchal 
ideology and all three showed these were predictive of violence against one’s female 
partner. Thus, the most direct and consistent measure of patriarchal ideology appears to 
be a significant predictor of men’s use o f violence against a female partner. It appears 
Sugarman and Frankel’s research, during the time of its publication, was able to 
determine that research up until that point had shown little support for gender attitudes as 
a predictor of men’s violence. However, the research these authors reviewed was not 
appropriate for making determinations about patriarchal ideology. Of the few studies that
9 Two other studies were included that assessed “violence attitudes”, however, these two 
studies (Browning 1983, had two separate dimensions of violence attitudes) are from 
unpublished sources so the specific measures and outcomes are unknown.
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did reflect patriarchal ideology, all suggested that patriarchal ideology was a significant 
predictor of men’s use of violence.
A third major review of the literature comes from Holtzworth-Munroe et al. 
(1997), who summarized the “empirical correlates of marital violence.” Although they 
did not conduct a meta-analysis like Sugarman and Frankel (1996), they did benefit from 
the strength of only including published research. Specific to the current study, Table 3.1 
summarizes the two major concepts they reviewed- attitudes toward women/sex-role 
attitudes and attitudes toward violence. The first o f these, attitudes toward women/sex- 
role attitudes, contained many studies already reviewed by Sugarman and Frankel as part 
of their concept “gender attitudes.” The findings on this first concept reviewed were 
mixed as well (as were their measures’ consistency with patriarchal ideology). 
Additionally, attitudes toward violence were also mixed and contradictory.
Holtzworth-Munroe share many similarities with other studies reviewed in this 
section. For starters, the attitudes toward women/sex-role attitudes are, in general, not a 
conceptual term that should be equated with patriarchal ideology. Indeed, after reviewing 
these studies, the authors labeled this concept “conservative sex role belief’ (where some 
studies measured entirely sex-role attitudes, others patriarchal attitudes, and others 
included a combination of each). Unlike some studies that measured “sex-role attitudes”, 
yet called them “patriarchal beliefs” (e.g. Hotaling and Sugarman 1986), Holtzworth- 
Munroe et al. did not make this mistake. They did, however, fail to acknowledge that 
many different concepts were being measured in their category of “conservative sex role 
belief.” Attitudes toward violence were also highly variable throughout this review. 
Although all five studies that included this concept were predictive o f attitudes toward
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violence, in fairness, only two (Saunders et al. 1987; Stith 1990) were consistent with 
patriarchal attitudes.
In a more recent and more rigorous meta-analysis, Stith et al. (2004) discovered 
that attitudes condoning violence and traditional sex-role ideology were both significant 
predictors of violence against a female partner. Table 3.2 shows, how, much like the 
previous reviews discussed, the “sex-role ideology” concept had a wide-variety of 
operational definitions and was not as robust of a predictor as attitudes condoning 
violence.
Despite the more rigorous and more recent review from Stith et al. (2004), some 
“gender symmetry” proponents (e.g. Bell and Naugle 2008; Dutton 1994, 2006; Scott 
2004), cite these systematic reviews as evidence that patriarchal attitudes, and patriarchy 
in general, does not adequately explain domestic violence. Others suggest that because 
the evidence is mixed and because patriarchal attitudes are not the most salient predictor 
of men’s violence, the feminist approach to researching “partner abuse” has little basis 
(Dixon and Graham-Kevan 2011). These conclusions are also drawn because these 
researchers are misrepresenting correlation analyses with causal analyses. Discounting 
feminist arguments because empirical research shows patriarchy does not cause violence 
against women is misleading since feminists do not argue causality and data assessing 
associations/correlations cannot determine causality. These inaccurate conclusions are 
drawn because these researchers have also uncritically accepted measures o f sex/gender 
role attitudes as indicators of patriarchal ideology.
Table 3.2. Research Studies from Four Major Systematic Reviews Looking at Patriarchal Ideology as a Predictor of Violence against 
Women
Peer-
Reviewed by:
A. Hotaling and Sugarman (1986)
B. Sugarman and Frankel (1996) Measures Consistent
Reviewed C. Holtzworth-Munroe et al. (1997) with Patriarchal
Research Publication? D. Stith et al. (2004) Measures Ideology? Predictor of VAWd?
Barnett and Sweet
(1986) Noa B Original Measures No Unknown
Adversarial Sexual Belief
Nob A, B Scale (Burt 1980) No Unknown
Browning (1983) Nob A, B
Approval of Violence 
Scale (Burt 1980) Yes Unknown
Nob A, B
Sex-Role Stereotyping 
Scale (Burt 1980) Mixed Unknown
Caesar (1985) Noa A Unknown Unknown Yes
Attitudes Toward Marital
Carrillo (1984) Noa B Violence (Saunders 1979) Mixed Unknown
Coleman, Weinman, 
and Hsi (1980)
Yes A Sex-Role Inventory (Bern 
1974)
No No
Crossman et al. (1990) Yes B, C
Sex-Role Egalitarianism 
Scale (Beere et al. 1984) No Yes
Dewhurst et al. (1992) Yes D
Acceptance of 
Interpersonal Violence 
Scale (Burt 1980) Yes No
Dibble and Straus
(1980) Yes A, C Original Measure No Yes
Psychological 
Maltreatment of Women
Dutton (1995) Yes D Inventory (Tolman 1989)c No Yes
00
Table 3.2. (Continued)
Research
Peer-
Reviewed
Publication?
Reviewed by:
A. Hotaling and Sugarman (1986)
B. Sugarman and Frankel (1996)
C. Holtzworth-Munroe et al. (1997)
D. Stith et al. (2004) Measures
Measures Consistent 
with Patriarchal 
Ideology? Predictor of VAWd?
Eisikovitz et al. (1991) Yes B
Inventory of Beliefs 
about Wife Beating 
(Saunders et al. 1987) Yes Yes
Hampton and Gelles 
(1994) Yes D Original Measures Mixed Yes
Hanson et al. (1997) Yes D Original Measures Yes Yes
Hurlbert et al. (1991) Yes D
Attitude Toward Women 
Scale (Spence et al. 1973) Mixed Yes
Johnston (1984) Noa A Unknown Unknown No
Johnston (1988) Yes B
Attitude Toward Women 
Scale (Spence et al. 1973) Mixed No
Kantoretal. (1994) Yes C
President’s Commission 
on the Causes and 
Prevention of Violence 
(Owens and Straus 1975) No Yes
La Violette et al. (1985) No* B
Attitude Toward Women 
Scale (Spence et al. 1973) Unknown Unknown
Margolin (1988) Yes B
Sex-Role Attitudes 
(Mason 1975)a Mixed No
Neff et al. (1995) Yes C Traditional Sex-Role 
Orientation (Markides 
and Vernon 1984)
Yes No
Neidig et al. (1984) No* A Unknown Unknown No
Table 3.2. (Continued)
Research
Peer-
Reviewed
Publication?
Reviewed by:
A. Hotaling and Sugarman (1986)
B. Sugarman and Frankel (1996)
C. Holtzworth-Munroe et al. (1997)
D. Stith et al. (2004) Measures
Measures Consistent 
with Patriarchal 
Ideology? Predictor of VAWd?
Neidig et al. (1986) Yes B, C
Attitude Toward Women 
Scale (Spence et al. 1973) Mixed Mixed
Rosenbaum and 
O’Leary (1981)
Rouse (1984)
Saunders et al. (1987)
Yes
Noa
Yes
B, C, D 
A
B, C
Attitude Toward Women 
Scale (Spence et al. 1973) 
Unknown
Inventory of Beliefs 
about Wife Beating 
(Saunders et al. 1987)
Mixed
Unknown
Yes
No
No
Yes
Smith (1990)
Yes B, C, D Original Measures Yes Yes
Yes C
Sex-Role Egalitarianism 
Scale (Beere et al. 1984) No Yes
Stith and Farley 
(1993) Yes C, D
Inventory of Beliefs 
about Wife Beating 
(Saunders et al. 1987) Yes Yes
Yes C, D
Sex-Role Egalitarianism 
Scale (Beere et al. 1984) No Yes
Telch and Lindquist 
(1984) Yes A, C Original Measures Unknown Yes
Walker (1984) Yes B
Attitude Toward Women 
Scale (Spence et al. 1973) Mixed Yes
Notes: Studies in bold reflect research that was published in a peer-reviewed publication and had measures consistent with patriarchal 
ideology. aconference presentation (as cited in Sugarman and Frankel 1996). bdoctoral dissertation. cbehavioral measure of emotional 
abuse and the only behavioral measure among the studies in this table. dVAW = violence against women
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These conclusions stem in large part from a poor understanding of patriarchy. 
“Gender-neutral” approaches, such as these, often fail to understand that patriarchy is 
conceptualized as having micro and macro components. Additionally, these researchers 
have a poor understanding of feminist theories of violence against women. Feminist 
researchers in the domestic violence field do not hold on to this mythic notion that 
patriarchy is the only viable explanation for men’s use of violence against current or 
former intimate partners. For example, DeKeseredy and Dragiewicz (2007:877-878), 
note that, “unemployment, globalization, deindustrialization, life events stress, intimate 
relationship status, familial and societal patriarchy, substance use, male peer support, 
and other factors” [emphasis added] contribute to violence against women.
Besides ignoring the micro and macro components o f patriarchy, past research has 
also made the mistake of equating patriarchal ideology with many concepts that have far 
different definitions. The conceptual murkiness exists in past research trying to 
differentiate between a plethora of closely related (but different) concepts such as: gender 
attitudes, sexist attitudes, traditional sex-role attitudes, conformity towards masculinity 
roles, etc. Separating out the different dimensions of global concepts like gender 
ideology is an important task (Mumen, Wright, and Kaluzny 2002). The reviews that 
combine all of these concepts together to get a broad overview of “gender ideology” are 
losing the complexities of more specific concepts like patriarchal ideology. This is an 
important point that has been completely ignored by gender-neutral approaches, such as 
Straus (2009:257) who states, “evidence linking sexism (i.e., holding traditional attitudes 
toward women) to partner violence in general is weak (Moore and Stuart 2005; Sugarman 
and Frankel 1996).” The work Straus is citing from Moore and Stuart (2005) reviews
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research measuring “masculine gender roles” (2005:56) (not consistent with patriarchal 
ideology). The second citation is from the aforementioned Sugarman and Frankel (1996) 
review that includes far more studies measuring “gender attitudes” with very few studies 
that measured patriarchal attitudes. Straus, however, is not the only researcher that has 
accepted the Sugarman and Frankel (1996) study as evidence against treating domestic 
violence as a gendered phenomenon.
Scott (2004:267) notes, “Despite the strong influence of feminist ideas on batterer 
programs, cross-sectional and longitudinal research has provided, at best, mixed evidence 
for the importance of men’s patriarchal attitudes for predicting abusiveness.” She goes 
on to cite some research showing a relationship between patriarchal attitudes and 
violence perpetration. But, she quickly attempts to discredit them. She states, “[...] 
Sugarman and Frankel (1996) concluded that adult batterers could not be differentiated 
from nonabusive men on the basis of traditional gender attitudes (i.e., sexism) or gender 
schemas (i.e., masculinity).” Like many uncritical researchers, Scott blindly accepts the 
meta-analysis from Sugarman and Frankel (1996). A critical or feminist framework 
shows what Table 3.1 does in that o f the ten studies assessing this relationship; just one 
actually includes a consistent measure of patriarchal ideology (i.e. Smith 1990, which 
does show a significant relationship). Her poor understanding of patriarchy is shown in 
how quickly she goes from “traditional gender attitudes” (largely consistent with 
patriarchal ideology) to equate this to “sexism”, “gender schemas”, and “masculinity” 
(which are conceptualized differently from patriarchal ideology). Sexism involves 
negative attitudes about women, but not always in relation to power and control. Also, 
masculinity and gender schemas are often conceptualized as biological traits. Perhaps
90
Scott is unaware about the differences between sex and gender and especially gender as it 
relates to power and control (i.e. patriarchy).
In short, the research looking at patriarchal ideology as a predictor of violence 
against women has rarely measured patriarchal ideology in an appropriate way. It is 
important to use operationalizations of patriarchal ideology consistent with this term. 
Examination of the relationship between these ideologies and men’s use of violence is 
important since so few studies in the past have done this in a way that properly measures 
individual patriarchal ideology. It is important to note, however, that while some of the 
later data analyses do include violence as an outcome variable, others treat patriarchal 
ideology as the dependent variable. The argument here, as made earlier, is that in 
research concerning violence against women, patriarchal ideology is important because 
its presence alone can create an environment that conducive to violence against women. 
The etiology of individual patriarchal ideology is essential in order to take proactive 
approaches that seek to change the cultural environment that condones, promotes, and 
encourages men’s patriarchal control of women.
Operationalization o f  Individual Patriarchal Ideology: Relevant Measures from Past 
Research
Mumen et al. (2002) conducted a meta-analysis reviewing research that examined 
“masculine ideology” in relation to sexual aggression. Although this concept sounds 
consistent with conceptualizations of masculinity that are usually centered on biological 
roles, they discussed specific, key concepts consistent with patriarchal ideology. While 
the outcome variable in the research in this meta-analysis was not necessarily domestic or
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relationship violence against women, the 39 studies reviewed included more relevant 
measures for patriarchal ideology than those coming from past research looking at 
gender/sex roles as predictors of domestic violence. The measures most relevant are: 
dominance/power over women, hostile masculinity, rape myth acceptance, and 
acceptance of violence against women. Overall, these four concepts from past research 
include items consistent with the current conceptualization of patriarchal ideology.
Dominance/Power over Women. This first component of patriarchal ideology in 
Mumen et al.’s (2002) review includes two measurement scales from past research. 
Malamuth (1986) conceptualized “dominance as sexual motive” to include items given to 
a male sample regarding, “the degree feelings of control over one’s partner motivate 
sexuality” (956). Also, Lisak and Roth’s (1988) scale measured “underlying power” or 
“the need to assert” (797) one’s self on a woman. Similar items can be used when 
operationalizing patriarchal ideology since these measures include items that make either 
dominance or power over women explicit.
Hostile Masculinity. Mumen et al. (2002) define the term hostile masculinity as 
similar to “hostility toward women” (Check et al. 1985; Malamuth et al. 1991)10. More
10 Mumen et al. (2002) also mention the term “hypermasculinity” (see Mosher and Sirkin 
1984; Mosher and Tomkins 1988) but unfortunately this concept is too inclusive. It has 
three major dimensions: calloused sex attitudes towards women, violence being seen as 
“manly”, and danger as exciting. The first of these is relevant, but the second is not in 
regards to violence towards women and the last measure, in general, is consistent with 
psychological constructions of masculinity.
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specifically, this concept is defined by Malamuth et al. (1995) as containing, “a) an 
insecure, defensive, hypersensitive, and hostile-distrustful orientation, particularly 
toward women, and b) gratification from controlling or dominating women” [emphasis 
added] (354). The second part of this obviously overlaps with the previous concept of 
dominance/power over women, but the first has tremendous use in measuring patriarchal 
ideology because it notes specific hostility towards women. A role theorist might look at 
one’s “attitudes towards women” (e.g. Spence et al. 1973), but the “hostility” or anger 
that is specifically aimed at women in this sense is consistent with patriarchal ideology.
It makes explicit the gendered dynamic o f the attitude (i.e. the respondent does not just 
possess a personality trait that makes them have negative or positive attitudes about 
people in general).
Rape Myth Acceptance. The acceptance of rape myths has tremendous overlap 
with power and control, as rape itself is an extreme, direct form of power and control. 
Rape myths typically involve the following: women lie about being raped, women that 
are raped deserve it (e.g. appearance, actions), men that do rape are acting on biological 
drives, and/or men that do rape suffer from mental deficiencies (Allison and Wrightsman 
1993). There is also considerable overlap between rape myths and “attitudes about 
violence against women” since rape is a form o f violence (at times called “sexual 
violence”). Numerous studies have used reliable measures of “attitudes toward rape and 
sexual coercion” (Patton and Mannison 1995), such as the “Rape Myth Acceptance 
Scale” (Burt 1980), or “Acceptance of Modem Myths about Sexual Aggression Scale” 
(Eyssel and Bohner 2008). An example of an item in these measures consistent with
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patriarchal ideology would be “If a girl consents to making out and she lets things get out 
of hand, it is her own fault if her partner forces sex on her” (Burt 1980: 223).
Acceptance o f Violence against Women. This concept is not explicit in the 
Mumen et al. (2002) review, but is a major component to the current operationalization 
of patriarchal ideology borrowed from Smith (1990). As discussed earlier, this term has 
considerable overlap with rape myth acceptance since rape is a type of violence against 
women. The argument is not being made that these two types of violence must be 
operationalized as separate dimensions of patriarchal ideology. One of the first 
“Acceptance of Interpersonal Violence Scales” (AIV) used a one-factor solution (Burt 
1980; see also Koss and Dinero 1988). However, Ogle, Noel, and Maisto (2009) found 
that a two-factor solution with one factor related to intimate partner violence and another 
about attitudes of sexual violence were more reliable than the single-factor 
operationalization (see also Saunders et al. 1987). Unfortunately, this current research is 
limited because it does not have enough indicators to operationalize acceptance of 
violence and rape acceptance/rape myth acceptance separately. Future 
operationalizations of patriarchal ideology should consider multi-factor latent variables 
for these and the other two potential dimensions o f patriarchal ideology. As Chapter 4 
will show, they are currently considered as part o f the same dimension.
Power and Control. Before moving on, it is wise to provide more conceptual 
clarity regarding power and control in relation to patriarchal ideology. Thus, while the 
definition of patriarchy emphasizes men’s control over women in the family, among 
other institutions, this does not mean that every abusive man is powerful and dominant in 
his intimate relationships. Contrarily, violent men are often responding to a lack o f  power
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in the family or other institutions (Websdale 2010). Whether or not power and control 
are obtained does not negate the importance of these concepts if they are motivating 
factors for violence. Thus, supporting the use o f violence against a female intimate 
partner is consistent with patriarchal ideology because the violence is used as an attempt 
to gain or reinforce power or control. The current conceptualization o f patriarchal 
ideology is therefore appropriate since it rests on ideals that support the patriarchal 
system and on ideals that support the use of violence against women, regardless of 
whether or not the violence reflects the perpetrator’s success at obtaining power or 
control.
Potential Sources o f Individual Patriarchal Ideology
Past research has found that male peer support approving violence against 
intimate partners is related to individual patriarchal ideology (DeKeseredy and Schwartz 
1993; Schwartz and DeKeseredy 1997; Smith 1991), while also relating to sexual 
aggression (Malamuth et al. 1991). More specifically, this means men that have strong 
patriarchal ideologies influence their male friends’ ideologies by condoning physical and 
sexual abuse of women. DeKeseredy’s (1988) original model of male peer-support 
suggested that men in dating relationships would seek out male peers for relationship 
advice. While the male peer-support model has been elaborated to include other 
predictors of violence against women (see DeKeseredy and Schwartz 1993), the salience 
of male peers remains (see also Schwartz and DeKeseredy 2000). Thus, any theoretical 
assessment of individual patriarchal ideology should include measures of male peer 
support for violence against women.
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Discussions concerning the influence of peers on attitudes and behaviors in the 
criminological literature reveal considerable disagreement about the appropriate causal 
order for an appropriate predictive model. In general, there have been debates within 
criminology about the direction of peer influence on attitudes and/or behaviors. One side 
of the debate centers heavily on social learning perspectives in that individuals with 
“normal” ideals obtain negative definitions/attitudes from associating with peer groups 
that hold negative ideals (Akers 2009). Others believe individuals with negative 
definitions are first drawn to other individuals with negative definitions and they then 
form groups that hold similar views with themselves (Costello and Vowell 1999; 
Matsueda and Anderson 1998). Specifically focusing on male peer’s support for negative 
definitions about women, past research has found that men that have negative definitions 
or have engaged in violence against women are more likely to seek out peer groups that 
support these actions, which subsequently would lead to a stronger male peer group 
reinforcement of these attitudes (Kanin 1967; Schwartz and DeKeseredy 1997). Thus, 
there is more support suggesting negative attitudes about women are present before one 
forms a male peer group that reinforces these negative beliefs about women. This 
suggests that development of reliable measures of patriarchal ideology must include an 
adequate theoretical model that reflects the appropriate causal order of male peers and 
patriarchal ideology.
Individual patriarchal ideology is believed to develop primarily in the family, 
what was previously referred to as familial patriarchy (DeKeseredy and Kelly 1993b; 
Dobash and Dobash 1979; Millet 1970). The family is the primary location where many 
male children learn to legitimize male power. They may learn that domestic work is for
96
women, husbands should dominate wives, fathers should dominate children, and women 
should serve men (Johnson 1997; Messerschmidt 2000; Pateman 1988). The previously 
discussed conceptualization of patriarchal ideology by Smith (1990) focused on familial 
patriarchal ideology. Smith’s research found that lower income men, men with little 
education, and men in low-status jobs were more likely than males that scored higher in 
these three areas to have strong ideologies regarding familial patriarchy. It is likely that 
children that witness domestic violence or are themselves victims of child abuse develop 
strong patriarchal ideologies. That is, since most children that witness domestic violence 
or are abused themselves do not become abusive, they may, alternatively, develop strong 
patriarchal ideologies associated with the family.
DeKeseredy and Kelly (1993b) found that men with strong ideologies o f familial 
patriarchy were more likely to be abusive of their female dating partners when these 
ideologies were supported by male peers. These findings highlight the importance of 
male peer support, but they also suggest that the direct effect of familial patriarchal 
ideology on violence is mediated by supportive male peer groups. Thus, a theoretical 
model of these relationships might start with early childhood experiences with familial 
patriarchy directly influencing patriarchal ideology, which influences male peer support, 
which then predicts adulthood relationship violence (then feeding back to patriarchal 
ideology).
Past research has also found familial patriarchy may be influenced by religion. 
Reviewing research looking at individual identification of Christian denominations,
Davis and Greenstein (2009) found that conservative Protestants are the least supportive 
of gender egalitarianism, with Catholics and moderate Protestants in-between, followed
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by Jewish individuals as the most egalitarian. Although this research was reviewing the 
use of more global measures of “gender ideology”, rather than patriarchal ideology, the 
overlap of both concepts (as previously discussed) suggests that religiosity may be an 
important variable to consider when assessing the etiology of patriarchal ideology. As a 
social institution, many religious institutions are based on patriarchal doctrines (Holland 
2006). Since the current focus is on individual patriarchal ideology, the focus will remain 
on individual-religiosity rather than specific individual’s religious denominations.
Operationalizations o f Individual Patriarchal Ideology over Time
Many studies assess some broader form of “gender ideologies”, “attitudes toward 
the family provider role” or “gender role attitudes”11 over time using the General Social 
Survey (GSS) (e.g. Bolzendahl and Myers 2004; Carter et al. 2009; Ciabattari 2001; Liao 
and Cai 1995; Mason and Lu 1988; Rice and Coates 1995; Wilkie 1993). These studies 
are primarily concerned with comparing change in gender role attitudes among men and 
women or among specific birth cohorts. Unfortunately, these studies use measures from 
the GSS that do not emphasize power regarding gender attitudes (e.g. Mason and Lu 
1988; Ciabattari 2001). In other words, the measures are largely inconsistent with the 
previously conceptualized patriarchal ideology. Another problem with the research using
11 These studies typically assess changing attitudes about both women’s roles in the 
economy and women’s roles in the family. Fan and Marini’s review (2000) notes that 
over time, there have been more accepting attitudes towards women regarding their roles 
in the economy than in the family.
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the GSS to assess the changes in these attitudes over time is that these studies are not able 
to assess individual-level change longitudinally because each year the GSS samples 
different respondents. Also known as a trend study, these research designs are often 
considered cross-sectional since they cannot account for individual-level change, just 
aggregate trends over time.
Past research assessing individual patriarchal ideology over time often includes 
measures inconsistent with patriarchal ideology. Fan and Marini (2000), Vespa (2009), 
and Davis (2007) each used measures from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 
(NLSY), which were consistent with gender role-attitudes, not patriarchal 
ideology/attitudes (e.g. power not made explicit, no measures regarding the acceptance of 
violence against women). Similarly, Cunningham et al. (2005) used data from the 
Intergenerational Panel Study of Parents and Children (IPSPC), which included 8 items 
assessing “gendered roles” that were inconsistent with patriarchal ideology.
Almost no research exists that has used longitudinal research designs treating 
individual patriarchal ideology as a dependent variable. Malamuth et al. (1995) did look 
at the direct effects of attitudes supporting violence against women (a proxy measure of 
patriarchal ideology) on hostile masculinity. The former, however, is much more 
consistent with the current conceptualization of patriarchal ideology, than the items that 
compose hostile masculinity. Thus, whether it is longitudinal or not, many researchers 
have failed to explore the etiology of patriarchal ideology (e.g. Malamuth et al. 1991; Wu 
et al. 2011). This appears to be true for broader measures of gender ideology as well 
(Davis and Greenstein 2009), suggesting ideologies about gender, in general, are often 
taken for granted.
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Quantitative Analysis and Patriarchal Ideology
This study utilizes quantitative measurements and analyses of individual 
patriarchal ideology. Barkan (2009) called out critical criminologists for doing the field a 
disservice in discrediting the value of quantitative research. This same criticism applies 
to feminist researchers that try to discredit quantitative methodologies about gender and 
more specifically about violence against women (e.g. Dobash and Dobash 1979) because 
they feel qualitative methods are “more feminist” (DeVault 1996:35). The reality is 
feminist theory and feminist inquiries do not require a distinct methodological orientation 
(Hughes and Cohen 2010; Risman 1993). Many feminist researchers do employ 
quantitative methodologies (e.g. Chafetz 2004; DeKeseredy and Schwartz 1998; Hester, 
Donovan, and Fahmy 2010; Katz 2000; Saunders 1990; Smith 1990; Yllo 1990) and 
qualitative methodologies (Campbell and Wasco 2000; DeKeseredy 201 la; Hughes and 
Cohen 2010). One of the mainstays o f domestic violence research, the “gender 
symmetry” argument, has been exposed using quantitative methods (e.g. DeKeseredy and 
Schwartz 1998; Rennison and Welchans 2000; Russell 1990; Tjaden and Thoennes 2000) 
as well as qualitative methods (e.g. Browne 1987; Dobash and Dobash 1979; Kelly 
1990). The current research is quantitative and feminist in three major ways: 1) it does 
not conform to unrealistic notions from many positivists, 2) the variables and theoretical 
models are obtained and constructed from past feminist research, and 3) feminist insights 
are used to interpret the data analyses.
Doing quantitative research is not synonymous with “doing positivism.” In fact, 
reducing quantitative methods to positivism is simplistic (see Undurraga 2010). Whereas 
a positivist believes a causal model should reflect reality or “truth” with zero
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measurement error, quantitative methodologists are often aware that models are not truth, 
but are “specified” and parameters are “observed” (see Ulmer and Spencer 1999). For a 
quantitative researcher, measurement error is acknowledged and considered to be one of 
the difficulties in trying to quantify social realities, whereas a positivist sees measurement 
error as a shortcoming of the researcher’s methodological techniques. Quantitative 
methodologists attempt to obtain and analyze data in an objective manner while 
recognizing that they have their own worldview that may influence how they do this. 
Positivists, on the other hand, believe “real-science” is completely value-free, largely 
ignoring the human element to data collection and data analysis. These assumptions are 
shown to be myopic below, but it is important to repeat that quantitative methods should 
not be reduced to positivism.
The quantitative methods and analyses that follow this chapter use variables 
obtained largely from feminist research. For example, the proxy measures of male peers 
are based on the empirical findings of feminist researchers Schwartz and DeKeseredy 
(1997) (see also DeKeseredy and Kelly 1993b; DeKeseredy and Schwartz 1993).
Another example is seen in the fact that the operationalization of patriarchal ideology is 
based on the quantitative work of another feminist (Smith 1990).
The quantitative analyses avoid what Mills (1959) called “abstracted empiricism.” 
That is, feminist insights are used to interpret the findings in a way that contextualizes the 
research historically (through an understanding of the time periods in which the data were 
collected) and structurally (through an understanding of the social structure in which the 
individual data were obtained). The current research is not trying to present itself as 
“value-free” simply because it is quantitative. Risman (2001:610) claimed, “Feminist
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scholarship expresses a commitment to science with and from a value position.” Despite 
some researcher’s claims, no research is “value-free” (see Becker 1967; Griffin and 
Phoenix 1994). An example of how a feminist standpoint is being utilized is seen when 
drawing on the previously reviewed research looking at the relationship between 
individual men’s patriarchal ideology and its relationship with woman abuse.
Researchers with non-feminist, non-critical standpoints that try to assess these 
relationships come the conclusion that there either is or is not a relationship between the 
two and leave it at that. Most feminist-oriented researchers, however, would recognize 
that the direct relationship of patriarchal ideology with violence is probably not very 
strong in samples derived from the general population considering violence is not typical 
of most men. Feminist positions would recognize that the ideologies play a bigger role in 
violence against women. They would recognize that there are variations in these 
ideologies, along a continuum, and that the ideologies are probably normalized. To 
borrow from Connell and Messerschmidt (2005), most men have a complicit masculinity. 
The dismissal of individual patriarchal ideology by many psychologists is a reflection of 
both their non-feminist standpoint and their own value positions. In relation to the latter 
of these two, one might find it regressive for different researchers’ value positions to 
debate the appropriate way of interpreting empirical realities. However, pretending to be 
“value free” and “gender-blind” when assessing intimate partner violence is a bias in and 
of itself, which values the status quo and is blind to inequality. While one may 
understand that those that come from the establishment want to preserve their positions of 
power with their worldviews, I choose to take the side of the subordinate in the way 
Howard Becker (1967) proposed. The subsequent data analyses stick to the tenets o f
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unbiased statistical data techniques. However, the interpretations of this data through a 
feminist lens, most certainly is biased. This “bias” is far more likely to see the empirical 
realities regarding concepts related to patriarchy, since mainstream (i.e. gender-neutral) 
approaches have historically failed to.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has provided a clear conceptualization of individual patriarchal 
ideology by differentiating it from the similar concepts: sex/gender role ideology and 
hegemonic masculinities. Individual patriarchal ideology differs from role analysts’ 
accounts of gender/sex role ideology in three major ways: prioritizing power, 
acknowledging change, and getting away from identity and personality traits that define 
individuals. Patriarchal ideology is centered on power, whereas gender ideologies are 
centered on gender identities or roles. The emphasis on power was the strength of the 
hegemonic masculinities research and is extremely useful in defining individual 
patriarchal ideology. The conceptual uncertainty regarding hegemonic masculinity as 
either an ideological or behavioral mechanism makes it difficult to use in a theory of 
violence against women that gives so much importance to patriarchal ideology 
(Hunnicutt 2009). The operationalization o f patriarchal ideology in past research using 
this term, or closely related concepts, are discussed to show the necessary measures when 
researching patriarchal ideology. Few researchers have assessed the predictive variables 
of patriarchal ideology and have only considered the ideology as important in assessing 
its own direct influence on men’s use of violence. The few research studies that have 
considered the predictive variables o f patriarchal ideology (or similar concepts) have
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helped in building the theoretical model of individual patriarchal ideology used in the 
next chapter.
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CHAPTER IV
METHODS: ASSESSING INDIVIDUAL PATRIARCHAL IDEOLOGY OVER TIME 
USING ATTITUDINAL MEASURES FROM A TEST/RETEST PANEL DESIGN
Before describing the methods used for the first major data analysis, it is 
important to discuss the overall framework regarding the data analyses in this 
dissertation. The current chapter, Chapter 4, presents the methodology regarding the use 
of a two-wave panel design assessing relationship violence and patriarchal ideology.
This is followed immediately by Chapter 5, which includes the results of these analyses. 
Chapter 6 presents the methodology regarding the use of latent growth-curve modeling 
assessing relationship violence and patriarchal ideology over time. This is followed 
immediately by Chapter 7, which includes the results of the methods discussed in Chapter 
6. Because this dissertation fills gaps in the research regarding the assessment of 
patriarchal ideology in fairly unique ways, the results o f each chapter are discussed 
inclusively in Chapter 8. This is done primarily for two reasons: 1) some of the 
methodological/data shortcomings in one analysis are accounted for in the other and 2) 
both analyses provide an empirical and holistic understanding of patriarchal ideology in 
ways that can further develop this concept as a theoretical tool in understanding violence 
against women.
As discussed below, both analyses come from the same larger longitudinal 
dataset, but because the key variables o f interest were not present at each wave o f data 
collection, the analyses had to be mutually exclusive. The current chapter describes the 
data used as a test/retest panel design. The key variable of interest, patriarchal ideology, 
was measured using attitudinal measures and because this differs from the analyses in
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Chapter 6, patriarchal ideology will be referred to in this chapter and Chapter 5 as 
patriarchal attitudes as a way to distinguish these measures from later analyses.
DATA AND SAMPLE
The data comes from the Longitudinal Study o f Violence against Women: 
Victimization and Perpetration among College Students in a State-Supported University 
in the United States, 1990-1995 (White, Smith, and Humphrey 2001; for a full Technical 
Report see White and Smith 2001). The research was funded by a National Institute of 
Health (NIH) grant to study the risk of sexual and physical assault among college 
students. Incoming college students were surveyed during student orientations and were 
integrated into student orientation activities so that almost every student that attended 
orientation (about 50% of incoming freshmen) would participate. Phone surveys were 
administered to the remaining students that did not attend orientation. This led to roughly 
83% of the population of incoming students being included.
Respondents were told of the study’s purpose and consent forms were completed 
prior to survey distribution. Identifying information was obtained for each respondent so 
that they could be contacted for each follow-up survey. In order to ensure confidentiality, 
each of the sheets that contained identifiers were assigned a random number. This 
number appeared on each answer sheet rather than the individual contact information in 
order to maintain confidentiality.
After the initial wave of data were collected prior to starting the first year of 
college, subsequent waves of data were obtained around the end of each spring semester. 
Thus, from Wave 1 (pre-college) to Wave 2 (end o f the first year of college) is sometimes
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referred to as a “year” follow-up point, but is technically referring to academic school 
year as the appropriate time metric. Various methods of contact were used to remind 
students about their voluntary participation in the study. Students that were no longer 
attending the university were contacted and invited to complete the survey through the 
mail. Students were paid $15 for their participation in the survey for each follow-up.
Although both males and females were surveyed, this current study is only 
concerned with the sample of males regarding their individual patriarchal ideology. 
Overall, three cohorts of college men were surveyed over five waves of data using an 
accelerated/cohort-sequential longitudinal design. The cohorts were all combined into 
one data set (as the original researchers did, see White et al. 2002; White and Smith 
2009). For reasons discussed below, just Waves 1 and 2 were used for this chapter and 
Chapter 5. Overall, Cohort 1 (1990 incoming year) had a sample size of 336, Cohort 2 
(1991 incoming year) had a sample size of 311, and Cohort 3 (1992 incoming year) had a 
sample size of 204. Thus, the total sample size at Wave 1 was initially 851. These were 
the full numbers from each cohort, prior to sifting through cases that had useable data 
(discussed below) and this is why Table 4.1 differs from these values. Combining 
cohorts allowed the primary metric o f time for assessing change to be years in college 
(pre-college, end of freshman year). It was hypothesized that no cohort interactions 
would exist due to the closeness in years between each (i.e. drawn from the same sample 
of incoming college students), however, sensitivity analyses did check for potential 
interactions.
Table 4.1. Sample Size for Valid Responses for each Data Point for Cohorts 1 and 2
Cohort 1 
Cohort 2
Combined Cohorts 1 & 2
Wave 1
Pre-College
Wave 2 
End of 1 st 
Year
Retention
Percentage
332 (1990)
304(1991)
636
245 (1991)
241 (1992) 
486
74%
79%
76%
1 0 8
Missing Data
Like most longitudinal research, attrition occurred. For the entire study, the 
yearly retention average was 71% (White and Smith 2001:40). There were missing 
responses that presented some confounding issues. Mainly, they centered on the removal 
of the key dependent variable from the surveys after the third year, not the third wave*.
In other words, in 1992, these items appeared for the last time. So, three waves of data 
were collected, but Cohort 1 (1990, 1991, 1992) was the only one that had data points for 
all three waves, with Cohort 2 having two data points (1991 and 1992), and Cohort 3 with 
only 1 data point (1992). Due to the fact that change values would have been either 
completely estimated or imputed, Cohort 3 was not included in the panel design analyses. 
Also, because of the large amount of “missing” (i.e. missing by design) cases at Wave 3, 
this data point was deleted. While change could be analyzed for at least one cohort, this 
is difficult for two major reasons: a small sample size at Wave 3 for Cohort 1 due to 
attrition (n = 178) and unreliable measures of patriarchal ideology2. Additionally, 10
1 In the original study, the items used to assess patriarchal ideology were dropped 
because “current research” (current during the time of data collection) had found that 
patriarchal ideology was not a significant predictor of sexual coercion, the main outcome 
variable for the original researchers. (Jackie White, email correspondence, November 11, 
2011).
2 The items that made up the patriarchal ideology attitudinal measures had unreliable a  
values at Wave 3 (a -  .301). Various checks were assessed (e.g. coding of items, inter­
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cases had item non-response for the key dependent variable at both waves and were 
deleted. Thus, the total sample at Wave 1 was 636 and at Wave 2 it was 486. Of the total 
number of cases, less than 5% of respondents provided just 1 response to the dependent 
variable at either wave (operationalized with 4 items per wave). These cases remained 
since it was assumed that they were missing completely at random (MCAR) (see Little 
and Rubin 1989). The remaining cases that were lost due to attrition were assumed to be 
MCAR as well, thus not related to the outcome variable3.
MEASURES
All of the variables used in various analyses are described in this section. Every 
variable name is the same for Wave 1 and Wave 2, with the number 1 or 2 after the label 
to indicate the data point. When referring to the variables in general (or in hypothesized 
figures) they are presented without the 1 or 2 at the end of the label.
Patriarchal Ideology
The operational definition of patriarchal ideology was similar to Smith’s (1990) in 
that it included attitudinal items regarding an agreement or disagreement with a set o f
item correlations, looking at just the 178 cases) to determine the nature of this, but no 
reasonable explanation could be determined.
3 To support this assumption, an independent samples t-test was performed comparing 
mean differences in the key outcome variable (i.e. patriarchal attitudes) between those 
that dropped out of the study and those that were present for both waves. Results 
indicated there were no significant differences between the two.
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items that legitimate male power and authority over women and/or a set o f attitudes or 
norms supportive of violence against women. The items were four questions measuring 
“Acceptance of Male Heterosexual Violence”, a subscale o f a broader “gender attitude 
inventory” (26 total items) from unpublished research (Ashmore and DelBoca 1987, as 
cited in White and Smith 2001). Because these items were drawn from an unpublished 
study and the original researchers collecting the data did not address the specific 
questions for this subscale, these measures were not directly known. Thus, the 
descriptive statistics in Table 4.2 include the 4 questions that were most consistent with 
patriarchal ideology4. The second item listed in the table, “A man is sometimes justified 
in hitting his wife,” was discussed in Chapter 3 regarding these types of items as being 
fairly inconsistent with the operational definition of patriarchal ideology. This measure 
did not make the mistake of using gender symmetry and wording the violence as “a 
partner” hitting the other (see Chapter 3 for more). However, it did not provide the 
context for the violence. Despite this, because gender was made explicit, the decision 
was made to keep this item as an indicator o f patriarchal ideology, although it was less
4 There were 5 items, but one was not reliable when combined with the others (Wave 1 a  
= .601, Wave 2 a  = .573) and was excluded. This item was “In forcible rape, the victim 
never causes the crime.” The unreliability of this item was found after it was reverse 
coded to remain consistent with the other responses in the scale. It was unclear why this 
specific measure reduced the scale’s reliability.
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specific than preferred. The variable labels for these at Wave 1 were: hitwife, askforit, 
herfault, and crywolf. At Wave 2 they were: hitwifel, ask4it2, herfaull, and crywolfl.
Regarding normality, two of the indicators at Wave 1 had a positive skew and one 
of the indicators at Wave 2 had a positive skew. These items were not transformed 
whenever patriarchal attitudes was modeled as a latent variable. This was because the 
two indicators with normal distributions at Wave 1 were thought to “even out”, in a 
sense, as indicators o f a latent construct, because half (Wave 1) and more than half 
(Wave 2) of the other items were normally distributed. At times, due to the complexity 
of some analyses, a composite measure of patriarchal attitudes was used. The composite 
measure was non-normal for each data point, so the decision was made to take the In 
function of this variable to induce normality. The composite measure is presented in all 
figures and tables as “Patriarchal Attitudes” (“Pattitudes” when space limitations are 
present). All analyses involving the composite measure are the normalized In version of 
this scale. The latent variable for patriarchal attitudes uses the same label, and in all 
relevant structural equation models where it is a latent construct, it is clearly modeled 
with an ellipse, indicating it as such.
Table 4.2. Descriptive Statistics for Patriarchal Attitudes
Wave 1 (Pre-College) Wave 2 (End of Freshman Year)
Survey Item3 Variable n Mean SD skew a Variable n Mean SD skew a
In most cases, when a woman gets 
raped she was asking for it. askforit 613 1.96 1.00 1.08 askforit2 489 2.62*** 1.29 -0.33
A man is sometimes justified in 
hitting his wife. hitwife 610 1.72 1.05 1.40 hitwife2 487 1.91*** 1.08 -1.23
If a woman is making out and she 
lets things get out o f hand, it’s her 
own fault if the man forces sex on 
her. herfault 615 2.33 1.02 0.52 herfault2 489 2.64*** 1.10 -0.21
Most charges of “wife beating” are 
made up by the woman to get back 
at her husband. crywolf 614 2.34 0.97 0.45 crywolf2 488 3.08*** 1.23 -0.03
Composite of all 4 itemsb
Patriarchal 
Attitudes 1 608 8.33 3.02 0.81 .737
Patriarchal
Attitudes2 486 10.26*** 3.45 -0.07 .695
*** Paired Samples t-test indicates statistically significant difference in means from Wave 1 to Wave 2 p < .001.
Notes:a Responses were reverse coded from their original codes so higher scores would reflect more patriarchal responses. Recoded 
responses ranged from “1- Disagree Strongly” to “5- Agree Strongly”. Composite scales ranged from 4- lowest level of patriarchal 
ideology (i.e. more egalitarian) to 20- highest level of patriarchal ideology (i.e. more patriarchal).b Listwise deletion was used for the 
creation of each composite scale, however, full sample size is shown since later analyses used maximum-likelihood (ML) estimation 
for missing values.
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Constant Variables/Time-Invariant Measures
Three dichotomous variables were treated as constants or time-invariant 
measures: race, witnessing domestic violence as a child, and religiosity. Frequencies for 
these items can be found in Table 4.3.
White. Race was obviously a constant variable. As seen in Table 4.3, the 
majority of the sample was white. Although there were other racial groups identified in 
the original research, so few respondents identified as being non-white that these 
individuals were grouped together5. Because whites were coded 1, the variable label for 
race was “White.”
WitnessDV. Whether or not the respondent ever witnessed domestic violence 
between their parents while growing up was included, called Witness Domestic Violence 
(or WitnessDV when space limitations are present). This measure was assessed at Wave 
1 with the item, “For an average month, indicate how often one of your parents or 
stepparents delivered physical blows to the other.” Response options were: 1- Never, 2- 
One to five times, 3- Six to ten times, 4- 11 to 20 times, 5- Over 20 times. Because o f the 
ordinal nature of this variable and because so few respondents had witnessed domestic 
violence, this variable was dichotomized (0- No, 1- Yes witnessed domestic violence 
growing up).
5 The available data had three race categories (i.e. white, black, other). Black was the 
second most frequent racial group (roughly 8% of the sample), but because this number 
was still too small in regards to statistical power, the decision was made to group black 
and other racial group (less than 6% o f the total sample) together as “non-white.”
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Religious. The last constant variable measured whether or not the respondent was 
religious. This was initially captured by asking, “How much of an influence would you 
say religion has on the way you choose to spend your time each day?” Response options 
were: 1- No influence, 2- Some Influence, 3- Fair amount o f influence, 4- A great deal of 
influence. Because responses were skewed, the item was dichotomized into: 0- not 
religious, 1 - religious. Admittedly, a single, dichotomous item to represent a concept like 
religiosity is not as robust as multiple indicators or ordinal responses. For these reasons, 
religiosity might best be thought of as a proxy measure. Although religiosity was 
measured at both waves of data, there was so little variation from Wave 1 to Wave 2 the 
decision was made to treat this as a time-invariant measure, using responses from Wave 1 
only. This measure is presented simply as “Religious.”
Time Variable Measures
In addition to the control variables listed above, Table 4.3 gives the frequencies 
for the other independent variables in the theoretical model(s). Below is a brief 
discussion of each.
Sexual Assault Program Attendance. A question was asked regarding whether or 
not the participant had ever attended a sexual assault awareness program. This variable 
was labeled SAP and was dichotomized (0- No, 1- Yes). This was the only item that 
could be considered both time variable and time invariable. That is, respondents that said 
yes at Wave 1 could not undo the fact that they attended a sexual assault program. Since 
later analyses will use maximum-likelihood (ML) estimation for missing values, it is not 
necessary to impute values for the 147 missing cases at Wave 2 due to attrition.
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However, the wording of this question allowed values to be implemented for 19 of the 
147 cases lost to attrition because these respondents said “1- Yes” to this question at 
Wave 1. Since a yes response is constant, these 19 values were manually changed since 
they were a much more reliable value at Wave 2 than later ML estimates. When space 
limitations are present, this variable is presented as “Sex Assault Program” or “SAP”.
Interestingly, 54 respondents said in Wave 1 that they had attended a sexual 
assault awareness program, but at Wave 2 they said they had not. Two potential options 
are presented here: (1) leave the Wave 2 responses alone or (2) re-code Wave 2 responses 
to a Yes. The first of these would assume that respondents had a better understanding of 
what a sexual assault awareness program was after their first year of college and realized 
that they were mistaken at Wave 1. The second option assumes that respondents at Wave 
2 misunderstood the question to ask “during the past year...” whether or not they had 
attended a sexual assault program and re-coding no responses to a yes accurately reflects 
if they have ever (in a lifetime) attended a sexual assault program. The choice was made 
to go with the second option of re-coding Wave 2 “No” responses that were a “Yes” at 
Wave 1 to a “Yes” at Wave 2.
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Table 4.3. Frequency Distributions of Independent Variables
Wave 1 (Pre-College)
Wave2 (End of 
Freshman Year)
Variable n Percentage n Percentage
Constants (Time-Invariant)
White
0- Other 84 13.8
1-White 524 86.2
Witness Domestic Violence
0- Never 561 91.7
1-Yes 51 8.3
Religious
0- Not Religious 242 38.2
1 - Religious 392 61.8
Time-Variant
Sexual Assault Program 
Attendance
0- Never 480 81.4 319 65.1
1-Yes 110 18.6 171 34.9
Single
0-No 88 13.8 163 33.5
1-Yes 548 86.2 323 66.5
Frequent Dater 
0- Almost never/Occasionally 
dated 249 39.5 248 51.0
1- Frequent Dater 378 59.9 237 48.8
Patriarchal Peers
1-Never 59 9.3 51 10.5
2- A few times a year 101 15.7 90 18.4
3- Monthly 101 15.8 71 14.5
4- Weekly 219 34.9 130 26.6
5- Daily 154 24.2 146 29.9
Note: Percentages not equal to 100 are due to rounding.
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Single. Regarding relationship status, this variable was originally nominal6. It 
was re-coded to a dichotomized variable since the majority o f respondents were single. 
Thus, relationship status was reflected in the dichotomized variable called Single (0- Not- 
Single, 1- Single).
Frequent Dater. An ordinal variable measured how often the respondent dated in 
high school (Wave 1) and during the last school year (Wave 2). Both Wave 1 and Wave 
2 items were followed by the statement, “By a date we mean a planned activity with a 
specific person.” Responses were: 1 - Almost never dated (a few times a year), 2- 
Occasionally dated (about once a month), and 3- Dated frequently (more than once a 
month). This question remained for Cohort 2, but the response items differed: 0- No 
Response, 1- Less than once a month, 2- Once a month, 3- 2-3 times a month, 4- About 
once a week, 5- More than once a week. In order to appropriately combine these two 
items for all respondents, the second set of responses was re-coded to fit the original 
criteria (thus 3-5, was re-coded 3 and items 1 and 2 remained the same). So the answers:
1 - Almost never dated (a few times a year), 2- Occasionally dated (about once a month), 
3- Dated frequently (more than once a month) reflect the re-coded range in responses.
The variable about dating behavior in the past year had one category added to it called 
“Never Dated.” This response was given by just 4% o f the sample at Wave 2 so in order 
to have consistency with the original response categories, these respondents were 
combined with those that said “Almost never dated (a few times a year).” Although this
6 Respondents were asked to: “Indicate your current relationship status.” Original 
response options were: Single, Engaged, Married, Divorced/Separated/Widowed.
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decreased variation, it was preferred rather than choosing one of the questions over the 
other and having missing cases for almost half the sample or simply leaving out this 
potentially important variable. To imply the positive direction in coding for someone that 
was a frequent dater, this variable is labeled “Frequent Dater” or when space limitations 
are present, “FDater”
Patriarchal Male Peer Support. While there are multiple dimensions to male 
peer support (see DeKeseredy and Kelly 1993b), this data had no measures consistent 
with any of the previously cited research (e.g. DeKeseredy and Schwartz 1993).
However, a proxy measure for male peer support was obtained from the question, 
“Currently, when you are with your friends, how often do you hear talk that speculates 
‘How a particular woman would be in bed?’”. Response options were: 1 - Never, 2- A 
few times a year, 3- Monthly, 4- Weekly, 5- Daily. This item was more inclusive than 
past research, which has focused more on the behaviors of male peers regarding their use 
of violence against female partners and their support of this violence in general. Thus, 
the weakness here was that this was most likely a measure o f “male peers’ sexist 
behaviors/attitudes” rather than the more direct, “male peers’ support of violence against 
women.” This variable was ordinal, so the time points between each interval were not 
equal. Despite this, the variable was normally distributed and was treated as continuous 
since male peer’s level of sexist behaviors can be thought of as continuous in nature. 
Higher values indicated a greater degree of these behaviors from respondent’s male 
peers. This variable was called “Patriarchal Peers 1” and “Patriarchal Peers2” for each 
respective time point or when space limitations were present, “Pat Peers 1” and “Pat 
Peers2.”
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In the previous chapter the causal ordering of male peer support was discussed. 
Recall that past research found that male peers that engaged in relationship violence 
increased the chance that an individual might perpetrate violence against a female. Some 
have found that negative attitudes about women in college are preceded by negative 
attitudes during high school (DeKeseredy and Kelly 1993a; DeKeseredy and Schwartz 
1998). Due to the wording of these items and limitations in the amount of data points, 
male peers was treated as an independent, rather than a mediating variable. Treating this 
variable as a mediating cause of relationship violence or mediating cause o f patriarchal 
ideology was not feasible with this data.
Scaled Variables for Relationship Violence Experiences. Borrowing from the 
Conflict Tactics Seale (CTS) (Straus and Gelles 1990), there were 9 total questions (5 
measures of verbal aggression, 4 o f physical aggression) assessing men’s experiences 
with relationship violence in high school (Wave 1) as well as during their first year o f 
college (Wave 2). Participants responded to the question, “How often have these things 
happened during high school?” (same question substituting high school with “during the 
last year” for Wave 2), with these potential responses: 0- 0 times, 1- Once, 2- 2-5 times,
3- 6-10 times, 4- more than 10 times7.
7 These responses reflect the current coding scheme. They were re-coded from the 
original responses of 0- No Response, 1- 0, 2- Once, 3- 2-5 times, 4- 6-10, 5- More than 
10 times. They were re-coded for ease in interpretation so that 0 would reflect never, 1 
would reflect 1, and then the subsequent numeric values would represent the respective 
categories.
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Osgood, McMorris, and Potenza (2002) discuss the many issues in combining 
multiple indicators in self-reported delinquency items that are ordinal. For one, if the 
choice was made to ignore their ordinal nature and sum all the items into a composite 
score this would make the incorrect assumption of equality between each interval. A 
composite, scaled score also produces highly skewed variables. The authors further 
mention how self-report items tend to overemphasize less serious offenses. In the present 
case, if the subject stomped out of the room “ 1-time”, yelled at a partner “1-time”, and 
sulked “1-time” and never engaged in any other behaviors they would receive a score for 
domestic violence perpetration equal to 3. Yet this person would be considered “more 
serious” than someone that never engaged in any of the other 8 items but they hit their 
partner “1-time” (a score of 1). Not only would the first respondent be considered more 
serious, but they would be more serious by two whole units. Osgood et al. (2002) cite 
Hindelang, Hirschi, and Weis (1981) who tested multiple techniques for dealing with 
issues such as these with ordinal self-reported delinquency measures. Ultimately, 
Hindelang et al. found one technique to be the most reliable. This was to recode their 
self-reported delinquency items into dichotomous (0- Never, 1- Ever) variables. These 
items were then summed into a composite variable. This technique produced a significant 
decline in the summed item’s skew, produced a measure where higher values better
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reflected the most serious cases, and it avoided the difficult task of assigning metric 
values to ordinal categories (see Osgood et al. 2002 for more)8.
These insights are extremely beneficial to the current study for the reasons 
mentioned above, but also because structural equation modeling (SEM) is designed to 
work best with continuous outcomes/mediators. Early exploratory models that modeled 
relationship violence measures as latent, ordinal variables created complex models with 
poor model fit. This was most likely because they were covarying with other control 
variables, which were manifest variables. In other words, SEM prefers that manifest 
measures covary with other manifest measures, not latent ones. Also, while dummy 
variables were an option, there was no theoretical cut-off point for each group that 
seemed to coincide with the data. For these reasons, they were combined using the 
aforementioned technique from Hindelang et al. (1981) into a manifest variable.
The 9 item scales for relationship violence perpetration that were dichotomized 
and then summed for each respective time point are called: “Relationship Violence 
Perpetration 1” (shortened to RVP1 where space limitations occur) and “Relationship 
Violence Perpetration2” (shortened to RVP2 where space limitations occur). The range
8 Osgood et al. (2002) went on to discuss a more systematic approach than the Hindelang 
et al. (1981) technique by using item-response theory (IRT) with tobit regression. Since 
the items on relationship violence are used primarily as independent variables, these 
techniques are not employed. That is, tobit regression is not based on linear outcome 
variables, and is used when the outcome variable of interest is censored (i.e. rank- 
ordered).
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for these two scales was 0-9. The 9-item scale at Wave 1 formed a reliable scale (a  = 
.81). The mean at Wave 1 was 2.35 (SD = 2.26, skew = .92). The 9-item scale was also 
reliable at Wave 2 (a  = .79). The mean at Wave 2 was 1.77 (SD = 2.02, skew = 1.34).
Two other variables were created in similar ways which measured the 
participants’ experiences as victims o f verbal and physical relationship aggression. These 
were the same 9 items across Waves 1 and 2 for perpetration, but instead asked how often 
their “partner did this” to them. These variables were called: “Relationship Violence 
Victimization 1” (shortened to RVV1 when necessary due to space limitations) and 
“Relationship Violence Victimization” (shortened for the same reasons to RVV2). The 
9-item scale at Wave 1 indicated a reliable construct (a = .85). These Wave 1 measures 
had a mean of 2.71 (SD = 2.58, skew = .82). The 9-item scale at Wave 2 also had strong 
reliability (a = .85). The Wave 2 scale also had a mean of 2.13 (SD = 2.40, skew =
1.16). A paired samples t-test (listwise deletion) indicated that there were statistically 
significant (p < .001) differences in mean scores for both relationship violence 
perpetration and victimization from Wave 1 to Wave 2.
ANALYSES
Structural Equation Modeling
Structural equation modeling (SEM) was the primary statistical technique used for 
all data analyses (for all analyses in this dissertation). AMOS 21 for Windows was used 
for all SEM models. SEM has several advantages over traditional linear regression.
SEM allows researchers to control for measurement error (for reviews see Byrne 2010;
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Kline 2011). Additionally SEM appropriately assesses structural models over time, even 
in pretest/posttest designs (Raykov 1992). SEM also allows one to hypothesize and 
model non-recursive relationships (Berry 1984; Kline 2011). Finally, due to sample 
attrition, the sample lost 150 cases at Wave 2. SEM uses the maximum-likelihood (ML) 
function for estimating missing cases (MCAR). While most researchers are likely aware 
of the various data imputation techniques for missing data (e.g. mean substitution), ML is 
not a form of data imputation and instead, “[...] searches over different possible 
population values, finally selecting parameter estimates that are most likely (have the 
‘maximum likelihood’) to be true, given the sample observations,” (Lewis-Beck 1993: v). 
The ML function was preferred for handling missing cases because it did not bias the 
sample in ways that data imputation or data deletion techniques can in standard OLS 
regression (Arbuckle 1996, 2012; Wiggins and Sacker 2002). Descriptive statistics and 
bivariate statistics were assessed using SPSS 21 for Windows.
RESEARCH QUESTIONS ADDRESSED IN DATA ANALYSES 
The current analysis addresses the following six questions:
Q1: Are the patriarchal attitudes measures reliable?
Q2: Are the patriarchal attitudes measures reliable over time (i.e. longitudinal 
measurement invariance)?
Q3: What are the predictors of patriarchal ideology before college and what are 
the predictors at the end of the first year o f college?
Q4: Does patriarchal ideology change from pre-college to the end of one’s 
freshman year?
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Q5: What accounts for the change or stability in patriarchal attitudes from pre­
college to the end of one’s freshman year?
Q6: What are the reciprocal effects of patriarchal attitudes and involvement in 
relationship violence?
Ql: Are the Attitudinal Measures o f  Patriarchal Ideology Reliable?
The first research question was addressed using confirmatory factor analysis 
(CFA) within the SEM framework. Unlike traditional exploratory factor analysis (EFA), 
the CFA controls for measurement error, can use ML to assess missing cases lost due to 
attrition, and these measurement models can later be expanded into full structural models 
that include manifest and latent variables. All of these strengths of the CFA approach 
make this a much more robust tool for assessing latent constructs than traditional EFA 
(Byrne 2010; Kline 2011).
First the dimensionality of the patriarchal attitudes measures was assessed. I 
discussed in the previous chapter the dimensionality of patriarchal ideology and it 
appears the four indicators might represent two of these dimensions. That is, two of these 
indicators represent the dimension of rape-myth acceptance (herfault, askforit) and the 
remaining two represent acceptance of violence against women (hitwife, crywolf). In 
order to test whether or not patriarchal attitudes was better operationalized with multiple 
dimensions (i.e. discriminant validity) or as a unitary construct (i.e. convergent validity), 
two different CFAs were conducted. The two-factor model can be found in Figure 4.1. 
The one-factor model is not pictured, but essentially it combined both latent variables in 
Figure 4.1 into one dimension labeled patriarchal attitudes (with all four indicators
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loading on this latent variable, with a 2 = 1, and reference indicator = 1 on arbitrary 
indicator hitwife). The dimensionality measurement models were assessed at Wave 1 and 
Wave 2, independent of one another. Since more indicators than just two per construct 
would have been ideal, it was expected that the two-factor approach would have less 
reliability than the one-factor approach. Because of this, subsequent models in this 
chapter discuss/model patriarchal attitudes as a unitary, four-item factor.
Q2: Are the Patriarchal Attitudes Measures Reliable over Time (i.e. longitudinal 
measurement invariance)?
In order to determine whether or not the measurement structure of patriarchal 
attitudes was invariant over time, which would allow for comparisons between data 
points, a longitudinal CFA (LCFA) was performed (see Brown 2006 for a review).
LCFA can be assessed using one of two techniques: autoregressive structural equation 
modeling (ARSEM) or multiple group structural equation modeling (MGSEM). The 
ARSEM involved the latent factor patriarchal attitudes at Wave 1 as a covariate with the 
same latent construct at Wave 2 (e.g. LCFA, longitudinal measurement model). Figure 
4.2 shows the hypothesized ARSEM used to assess the reliability of patriarchal attitudes 
over time, providing an answer to Q2. Models with and without covarying error terms 
were assessed.
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Figure 4.1. Hypothesized Two-Factor Operationalization o f Patriarchal Attitudes
var = 1var = 1 Violence
Against
Women
Acceptance
Rape
Myth
Acceptance
askforit herfault c ry w o lfhitw ife
el e3 e2 e2
Notes: Variance of each factor = 1 so that reference indicators would not be needed. 
Error parameters = 1 reflect manual constraints.
Figure 4.2. Hypothesized Longitudinal Confirmatory Factor Analysis (LCFA)
Patriarchal
Attitudes
Pre-College
cryw olf herfaultaskforit hitwife
Patriarchal 
Attitudes 
End o f  1st 
Year
askforit2 crywolf2 hitwife2 herfault2
e l e2 e3 e4 e5 e6 e7 e8
Notes: This figure does not include covarying error terms for repeated measures, although subsequent models in the next chapter did. 
Parameters = 1 reflect manual constraints for arbitrary reference indicator and error-term regression weights.
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Q3: What are the Predictors o f  Patriarchal Attitudes before College and after One Year 
o f College?
Once measurement reliability was established the next research question was 
addressed using multiple indicator multiple causes SEM, also known as MIMIC 
modeling (for a review, see Smith and Patterson 1984). Figure 4.3 shows the MIMIC 
model that was conducted for both data points, substituting the appropriate time, but 
same variables for each. MIMIC models are very similar to OLS regression with the 
exception that they control for measurement error and have a latent variable as an 
outcome. Looking at just the cross-sectional data from Wave 1 makes causality 
impossible, but it allowed me to assess significant relationships between the hypothesized 
independent variables and patriarchal ideology. These analyses assessed the significant 
predictors of patriarchal ideology at each respective time point.
Figure 4.3. General MIMIC Model used for Wave 1 and Wave 2
resl
Patriarchal
Attitudes
askforit
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crywolf
herfault
White
Religious
Patriarchal Peers
Sex Assault 
Program
Rel. Violence
Victimization
Single
Rel. Violence 
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el
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e4
Notes: Covariates for independent variables are not drawn for clarity and space considerations. Parameter constraints = 1 are for 
model identification and for all error and residual parameters. Error and residual ellipses are not drawn for clarity purposes. Wave 1 
variables in actual models are same names as pictured, but they have a 1 after and the same is true for Wave 2 measures, but with a 2 
after them.
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Q4: Do Patriarchal Attitudes Change from Pre-College to the end o f  One s Freshman 
Year?
Earlier t-tests suggested significant change in patriarchal attitudes from Wave 1 
to Wave 2. This approach was limited, however, in that it deleted missing values rather 
than taking advantage of all of the information by using ML estimation. Essentially, Q4 
was addressed using CFA with structured means (see Arbuckle 2012: 229-240 for a 
review). Unlike the previous ARSEM model from Q2 (but similar), this analysis used 
multi-group structural equation modeling (MGSEM). Although described in more detail 
in Chapter 5, the MGSEM for assessing mean structures essentially treats each data point 
as a “group” and constrains one of the latent variable’s mean to 0, while freely estimating 
the other. The freely estimated latent mean reflected the number o f units higher or lower 
from 0 (i.e. the other latent mean) that variable was. Significance in this value (p < .05) 
would indicate significant change from Wave 1 to Wave 2.
Q5: What Accounts for the Change or Stability in Patriarchal Attitudes from Pre- 
College to the end o f one’s Freshman Year?
Q5 could only be addressed once the results of Q4 were known. If Q4 found 
significant differences in the mean of patriarchal attitudes from Wave 1 to Wave 2, Q5 
would address significant variation using a MGSEM. Model fit difference tests and 
critical ratio differences (z-tests) for individual parameter estimates would help establish 
where the source of significant variation was.
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Q6: What are the Reciprocal effects o f  Patriarchal Attitudes and Experiences with 
Relationship Violence?
The current study is one of the few to consider patriarchal ideology as a 
dependent variable, whereas past research has typically only included it, at best, as a 
mediating variable, predictive of domestic/relationship violence. Chapters 2 and 3 
clearly laid-out an argument for patriarchal ideology as an important concept for 
understanding relationship violence against women outside of its direct predictive power. 
It should play a role (when conceptualized properly), however, for those few men that are 
violent or perceive themselves as “victims” of relationship violence. No known research 
has considered patriarchal ideology and relationship violence in a non-recursive manner.
It is unclear what the potential feedback effects are between patriarchal ideology and 
experiences with relationship violence. Theoretically, it would be important to consider 
the indirect feedback loops, which would assess the reciprocity of these three variables 
(i.e. patriarchal attitudes, violence perpetration, violence victimization). I hypothesize 
that patriarchal attitudes would predict the use of violence and that victimization would 
then increase patriarchal attitudes. Keep in mind that the men’s “victimization” lacks the 
exact context of the female partner’s use o f violence, but assuming a good amount of 
these episodes were consistent with past research findings (e.g. women’s violence as pre­
emptive, in self-defense, or secondary to men’s initial aggression) (Allen et al. 2009;
Daly and Wilson 1988) they should feedback to patriarchal ideology in a significant way 
that increases the ideology. However, this is just one potential direction these 
relationships could have with one another.
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Kline (2011) notes that there are many different ways to assess non-recursive 
structural equation models using panel data (see Kline 2011:103-110 for a review; see 
also Brito and Pearl 2002). Any time researchers want to know the feedback effects of 
more than two variables, they must model the data in a way that has indirect feedback 
effects as shown in Figure 4.4. The dashed lines in Figure 4.4 represent the multiple 
feedback effects. Because this was the first study to consider the feedback effects of 
these variables, the dashed lines reflect the exploratory nature of the reciprocal analyses. 
The feedback effects come into play by assessing the correlated residuals of these 
variables (also dashed since the exact correlations vary depending on the direction of the 
feedback loops). Others might prefer cross-lagged parameters with no feedback effects. 
Cross-lagged SEMs could still be assessed but such models are quite complex and have 
been critiqued for what some see as an inherent tautology when only two-waves of data 
are present (Stoolmiller and Bank 1995). Also, the MGSEM approach does not work 
here since direct relationships from Wave 1 to Wave 2 need to be modeled with 
appropriate parameters when assessing feedback effects.
In Figure 4.4 the scaled variable for patriarchal attitudes was used rather than the 
latent variable in previous models. As seen in Figure 4.4, the decision was made to 
conduct a full structural model where all variables were manifest variables. This was 
done for two reasons. First, a very complex model assessing the feedback effects of a 
latent variable (i.e. patriarchal attitudes) with the two scaled manifest variables (domestic 
violence perpetration and victimization) would have produced poor model fit. This may 
not be as robust of an analysis as using just latent variables, but Sass and Smith (2006) 
found that whether one decides to use single scaled variables, item parcels, or individual
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latent variables, all o f these produce very similar coefficients regarding measurement 
error in SEM. Because the Cronbach’s a  was at an acceptable level for these three 
composite measures (a  > .70), there was little reason to suggest that the complexities of 
these variables would be greatly diminished treating them as observed measures. 
Secondly, this was done because the sample size was too small for the amount o f 
parameters needing to be assessed using the latent constructs of all three variables.
Once the initial reciprocal effects were assessed without any exogenous variables, 
exogenous predictors were added to the model from Figure 4.4. Because of the many 
autocorrelations of many time-variant independent variables the only independent 
variables added are the three constants: white, witnessing domestic violence, and 
religious. The key thing to take from these analyses in response to Q6 is that while such 
models cannot “prove” causality, they can help establish the temporal order (Biesanz 
2012) regarding these three key variables. These non-recursive models, therefore, should 
provide insight not just for feedback effects regarding these variables in general, but also 
specifically in that Chapters 6 and 7 have much to gain in their models from these 
assessments.
Figure 4.4. Hypothesized Nonrecursive SEM of Key Outcome Variables
Pre-College End of 1st Year
Patriarchal
Attitudes2
Patriarchal 
Attitudes 1
Rel. Violence 
Perpetration 1
Rel. Violence 
Perpetration 2
Rel. Violence 
Victimization
Rel. Violence 
Perpetration 1
Notes: Dashed arrows represent feedback loops for separate models. Parameter constraints are lacking since these will vary 
depending on the temporal order of each model.
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CONCLUSION
This chapter provides an overview o f the analyses performed to assess attitudinal 
measures of patriarchal ideology over time using two-wave longitudinal data. The 
complex data are described regarding the different cohorts, waves, missing data, removal 
of items, and key variables are discussed. The data analyses that mainly revolve around 
the use of structural equation modeling are then discussed. A model that assesses 
reciprocal changes in patriarchal ideology is also presented. Overall, the data and 
analyses are used to provide answers to two general questions: 1) does patriarchal 
ideology change over time and 2) what accounts for this change/stability? The chapter 
concludes with the limitations of the data and the analyses performed. The next chapter 
presents the results from the methods described in this chapter.
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CHAPTER V
RESULTS: ASSESSING INDIVIDUAL PATRIARCHAL IDEOLOGY OVER TIME 
USING ATTITUDINAL MEASURES FROM A TEST/RETEST PANEL DESIGN
The previous chapter established six major research questions that will be 
addressed regarding attitudinal measures of patriarchal ideology using a test/retest panel 
design. The analyses below address these questions as far as whether or not patriarchal 
ideology is: 1) reliable, 2) invariant over time, 3) related to the key independent variables, 
4) changing over time, 5) changing over time due to any of the key independent variables 
and 6) reciprocally related to experiences with relationship violence. The major sections 
below are titled appropriately with the specific research question they address.
MEASUREMENT RELIABILITY
QI: Are the Attitudinal Measures o f  Patriarchal Ideology Reliable?
The measurement reliability of the four attitudinal indicators o f patriarchal 
ideology were assessed using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). Prior to running the 
CFA, bivariate inter-item correlations and alpha reliability analyses were assessed. 
Conducting these prior to the CFA allowed for an assessment of reliability that was not as 
robust as the CFA in and of itself, but these techniques allowed me to eliminate measures 
that were not reliable. That is, while the CFA is more robust technique for measurement 
reliability, the inter-item correlations and alphas needed to meet certain criterion before 
even being considered in a CFA.
Inter-Item Correlations and Reliability Coefficients. Table 5.1 presents the inter­
item coefficients, descriptive statistics, and Cronbach’s a  reliabilities for the indicators of
patriarchal attitudes at each data point. The top of Table 5.1 shows that all four measures 
at Wave 1 had significant (p < .01) and acceptable correlations with one another (Mean o f 
6 correlations = .42). For Wave 2, 5 of the 6 inter-item correlations were acceptable in 
size (Mean of 5 correlations = .45) with 1 fairly weak correlation (r = .12) and all 6 were 
statistically significant (p < .01). The change in the a  for the full sample from .74 at 
Wave 1 to .70 at Wave 2 indicates that the scale o f all four measures is right at the cut-off 
for Cronbach’s a  reliability (typically a  > .70). Although it is still acceptable at Wave 2, 
the drop in the a  value could have been due to numerous reasons (i.e. loss in sample size 
due to attrition, measurement error). Perhaps most important, was determining whether 
or not the lower reliability at Wave 2 was the result of true changes in these values or 
changes in the meaning of this construct from Wave 1 to Wave 2. While “true change” 
can be difficult to determine using panel data, it was important to minimize the chance 
that the decline in reliability was due to issues with the data rather than a decline in the 
meaning of these items.
Table 5.1. Inter-Item Correlations, Descriptive Statistics, and Cronbach’s a  for Patriarchal Attitudes
Wave 1 
Full Sample (n = 608, a  = .74)
Wave 2 
Full Sample (n = 486, a  = .70)
1. askforit 2. hitwife 3. herfault 4. crywolf 1. ask4it2 2. hitwife2 3. herfaul2 4. crywolG
1. askforit 1.00 1. ask4it2 1.00
2. hitwife .40 1.00 2. hitwife2 .30 1.00
3. herfault .43 .38 1.00 3. herfaul2 .50 .38 1.00
4. crywolf .42 .46 .38 1.00 4. crywolG .55 .12 .32 1.00
Mean 1.96(1.0) 1.72(1.05) 2.33(1.02) 2.34 (.97) Mean (SD) 2.62(1.29) 1.91 (1.08) 2.64(1.10) 3.08(1.29)
skewness 1.08 1.41 .52 .46 Skewness .33 1.23 .21 .03
Cohort 1 (n = 315, a  = .73) Cohort 1 (n = 245, a  = .79)
1. askforit 2. hitwife 3. herfault 4. crywolf 1. ask4it2 2. hitwife2 3. herfaul2 4. crywolG
1. askforit 1.00 1. ask4it2 1.00
2. hitwife .38 1.00 2. hitwife2 .45 1.00
3. herfault .41 .31 1.00 3. herfaul2 .50 .45 1.00
4. crywolf .44 .47 .39 1.00 4. crywolG .55 .48 .49 1.00
Mean (SD) 2.00(1.03) 1.75(1.09) 2.35(1.03) 2.35 (.97) Mean (SD) 1.92(1.08) 1.80(1.21) 2.36(1.11) 2.27 (.95)
skewness 1.10 1.42 .52 .45 Skewness 1.39 1.47 .56 .63
Cohort 2 (n = 293, a  = .75)
1
Cohort 2 (« = 241, a  = .19)
1. askforit 2. hitwife 3. herfault 4. crywolf 1. ask4it2 2. hitwife2 3. herfaul2 4. crywolG .
1. askforit 1.00 jl .  ask4it2 1.00
2. hitwife .43 1.00 |2. hitwife2 ,09NS 1.00
3. herfault .45 .46 1.00 |3. herfaul2 .39 .26 1.00
4. crywolf .40 .45 .37 1.00|4. crywol£2 .06NS -.43 -.07NS 1.00|
Mean (SD) 1.91 (.96) 1.69(1.00) 2.30(1.02) 2.33 (.96)'Mean (SD) 3.34(1.07) 2.02 (.92) 2.93(1.02) 3.91 (1.03)1
skewness 1.05 1.37 .52 .47j Skewness -.27 .91 -.04 -.79j
Notes: Sample sizes are based on listwise deletion for a  reliabilities. Cohort 2 at Wave 2 highlighted due to poor reliability. All 
correlations are significant (p < .01) except where otherwise noted (i.e. NS = not significant, p > .05).
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One way to eliminate a potential confounding source of the decreased reliability 
in the a  level was to perform a sensitivity check on these items by assessing them for 
each cohort independently. While cohort effects were not anticipated because each 
cohort was thought to be homogenous, dividing the sample by cohorts was an easy way 
to rule out one potential source for inconsistency in these measures over time. The data 
was separated into: Cohort 1 (1990 incoming class) and Cohort 2 (1991 incoming class). 
The middle matrices in Table 5.1 show that for Cohort 1, patriarchal attitudes was 
reliable based on Chronbach’s a  values at Wave 1 (a = .73, n = 315) and Wave 2 (a  =
.79, n = 245)1. Thus, Cohort 1 actually had an increase in reliability at Wave 2. The 
inter-item correlations were all significant (p < .01) and acceptable in strength (Mean of 
all 12 items > .40). The bottom part of Table 5.1 shows that Cohort 2 had reliable 
measures of patriarchal attitudes (a  = .75) with acceptable and reliable inter-item 
correlations (Mean of all 6 items > .42, all p < .01) at Wave 1. At Wave 2, however, the 
a  value was extremely poor (a  = .186), as supported by the inter-item correlation matrix 
with variable degrees of significance with most correlation coefficients being fairly weak.
The lack of reliability for the attitudinal measures of patriarchal ideology at Wave 
2 for Cohort 2 presented some confounding problems. After coding of the items was 
checked as well as potential outlying cases, the exact reason for the lack o f longitudinal
1 Wave 1 a  was even higher for Cohort 1 when cases lost due to attrition at Wave 2 were 
deleted from Wave 1 (a  = .746). However, because later SEM analyses will estimate 
these values using maximum likelihood (ML), these cases remained.
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measurement invariance for one cohort and not the other was not unclear. Previously it 
was discussed that cohort effects were not anticipated since both cohorts were 
homogenous regarding their sampling technique and among independent variables. 
However, based on the available information, cohort interactions might be a potential 
explanation for the lack of measurement invariance over time. That is, the meaning of 
patriarchal attitudes (as measured by these 4 indicators) very well could have changed for 
the incoming class of 1991 but not the 1990 incoming class. Since the conceptual 
domain of these measures was unstable for Cohort 2, it was not appropriate to proceed 
with further analyses regarding Cohort 2 (see Brown 2006). Thus, Cohort 2 was deleted 
from the dataset fo r the remainder o f  this chapter and analyses describedfrom this point 
forward regarding the test/retest panel analyses involve just Cohort 1 (Wave 1 n = 332, 
Wave 2 n = 245)1.
Since cohort 2 was deleted it was important to look at the descriptive statistics for 
just Cohort 1. Table 5.2 includes the descriptive statistics for all of the indicators of
2 Sensitivity analyses were performed on the full sample as well as just Cohort 2 since 
unstable inter-item correlations and a  values are not the most rigorous techniques for 
establishing measurement invariance. Confirmatory Factor Analyses were performed on 
the full sample and Cohort 2. As expected, the Wave 2 measures for Cohort 2 (and thus 
the full sample) showed poor fitting models (i.e. non-equivalence in the meaning of the 
construct of patriarchal attitudes over time). This further justified the removal of Cohort
2 from the data.
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patriarchal attitudes. Notice the statistically significant differences reported earlier are 
now gone for all items, suggesting stability in patriarchal attitudes from Wave 1 to Wave 
2. Descriptives for all other variables can be found in Table 5.3.
Like the last chapter’s descriptive statistics, relationship violence variables are not 
reported in the above tables. The 9 items for relationship violence perpetration at Wave 1 
for just Cohort 1 formed a reliable scale (a  = .81) and had a mean of 2.33 (SD = 2.25, 
skew = .91). The same 9 items at Wave 2 for formed a reliable scale (a  = .80) and had a 
mean of 1.89 (SD = 2.08, skew = 1.26). Because of the positive skew of the second 
scale, both variables were computed using the In function to induce normality. Thus, the 
Wave 1 scale had a mean of .96 (SD = .72, skew = -.07) and the Wave 2 perpetration 
measures had a mean of .82 (SD = .70, skew = .19). A paired samples t-test for the In 
variables showed significantly different values in relationship violence perpetration over 
time (t = 2.81, d f=  238, p < .01). Because the original measures failed to meet the 
assumptions of normality, anytime from this point forward “relationship violence 
perpetration” or “RVP” are presented, these are the In versions of these variables.
Table 5.2. Descriptive Statistics for Patriarchal Attitudes, Cohort 2 Deleted
Wave 1 (Pre-College) Wave 2 (End of Freshman Year)
Survey Item Variable n Mean SD skew a Variable n Mean3 SD skew a
In most cases, when a woman gets 
raped she was asking for it. askforit 317 2.00 1.03 1.10 askforit2 248 1.92 1.08 1.39
A man is sometimes justified in 
hitting his wife. hitwife 315 1.75 1.09 1.42 hitwife2 246 1.80 1.21 1.47
If a woman is making out and she 
lets things get out of hand, it’s her 
own fault if the man forces sex on 
her. herfault 316 2.35 1.03 0.52 herfault2 248 2.36 1.11 0.56
Most charges of “wife beating” are 
made up by the woman to get back 
at her husband. crywolf 316 2.35 .97 0.45 crywolf2 247 2.27 .95 -0.63
Composite of all 4 items'*
Patriarchal 
Attitudes 1 315 8.45 3.04 0.85 0.73
Patriarchal
Attitudes2 245 8.35 3.40 1.18 0.79
Notes: “Paired samples t-tests indicated no statistically significant differences in any of the means from Wave 1 to Wave 2, p > .05. 
bListwise deletion was used for the creation of each scale.
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Table 5.3. Frequency Distributions of Independent Variables, Cohort 2 Deleted
Wave 1 (Pre-College)
Wave2 (End of 
Freshman Year)
Variable n Percentage n Percentage
Constants (Time-Invariant)
White
0- Other 52 17.0
1- White 253 83.0
Witnessed Domestic Violence
0- Never 288 91.7
1-Yes 26 8.3
Religious
0- Not Religious 107 43.3
1 - Religious 140 56.7
Time-Variant
Sex Assault Program Attendance
0- Never 230 75.7 167 69.9
1-Yes 74 24.3 72 30.1
Single
0-No 8 2.4 74 29.8
1-Yes 324 97.6 174 70.2
Frequent Dater
0- Almost never/Occasionally 
dated 155 46.7 127 51.6
1- Frequent Dater 173 52.1 119 48.4
Patriarchal Peers
1- Never 24 7.2 19 7.7
2- A few times a year 47 14.2 38 15.4
3- Monthly 62 18.7 39 15.8
4- Weekly 126 38.0 73 29.6
5- Daily 73 22.0 78 31.6
Note: Percentages not equal to 100 are due to rounding.
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The 9 items at Wave 1 for relationship violence victimization for just Cohort 1 
formed a reliable scale (a = .85) and had a mean of 2.72 (SD = 2.59, skew = .84). The 
same 9 items at Wave 2 formed a reliable scale (a  = .84) and had a mean of 2.16 (SD = 
2.40, skew = 1.03). Because o f the positive skew of the second scale, both variables were 
computed using the In function to induce normality. Thus, the Wave 1 victimization 
measures had a mean of 1.05 (SD = .76, skew = -.11) and at Wave 2 they had a mean of 
.87 (SD = .77, skew = .19). A paired samples t-test showed significantly different values 
in relationship violence victimization overtime (t = 3.26, df = 241, p < .001).
Confirmatory Factor Analyses
Discriminant Validity. The previous chapter discussed the possibility o f a two- 
factor solution in which two of the indicators for patriarchal attitudes represent rape-myth 
acceptance and two represent acceptance of violence against women (see previous 
chapter’s Figure 4.1). Both were thought to be underlying dimensions of patriarchal 
attitudes. Thus, the two-factor hypothesized model was assessed across both waves o f 
data. The two-factor model had acceptable model fit, but had a large correlation 
coefficient between each factor (r > .85) indicating poor discriminant validity of the two- 
factor solution (i.e. high multicollinearity).
Convergent Validity. A four-indicator single-latent factor o f patriarchal attitudes 
(results in Table 5.4) was more reliable than the two-factor (two indicators per factor)
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model3. Patriarchal attitudes, modeled as a latent construct, was reliable at Wave 1 and 
Wave 2, when conducting two separate CFA models. Both had acceptable model fit and 
moderate to strong (b > .54), statistically significant (p < .001) factor loadings. These 
CFA models suggest that there were reliable measures of patriarchal ideology for each 
wave of data, independent of one another. In other words, the answer to Q1 is simply: 
yes, the attitudinal measures o f  patriarchal ideology are reliable. Since these CFAs were 
conducted independently, comparisons between the two waves (i.e. longitudinal 
measurement invariance) were not yet possible.
3 This is not to suggest that multiple dimensions o f patriarchal ideology will always have 
high multicollinearity. One reason for this finding could be that only two indicators per 
factor were available. Thus, more indicators might reduce the correlation between these 
two factors, but these were not available with this data.
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Table 5.4. Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) Results o f Independent Measurement
Models
Parameter Estimates
Wave la Wave 2b
3(SE) b 3(SE) b
Patriarchal Attitudes —► hitwife 1.00 0.62 1.00 0.65
Patriarchal Attitudes —► askforit 0.96*** (.12) 0.63 1.00*** ( .12) 0.72
Patriarchal Attitudes —*• herfault 0.82*** (.12) 0.54 0.95*** (.12) 0.67
Patriarchal Attitudes —* crywolf 1.03*** (.13) 0.71 0.90*** (.11) 0.74
***p<.001
Notes: Beta =1.0 reference indicator. aWave 1 model fit: y2 = 3.84, d f = 2, p = .147; CFI 
= .992; RMSEA = .053. bWave 2 model fit: %2 = 0.65, d f = 2, p = .721; CFI = 1.0; 
RMSEA = .000.
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MEASUREMENT RELIABILITY OVER TIME
Q2: Are the Attitudinal Measures o f  Patriarchal Attitudes Invariant over Time?
In order to assess measurement invariance over time, the model fit for the initial 
hypothesized CFA (Figure 4.2 in previous chapter), with all factor loadings freely 
estimated (with the exception of the arbitrary reference indicators o f hitwife and hitwife2, 
both = 1.0) was called Model 1A. The goodness of fit for Model 1A and all of the CFAs 
described in this section can be found in Table 5.5. As Table 5.5 shows, Model 1A fit the 
data well based on the comparative fit index (CFI) but not for the %2 value and was only 
moderately supported by the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA).
Since the factors o f patriarchal attitudes at Wave 1 and Wave 2 were measured 
with identical items administered in an identical fashion, correlated error terms for each 
indicator were added to create a better fitting model (Model IB) that accounted for these 
“method effects” (see Berry 1984 for a review; see also Brown 2006). That is, Model IB 
added 4 covariances between each indicator’s error term at Wave 1 and the same 
indicator’s error term at Wave 2. Table 5.5 shows that goodness of fit indicators for 
Model 1B all suggested good model fit, which was much better than Model 1A (although 
significant difference tests were not possible since Model 1A was poor fitting from the 
onset). Results from Model 1B regarding individual regression weights/factor loadings 
are shown in Figure 5.2. As Figure 5.2 shows, factor loadings were all statistically
Table 5.5. Goodness-of-Fit Statistics for Auto-Regressive Structural Equation Models for Longitudinal Confirmatory Factor Analyses
Comparative
Ax2Sig.Model and Description Model X2 df P CFI RMSEA AX2 Adf
1A. Unconstrained ARSEM
Model 57.10 19 .000 .930 .078
1B. Covariances between error
terms added 16.78 15 .332 .997 .019
1C. Equality constraints: factor
loadings IB vs 1C 19.47 18 .364 .997 .016 2.69 3 .442
1D. Equality constraints: factor
loadings and factor intercepts 1C vs ID 23.37 22 .381 .997 .014 3.90 4 .420
IE. Equality constraints: factor
loadings, factor intercepts, and ID vs IE 27.01 26 .409 .998 .011 3.64 4 .457
error variances
Notes: df = degrees of freedom; CFI = Comparative Fit Index; RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation.
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significant (p < .001) and strong across both waves of data. Correlated error terms were 
all statistically significant accept for the askforit error term4.
The covariance between the repeated latent variables (e.g. autocorrelation, serial 
correlation, stability coefficient) was statistically significant and suggested weak to 
moderate stability (r = .34, SE = .11, p < .001). While autoregressive coefficients that are 
very strong make it clear that a measure has high stability, moderate coefficient strength 
is not always as straightforward (Mroczek 2007). That is, it can be difficult to interpret 
with the r alone whether or not the measures are unstable or the measures lack continuity 
(i.e. significant mean differences). Keep in mind that one early test (paired samples t- 
test) indicated no significant differences over time while the a  reliability indicated 
measurement reliability. These early measures suggest reliable measures along with no 
change over time in the construct. To be sure, the section below regarding mean 
differentials within the confines of SEM allowed for more informed conclusions than the 
paired-samples t-test/a reliability tests and the current LCFA. For now, keep in mind 
that this coefficient o f .34 was positive in value, somewhat weak but close to moderate in 
strength, and was produced in a CFA that had model fit indicators all suggestive of 
acceptable reliability (thus far). Again, whether or not a low stability coefficient is the
4 Even though deleting this parameter showed slight improvements in the overall model 
fit, there was no theoretical reason as to why this measure’s error was different from the 
other indicators. Therefore, this correlated error term remained as the overall model fit 
was still reliable.
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product of weak reliability over time or attitudinal discontinuity can be complicated but 
the anticipation was that mean differentials were the likely culprit for why this coefficient 
was not stronger in value. Prior to mean comparisons, further analyses were conducted to 
ensure the measurement reliability over time.
The next step in testing for longitudinal measurement invariance involved 
constraining factor loadings equal to one another across waves, which produced Model 
1C. As seen in Table 5.5, Model 1C also had good model fit. Model fit comparisons 
between Model 1C and Model IB regarding the A%2, ACFI, and ARMSEA indicated 
Model IB and Model 1C were not statistically different from one another (p > .05).
Next, indicator intercepts were constrained equal to one another, called Model ID.
Model 1D was invariant from Model 1C, indicating the observed scores of the indicators 
were not changing over time. Although some consider it a restrictive test (Byrne 2010; 
Chan 1998) since previous models showed metric invariance from Wave 1 to Wave 2, 
Model 1E was created in which indicator error variances for all 8 factors were 
constrained equal (i.e. factor variance at Wave 1 constrained equal to repeated measure’s 
variance at Wave 2), in addition to the existing factor loading and factor intercept 
constraints. This “hypothesis of equal reliabilities” (Lance and Vandenberg 2000:34) 
further supported the notion that these measures were equivalent at each data point as 
seen in the model-fit difference tests between Models IE and ID.
Figure 5.1. Results of Longitudinal Confirmatory Factor Analysis (LCFA) (Model IB)
.34 (.11)
Patriarchal 
Attitudes 
End of 1st 
Year
Patriarchal
Attitudes
Pre-College
.72 (.11).55 (.12).63 (.12) -7? (-13) .64 (.11)
askforit hitwife herfaultcrywolf askforit2 crywolf2 hitwife2 herfault2
e8e6el e3 e4e2 e5 e7
.09NS (.05 ) -2 9 ** (-05) •16* (-06) ,.34***(.04)
***p < .001; **p < .01; * < .05
Notes: All factor loadings and values in bold are significant (p < .001). All values are standardized estimates with SE in parentheses. 
Model fit indicators: *2 = 16.78, df = 15, p = .332; CFI = .997; RMSEA = .02.
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Since the conceptual domain showed consistency in the structural measures of 
patriarchal ideology across time, the final step in making sure that longitudinal 
measurement invariance was established was to compare factor loadings from Wave 1 to 
Wave 2. Parameter constraints were removed (with the exception of reference indicators) 
meaning individual factor weights were compared in Model IB using z-tests (i.e. critical 
ratios of indifference). The z-scores for all factors showed no significant differences (z <
1.96) across data points, further supporting the notion that patriarchal ideology had 
longitudinal measurement invariance. In sum, the LCFA with equivalence tests answer 
Q2 by simply saying: the measures for patriarchal attitudes were invariant over time.
PREDICTORS OF PATRIARCHAL ATTITUDES BEFORE AND AFTER ONE YEAR 
OF COLLEGE
Q3: What are the Predictors o f  Patriarchal Attitudes before College and after One Year 
o f  College?
A correlation matrix containing bivariate Pearson’s r correlations among all 
variables can be found in Table 5.6. Instead of including each individual indicator of 
patriarchal attitudes, the composite scales are provided (i.e shortened in name due to 
space to Pattitudesl and Pattitudes2). Bivariate analyses were conducted to get a feel for 
what relationships would likely be significant in multivariate analyses.
Table 5.6. Pearson’s r Correlation Matrix, Cohort 2 Deleted
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
1 White 1.00
2 WitnessDV .04 1.00
3 Religious -.12 .05 1.00
4 SAP1 .05 .00 .13 1.00
5 Single 1 .04 -.03 .02 .04 1.00
6 FDaterl .10 -.05 .02 -.05 .03 1.00
7 PatPeersl -.02 .02 -.00 -.18** .02 .20*** 1.00
8 Pattitudesl -.10 .20*** .03 -.07 .03 .00 .07 1.00
9 RVP1 .04 .11 -.05 -.04 -.10 .34*** .09 .13** 1.00
10RVV1 .09 .11 -.03 -.01 -.08 .37*** .15** .11 79*** 1.00
11SAP2 -.00 -.01 .05 .32*** -.13* -.05 -.22** -.05 -.04 -.03 1.00
12Single2 -.07 -.05 -.07 .01 -.13* -.24*** -.04 .07 -.08 -.13* -.00 1.00
13FDater2 .07 .04 .05 -.02 -.07 .45*** .01 .06 .12 .18** -.05 -.39*** 1.00
14 Pat Peers2 .06 .25*** -.05 -.13* .04 .14** .45*** .10 .12 .10 -.14* .08 .07 1.00
15Pattitudes2 -.15* .15* .03 -.09 -.06 -.04 .18*** .38*** .04 .03 .02 .02 -.07 .09 1.00
16RVP2 -.07 .10 l o t © o\ -.09 .20** .09 .08 .38*** .31*** .01 -.26*** .13*** .01 .24*** 1.0
17RVV2 -.12 .07 -.00 -.04 -.10 .23*** .11 .13* .33*** .37*** .06 -.24*** 19*** .03 .22** .82*** 1.0
***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05
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SEM was used to assess the predictors o f patriarchal attitudes for the pretest and 
the posttest, independent of one another, known as MIMIC models (see Figure 4.3 from 
previous chapter). Results from both of these MIMIC models can be found in Figure 5.2 
(Wave 1) and Figure 5.3 (Wave 2). A few of these key relationships are discussed 
herein, but keep in mind that two models were assessed, independent of one another so as 
not to confuse auto-correlated effects. At Wave 1 the independent variables explained 
11 % of the variance in patriarchal attitudes, as evidenced by the squared multiple 
correlations (SMC) of the patriarchal attitudes predictors. At Wave 2, the independent 
variables explained 15% of the variance in patriarchal attitudes (SMC = .15).
As seen in Figure 5.2, witnessing domestic violence was significantly related to 
patriarchal attitudes at Wave 1 (b = .24, SE = .17, p < .001), but not at Wave 2 
(b = .13, SE = .21, p = .07). This indicates that pre-college patriarchal attitudes were .22 
units higher among individuals that witnessed domestic violence compared to those that 
did not witness domestic violence as a child while controlling for other key independent 
variables. However, the negative effects witnessing domestic violence had on patriarchal 
attitudes appeared to subside after the first year o f college. White was significantly 
related to patriarchal attitudes at Wave 2 (b = -.14, SE = .15, p < .05), but not Wave 1 (b 
= .10, SE = .12, p > .05). That is, whites and non-whites had no significant differences in 
patriarchal attitudes before college, but after that first year whites’ patriarchal attitudes 
were .14 units lower than non-whites. Frequency in dating was not significantly related 
to patriarchal attitudes at Wave 1 (b = -.04, SE = .10, p > .05) but at Wave 2 it did 
approach significance (b = -. 14, SE = . 11, p = .07). This indicates that frequency in 
dating did not have any effect on pre-college patriarchal attitudes. However, frequent
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daters in college had levels of patriarchal attitudes that were -.14 units less than 
individuals that rarely dated.
Regarding relationship violence perpetration and victimization, neither one at 
Wave 1 or Wave 2 were significant predictors of patriarchal attitudes. Relationship 
violence perpetration at Wave 1 approached significance (b = .18, SE = .10, p = .07). 
Because this variable was computed using the In function, this implies that for every unit 
increase in relationship violence perpetration, we would expect a 19% increase in 
patriarchal attitudes while holding all other independent variables constant.
MEAN DIFFERENCES IN PATRIARCHAL ATTITUDES
Q4: Do Patriarchal Attitudes Change from Pre-College to the end o f  One's Freshman 
Year?
Recall that the earlier paired-samples t-test of the patriarchal attitudes scale 
originally showed significant differences (t = -9.90, d f = 457, p < .001) in mean values 
from Wave 1 (= 8.29) to Wave 2 (x = 10.26), but remember that this scale initially 
contained Cohort 2. The paired samples t-test also included just 458 of the original 636 
respondents that were combined from cohorts 1 and 2 due to missing values (i.e. listwise 
deletion). Since Cohort 2 lacked measurement reliability and only Cohort 1 was being 
used, a similar comparison to this earlier t-test was to do the same paired-samples t-test of 
just Cohort 1, which Table 5.2 reported earlier in this chapter.
Figure 5.2. MIMIC Model for Wave 1
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Figure 5.3. MIMIC Model for Wave 2
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In short, the average level of patriarchal attitudes decreased from Wave 1 to Wave 
2. However, this decrease was not statistically significant, indicating patriarchal ideology 
was stable from the initial, pre-college values to the end of one’s freshman year.
However, the paired samples t-test was not as robust o f a test for assessing mean 
difference scores as a CFA with structured means (see Arbuckle 2009: 229-240 for a 
review). The main reason the CFA with structured means is more reliable is its ability to 
model error-terms for each indicator/factor as well as the ability to include the full sample 
size for Cohort 1 (n = 332) by using maximum-likelihood (ML) estimation for missing 
values lost to attrition at Wave 2.
CFA with structured means comparisons were assessed using multi-group 
structural equation modeling (MGSEM). All models and their appropriate goodness-of- 
fit statistics are presented in Table 5.4. The first step in the MGSEM was establishing 
appropriate model fit for each wave separately, which was the CFA models from Q1 that 
already showed reliable measures for each independent wave. The next step involved the 
initial, baseline multi-group model (Model 1.1), which freely estimated all parameters 
(with the exception of one reference indicator for each data point). As expected, Model 
1.1 had acceptable model fit with the data. The next model constrained all parameters 
equal to one another (Model 1.2). This model also had good model fit and showed no 
significant differences (p > .05) from it to Model 1.1. The next model (Model 1.3) 
constrained the intercepts of each factor equal to one another while keeping all of the 
previous parameter constraints from Model 1.2. Model 1.3 also produced good model fit. 
Next, Model 1.4 removed the Wave 1 latent variable (patriarchal attitudes) mean 
constraint, which defaults = 0. The Wave 2 mean constraint of 0 remained. Since SEM
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is typically not used for mean difference comparisons, there is no procedure for 
computing a mean for each latent variable simultaneously (Arbuckle 2012). Thus, either 
Wave 1 or Wave 2 needed its mean constrained to 0 while the other was freely estimated 
(while keeping all previous constraints). The constraining o f the Wave 2 mean to 0 was 
completely arbitrary. As seen in Table 5.4, Model 1.4 had good model fit. The mean in 
patriarchal attitudes at Wave 1 was .04 units higher than the mean at Wave 2. However, 
this difference was not statistically significant (p = .602), indicating the answer to Q3 is 
simply: patriarchal attitudes did not change from their pre-college levels to the end o f  the 
first year o f college.
PATRIARCHAL ATTITUDES AND STABILITY
Q5: What Accounts fo r  the Change or Stability in Patriarchal Attitudes from Pre- 
College to the End o f One ’s Freshman Year?
The earlier measurement model assessing longitudinal measurement invariance of 
patriarchal attitudes found that the correlation between the two latent factors was 
significant, but only moderate in strength (r = .34, p < .001). The value of this 
autocorrelation led to the assumption that patriarchal attitudes were stable over time (i.e. 
stability coefficients). This assumption was strengthened by the previous mean 
comparison tests.
Table 5.7. Goodness-of-Fit Statistics for Multi-Group Structural Equation Models
Model and Description
Comparative
Model x2 df P CFI RMSEA
<1 Adf A X2 Sig.
1.1 Unconstrained multi-group 
model 4.49 4 .343 .999 .014
1.2 Constrained factor loadings
1.3 Constrained factor loadings
1.1 vs 1.2 6.99 7 .430 1.00 0.00 2.50 3 0.475
and factor intercepts 
1.4. Constrained factor 
loadings, factor intercepts. M  of
1.2 vs 1.3 10.11 11 .520 1.00 0.00 3.12 4 0.538
Patriarchal Atitudesl = freely 
estimated, mean of Patriarchal 
Attitudes = 0.
1.4 vs 1.3a 9.84 10 .455 1.00 0.00 0.27 1 0.603
Notes: df = degrees of freedom; CFI = Comparative Fit Index; RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation. aThe x2 and df 
were both lower than the previous model because Model 1.3 had mean constraints = 0 for patriarchal attitudes at both waves (the 
default value in SEM) and Model 1.4 only constrained one of these.
Stoolmiller and Bank (1995) suggested that when repeated measures produce 
small levels of change, autoregressive (AR) SEM (i.e. residual change model) may be 
better than simple difference score (SDS) models at assessing predictors o f change. 
Arbuckle (2012) provides an alternative to the popular ANCOVA technique when 
variance over time is of interest and is most closely in line with the autoregressive 
method. The first approach simply took the previous LCFA from Q2 and changes the 
model from a measurement model to a structural model by replacing the double-headed 
covariance between the two latent factors o f patriarchal attitudes with a single-headed 
arrow from Wave 1 to Wave 2. The first step actually produced a regression weight that 
was exactly the same as the previous covariance value as well as model fit parameters 
that were the same as the LCFA (which were reliable). Thus, the previous LCFA showed 
reliable measurement and introducing manifest variables in an autoregressive SEM could 
continue. However, due to model complexity, patriarchal attitudes were included in these 
models as a composite scale (i.e. observed variable). Also, since the previous chapter 
noted the somewhat exploratory nature of these analyses, the goal was to create the most 
parsimonious model based on sound theory and empirical evidence from previous 
analyses. Therefore, the new model (seen in Figure 5.4, with results) includes the 
constant variables witnessed domestic violence and white (excluding religious due to 
non-significance in earlier analyses). The time-variant measures included: patriarchal 
peers, relationship violence perpetration 1 and patriarchal attitudes 1. Other time-variable 
measures were left out because of non-significance and frequent dater was included at 
first, but doing so produced poor-fitting models. The model was not fully-identified so as
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to allow for some flexibility in degrees of freedom. The final model, pictured in Figure 
5.4, had acceptable goodness-of-fit statistics (x2 = 2.33, d f = 5, p = .803).
A few things should be highlighted from Figure 5.4. First, the predictors of each 
time-variable measure are all fairly weak at explaining the variance in each (i.e. squared 
multiple correlations), presented as R2. Regarding stability, or predictors for Wave 2 
variables, the only significant cause parameter is the parameter from Patriarchal Peers 1 to 
patriarchal attitudes2 (b = .14, SE = .02). The variance in the residuals for each repeated 
measure further suggested stability in that z-scores reflect no significant changes in each 
(z< 1.96).
Although it was known prior to this analysis that accounting for change in a two- 
wave panel design is inherently difficult, a tentative conclusion can be drawn for now. 
That is, the answer to Q5 is simply: accounting fo r  the stability in patriarchal ideology is 
very difficult with the current dataset. Although this answer to Q5 may be entirely 
unsatisfying, it is the only valid answer considering the available data. Given the 
confounding issues with two-wave panel designs, any other conclusions might be 
erroneous. However, one area to discuss is in the area of male peer influence on 
patriarchal attitudes. Patriarchal peers might cause stability in patriarchal attitudes in 
college but the origin of patriarchal attitudes before college starts appears to be unrelated 
to patriarchal peers. Keep in mind, however, the effect o f patriarchal peers in the cross- 
sectional analyses was non-significant when other controls were added to the model.
This is a point further explored in the discussion chapter, Chapter 8.
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RECIPROCAL EFFECTS OF RELATIONSHIP VIOLENCE AND PATRIARCHAL 
ATTITUDES
Q6: What are the Reciprocal Effects o f  Patriarchal Attitudes and Experiences with 
Relationship Violence?
The directionality of the patriarchal attitudes/relationship violence variables was 
going to be assessed using non-recursive SEM. Unfortunately, these were not possible. 
Cross-lagged, non-recursive models require at least three data points (Kenny 2012). An 
alternative was to at least conduct a cross-sectional, non-recursive model for each wave 
independently. This too was problematic. Essentially, non-recursive causal models 
suffer from inherent problems of under-identification (Berry 1984). One way around this 
is to include exogenous variables that covary, but predict different outcomes (i.e. 
instrumental variables). This was not possible with either Wave 1 or Wave 2. Simply 
adding non-significant variables to improve model fit (i.e. adding a variable = 0 was the 
same thing as not adding a variable) was inappropriate.
Figure 5.4. Autoregressive SEM Assessing Predictors of Change/Stability in Patriarchal Attitudes
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In short, Q6 could not be answered because o f  limitations in the data that prevent 
logical theoretical tests o f  reciprocal relations between patriarchal attitudes and 
relationship violence. Fortunately, the data in the next chapter had three data points and 
non-recursive models could be conducted that assessed the reciprocal relationship 
between relationship violence and patriarchal attitudes.
LIMITATIONS
Assessing change in two-wave panel designs can involve a number of statistical 
approaches (Kline 2011; Markus 1979). While the numerous analysis techniques are 
partially a reflection of how advanced statistical techniques have become, none o f these 
can account for the fact that assessing change from just two waves of data is inherently 
difficult. However, two-wave panel models can provide preliminary insight into building 
more complex (or more parsimonious) theoretical models, which could aid in the 
analyses covered in the next two chapters.
One benefit of having fewer data points in a longitudinal analysis is that the threat 
to internal validity known as history is far less likely (see Campbell and Stanley 1963). 
While other threats to internal validity are also minimized in one group pre-test/post-test 
designs, history is particularly important to discuss when dealing with concepts like 
patriarchal ideology that may be influenced by macro-level factors. Although it was 
previously discussed that changes in the structure of patriarchy can occur without any 
change to the ideological components, this does not mean institutional sources can never 
influence patriarchal ideology. The limited data points here, and the relatively short time
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period between them (9 months) is beneficial for reducing the likelihood that aggregate 
and/or exogenous variables that are unaccounted for will influence the outcomes.
This limitation, however, seems contradictory to the longitudinal measurement 
variability of patriarchal attitudes for Cohort 2. Also, keep in mind that Chapter 4 had a 
footnote (Footnote 2) that showed these measures were unreliable for Wave 3 for Cohort 
1. Admittedly, these findings were completely unexpected. It is possible that these 
measures were just not reliable over time and perhaps it was mere coincidence that Wave 
1 and Wave 2 were reliable for Cohort 1. Attitudinal measures, after all, are considered. 
Despite this, some have measured ideological constructs reliably in the past (see Chapter 
3). There may be something unique about patriarchal ideology that makes attitudinal 
constructions of them variable over time and perhaps other methods of capturing this 
construct are more reliable. Theoretically and methodologically these points, in general, 
are definitely possibilities. However, I suspect that the actual data collection techniques 
were the likely culprit for the lack of longitudinal measurement invariance.
At the beginning of this chapter, I gave the breakdown of the sample size 
distributions at each data point for each cohort. In the next chapter I do the same 
regarding the vignette-style items. Although more detailed in that section, briefly, I 
should mention that Cohort 1 was not given those items at Wave 2, but Cohort 2 and 
Cohort 3 were. Once Cohort 1 was given these items at Wave 3, the reliability o f the 
attitudinal items dropped considerably. Moreover, 175 respondents from Cohort 1 at 
Wave 3 were missing from the attitudinal items, the same number o f  respondents that 
had valid responses to the newly added vignette items. This seemed too odd o f a 
coincidence, but nowhere in the codebook was this mentioned. The principal investigator
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was also unaware of any overlap in items that would create this issue5. This is one o f the 
consequences of dealing with older datasets, unfortunately, and is one of the limitations 
in this data. Pointing out the confounding issues o f these items actually helps solidify the 
analyses that were done, however. If the only times (with the exception of Wave 3, 
where it appears half the sample received the vignette-style items and half received the 
attitudinal items for Cohort 1) that the attitudinal measures were not reliable were when 
these new items were not included in the surveys, then most likely the survey 
construction is the real reason for the lack of longitudinal measurement reliability for 
Cohort 2 and for more than 2 data points.
The last limitation to discuss in this chapter is that this sample of college males 
was not generalizable to males in the general population. Additionally, the college 
students selected are not nationally representative o f all college students since they are 
from one college. Also, the emphasis placed on intersectionality in previous chapters 
cannot account for the fact that the use of a homogenous sample of college students 
produces nothing more than a dichotomous measure of race and no indicators of SES.
The use of a non-representative sample is somewhat problematic for theory building 
concerned with patriarchal ideology for men in general. However, insights can be gained 
from the current research since it is really the first o f its kind to assess individual 
patriarchal ideology as the key outcome variable for any sample o f  males. Future studies 
should analyze individual patriarchal ideology over time amongst samples o f the general 
population, especially those with more variable race categories and some measure of
5 Jackie White, email correspondence, November 11,2011.
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SES. College men, however, do present some unique attributes that make them 
interesting to study. This is why many research studies involving violence against 
women have relied on samples of college men (e.g. DeKeseredy and Kelly 1993b; Koss 
et al. 1987; Porter and Williams 2011; Schwartz and DeKeseredy 1997).
CONCLUSION
This chapter provided the analyses that addressed 6 major research questions 
about attitudinal measures of patriarchal ideology. The panel data of college males from 
1990-1991 was analyzed in a test/retest manner in order to assess: 1) the measurement 
structure of the attitudinal items of patriarchal ideology, 2) the reliability o f these 
measures over time, 3) the predictors o f patriarchal ideology, 4) the change/stability in 
patriarchal ideology, 5) the reasons for the change/stability, and 6) the reciprocal 
relationships between patriarchal ideology and relationship violence experiences.
The findings imply that attitudinal measures o f patriarchal ideology are reliable, 
even over time with only minor reservations, most likely due to data collection 
techniques. In multivariate analyses, witnessing domestic violence between one’s parents 
suggested a higher level of pre-college patriarchal ideology than those that did not 
witness domestic violence, while controlling for other key independent variables. These 
effects were not as significant at the end of the first year of college, although a  levels did 
approach significance. This was the only significant predictor of pre-college patriarchal 
ideology, although relationship violence perpetration did approach the a  level as those 
with higher levels of involvement were likely to have higher levels of patriarchal 
ideology. At Wave 2, the only significant predictor of patriarchal ideology was race,
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suggesting non-whites had higher levels o f patriarchal ideology than whites. One 
variable besides witnessing domestic violence approached the a  level of significance at 
Wave 2, was dating frequency. That is, those that dated rarely or only occasionally in the 
first year of college appeared to have lower levels of patriarchal ideology than those that 
dated frequently.
Regarding change, individual patriarchal ideology appears to have been stable 
from wave to wave. The exact source of this stability was difficult to assess, although 
there was some evidence that patriarchal male peers prior to college significantly 
predicted higher levels of patriarchal ideology after the first year o f college. Patriarchal 
male peers during college, however, were not indicative o f a higher level o f patriarchal 
ideology. In other words, it appears patriarchal male peers before college may have a 
delayed effect on patriarchal ideology, since they were not significant predictors until 
after the first year of college. No other explanations for stability could be drawn. The 
last research question could not be assessed. This was either due to non-reciprocity 
between patriarchal ideology and relationship violence experiences because these 
constructs/experiences are just not related (hence why none of the models were reliable) 
or limitations in the data.
Some of the limitations in the data and analyses from this chapter are addressed in 
the next two chapters. Those analyses ask very similar research questions in comparison 
to those addressed in this chapter. Although there are slight variations in these questions, 
overall, they, in combination with this chapter’s questions, address the overall question 
of: how does patriarchal ideology change over time and what accounts for these changes
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(if any)? After the next two chapters is Chapter 8, the Discussions chapter in which 
many of the findings from this chapter and the next two will be put into context.
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CHAPTER VI
METHODS: ASSESSING INDIVIDUAL PATRIARCHAL IDEOLOGY OVER TIME 
USING LATENT GROWTH CURVE MODELING
In this chapter, a major limitation of the previous analyses is addressed. 
Specifically, the difficulty in assessing “true change” in individual patriarchal ideology 
from two data points is addressed in this chapter. This chapter describes a more 
sophisticated method for modeling intra- and inter-individual change in patriarchal 
ideology through the use o f latent growth curve modeling (LGM) over three waves of 
data. LGM accounts for some of the deficiencies found in the previous chapter’s 
analyses, but is not without its own limitations. As Rogosa, Brandt, and Zimowski 
(1982) so eloquently put it, “To discard the logic of models for individual change because 
of the deficiencies of two-wave data is like ‘throwing away the baby with the bathwater”’ 
(735). The prior chapters’ analyses, along with those described in this chapter (results in 
Chapter 7), complement one another in providing a holistic approach to understanding 
individual patriarchal ideology. Outside of the LGM approach, the other key distinction 
in the second major analysis is the key outcome, patriarchal ideology, is measured with 
vignette-based items instead o f attitudinal measures. Five of the key research questions 
addressed with the LGM analyses (which closely parallel research questions from the 
previous two chapters) are:
Ql: Are the vignette-based items reliable measures of patriarchal ideology?
Q2: Does patriarchal ideology change over time?
Q3: If patriarchal ideology does change, in what direction does it change (i.e.
what is the trajectory o f patriarchal ideology over time)?
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Q4: How does patriarchal ideology change over time (i.e. direction of trajectory) 
in conjunction with relationship violence involvement?
Q5: What predicts the variation in patriarchal ideology over time?
Q6: What is the reciprocal relationship between patriarchal ideology and 
relationship violence?
Unlike the previous chapter, where all research questions were addressed in the analysis 
chapter, Ql and Q2 are addressed in this chapter, and the remaining questions are in 
Chapter 7. This was done so that Chapter 7 would focus entirely on multivariate growth 
and change in the key variables of interest.
This chapter begins with a description of the data and sample used in this chapter 
and Chapter 7. This is followed by a discussion of the key variables o f interest, including 
their descriptive statistics and reliability analyses for key constructs. Then, bivariate 
analyses are performed to help get a basic understanding of some o f the key relationships 
of interest in later multivariate models. Lastly, the growth curve models used to address 
many of the above research questions are explained. The next chapter (Chapter 7) 
presents the results of various models aimed at addressing Q3-Q6.
DATA AND SAMPLE
The methods described in this chapter rely on data from the same Longitudinal 
Study of Violence against Women (White et al. 2002) as the previous test/retest analyses. 
As part of the original research design, the items used to represent patriarchal ideology in 
this chapter were added to the survey after the initial wave of data collection. Thus,
Wave 2 (end of first year of college; end of freshman year), Wave 3 (end of second year
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of college; end of sophomore year), Wave 4 (end of third year of college; end of junior 
year), and Wave 5 (end o f fourth year of college; end of senior year) all contained these 
items; however, Wave 5 was deleted because the sample size was too small for LGM (n < 
200; see Byrne 2010)1. This left Wave 2, Wave 3, and Wave 4 as the data points under 
study for the current chapter, with results in the very next chapter (Chapter 7). Since the 
previous chapter used this same dataset, the waves of data are called Waves 2, 3, and 4 
even though Wave 2 was the initial/baseline data point fo r  this chapter.
Recall that the original sample size was 851. However, this number was reduced 
when respondents with missing answers (mainly due to attrition) at all three waves 
regarding the key dependent variable o f patriarchal ideology were deleted from the 
dataset. Thus, the initial sample size for Wave 2 was 578. That is, 578 respondents had 
at least 1 data point in which they responded to the key outcome variable o f interest: 
patriarchal ideology. Table 6.1 summarizes the total sample size at each time point along 
with sample retention rates.
1 Class level changes are not automatic from year to year if the appropriate credits are not 
met. However, the assumption was that most participants were making satisfactory 
progress from one academic school year to the next. While it is possible some may have 
made satisfactory progress towards graduation within 4 years and not made the expected, 
time-appropriate increase in class status, the time periods are at times referred to in 
relation to class-status (e.g. “end of sophomore year”). This was done mainly because of 
the generality and easy frame of reference that college-class level provides.
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Missing Data
Recall that in the previous two-wave panel analyses there were three cohorts 
combined into one dataset as part o f an accelerated-cohort sequential design. By 
combining all cohorts, the original research assumed cohort effects were not present, 
essentially employing a traditional longitudinal design. Table 6.1 provides clarity 
regarding the size of each cohort at each wave of data collection since there was data 
missing by design as well as data missing due to attrition. Cohort 1 was the only cohort 
that did not receive the items/indicators o f patriarchal ideology across all three time 
points and for reasons not discussed by the original researchers, they only received these 
measures at Waves 3 and 4 (i.e. missing by design at the initial data point, see Little and 
Rubin 1989). When data were missing by design, they were treated as MCAR whenever 
LGMs were used (see Duncan, Duncan, and Strycker 2006)2. These missing cases, as 
well as those lost due to attrition, and those missing due to item non-response (< 5%) 
were later estimated using maximum-likelihood (ML).
2 Like the panel data from Chapter 4, the MCAR assumption was supported by an 
independent samples t-test was performed comparing the mean level of patriarchal 
ideology among those that remained at all three waves and those that dropped out (at any 
point). There were no significant differences between the patriarchal ideology of those 
that were retained at all three waves and those that dropped out of the study.
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Table 6.1. Sample Size for Valid Responses for each Data Point for Cohorts 1, 2, and 3 
Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4
End of End of Average Retention
Freshman Sophomore End of Junior Retention Wave 1 to 
Year__________Year________ Year____Percentage Wave 3
Cohort 1 0 (1991)* 175(1992) 120(1993) 69% 69%
Cohort 2 241 (1992) 181 (1993) 112(1994) 69% 47%
Cohort 3
Total Sample 
Size
157(1993) 94(1994) 66(1995)
398 450 298
65%
N/A
42%
N/A
Notes: Retention percentages o f total sample are not listed since these can be difficult to 
interpret since Wave 3 “retained” more respondents than those that were available at 
Wave 2. “Items were not given to Cohort 1 until Wave 3 (i.e. missing by design).
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Many of the variable descriptions discussed below appeared in the earlier two- 
wave panel models. The descriptive statistics of these, however, differ from those in 
Chapter 4. This is because of the differences in: the number of cohorts used, the number 
of data points, and the data points used including the initial wave of data. Also, because 
of various issues regarding missing data, some variables were excluded from the previous 
chapter while some new variables were introduced.
OPERATIONALIZING PATRIARCHAL IDEOLOGY WITH VIGNETTES
Whether or not the use of vignette items to represent ideologies is “better” or
“worse” than traditionally used “attitude/agreement” statements is a contested issue.
Finch (1987:105) correctly discussed how challenging it can be to study ideologies when
she stated, “The empirical study of beliefs, values and norms has always posed some of
the most difficult methodological questions for sociology.” Using an individual’s actions
as a reflection of their ideology is highly problematic for two obvious reasons. First, the
psychological literature on cognitive dissonance tells us an individual’s actions can be at
odds with their ideology. Second, this can be tautological if trying to predict an
individual’s actions based on their ideology (when the ideological measures contain the
very actions one is interested in, in the first place). Finch (1987) argued for the use of
vignettes as one of the more reliable measurement tools to measure ideology. Note the
less subjective and contextual components of attitudes/ideologies:
Vignettes move further away again from a direct and abstracted approach, and 
allow for features o f the context to be specified, so that the respondent is being 
invited to make normative statements about a set of social circumstances, rather 
than to express his or her ‘beliefs’ or ‘values’ in a vacuum. It is a method which, 
in other words, acknowledges that meanings are social and that morality may well 
be situationally specific. (Finch 1987:105-106)
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Finch’s argument helps make the case for why vignettes might be preferred when 
researchers are specifically measuring ideological concepts. Specific to violence against 
women, research from Pease and Flood (2008) has echoed Finch. They argued against 
the use of attitudinal statements in saying, “ideology is more concerned with how 
individual character is shaped by social conditions and social consciousness’’ [emphasis 
added] (554). The use of vignette-style items in assessing patriarchal ideology appears to 
be just as reliable, if not a better measurement technique than traditional attitudinal items.
The vignettes described in this chapter represent a dimension of patriarchal 
ideology: rape myth acceptance. At first glance, this may appear to be quite limiting 
since four dimensions of patriarchal ideology were previously discussed (i.e. 
dominance/power over women, hostile masculinity, rape myth acceptance, acceptance of 
violence against women). Recall that rape myth acceptance overlaps considerably with 
acceptance of violence against women and dominance/power over women. This is 
because rape is viewed as intrinsically violent3. At the same time, rape is a direct form of 
dominance for the individual perpetrator and at times institutional responses to rape have 
resulted in the continued subordination of women (Caringella 2009; Sanday 2007).
3 These issues are highlighted by Caringella (2009) who notes changes in legal 
terminology, “Redefining rape as criminal violence, or replacing the rape-as-sex view 
with the notion of rape-as-violence, is designed to make rape and/or sexual assault 
offenses as serious, legally and sociologically speaking, as other offenses that are violent 
in nature.” However, she further argues that not all sexual assaults are violent and the 
sexual nature of these crimes can sometimes be lost if  one nuances these terms.
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Whether rape myth acceptance should be treated as a dimension of patriarchal ideology 
or as an indicator of an existing dimension is still unclear. For the current study, it is the 
only component of patriarchal ideology that the vignettes measured. For these reasons, 
the combination of these six items might be considered a proxy measure of patriarchal 
ideology.
OUTCOME VARIABLES AND RELIABILITY
Dependent Variable: Patriarchal Ideology
Patriarchal ideology was operationalized using six vignette-style items in which
male respondents were given the following scenario:
There are a number of circumstances under which some people think it is OK to 
have sex with a woman who didn’t want to (i.e., resisted verbally and/or 
physically). How likely is it you would have sex with a woman when she didn’t 
want to if each of the following happened? (White et al. 2002)
The vignettes were:
You spend a lot of money on her.
She’s had sexual intercourse with other guys.
She previously had sexual intercourse with you.
She is stoned or drunk.
She gets you sexually excited.
She said she’s going to have sex with you and then changes her mind.
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Responses were based on Likert-scale items (0- Never, 1- Very Unlikely, 2- Somewhat 
Unlikely, 3- Somewhat Likely, 4- Very Likely)4.
Ql: Are the Vignette-Based Items Reliable Measures o f  Patriarchal Ideology?
The six vignette-based items were scaled into composite variables called 
Patriarchal Ideology2 (at times shortened for space and clarity to PID2), Patriarchal 
Ideology3 (at times PID3), and Patriarchal Ideology4 (at times PID4) for each respective 
wave. When referring to this variable in general and not in terms of any specific wave, it 
is presented as simply, “Patriarchal Ideology.” Each of the time-specific measures of 
patriarchal ideology had strong levels o f reliability as evidenced by their Cronbach’s a  
values: Wave 2 (a = .901), Wave 3 (a  = .920), and Wave 4 (a  = .966). The descriptive 
statistics for these dependent variables can be found in Table 6.2. As anticipated, the six-
4 Original response options were: 0- No Response, 1- Very likely, 2- Somewhat likely, 3- 
Somewhat unlikely, 4- Very Unlikely, 5- Never. Response options were re-coded from 
the original data so that higher scores^ would indicate a higher degree o f patriarchal 
ideology and 0 would be the baseline, consistent with other variables. Non-response 
items were recoded into a 9-Missing and were list wise deleted when all items were 
combined into a scale.
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item scale had a positive skew5. Therefore, the variable PIDln was created to induce 
normality, in which the In function of PID was computed (+ 1 due to 0 starting point). 
This was done for each time period (i.e. PIDln2, PIDln3, PIDln4). Because the 
patriarchal ideology variable was skewed, only the In version of the variable was used in 
any of the analyses from this point forward. So when “patriarchal ideology” is seen in 
any of the analyses in the remaining sections of this chapter, it is the In version, even if it 
is not explicitly labeled as such. Based on the a  values for each composite scale, the 
answer to Ql is simply: yes the six vignette-style items all scaled together to form one 
reliable construct at each data point.
The previous chapter did emphasize the importance of checking for longitudinal 
measurement invariance (i.e. longitudinal CFA). Longitudinal measurement invariance 
was not assessed here, however, because such models make more sense to conduct when 
latent factors are used in subsequent SEM models. LGM does not typically use latent
5 Although Chapter 3 highlighted that patriarchal ideology is normalized (e.g. complicit 
masculinities), these measures were proxy measures and were really only one dimension 
of patriarchal ideology, rape myth acceptance. However, since the items were based on 
hypothetical scenarios in which individuals would behave, most individuals were thought 
to report that they would not rape in almost any circumstance, hence the positive skew. 
Theoretically, however, we would expect these values to be less extreme (as they were in 
the previous chapter) if they were traditional “acceptance of rape myths”-type measures 
in which they accepted rape in general (e.g. not individualizing it, friends use of rape).
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constructs (since the slope and mean are modeled as latent factors). Although it is 
possible to first create a latent variable CFA and then assess the slope and mean of the 
latent construct as second-order factors, these models are quite complex and are difficult 
to fit with data from relatively small samples such as the one currently being used. While 
this may seem limiting to some, requiring latent factors as outcomes and means as well as 
slopes as second order factors is not a common practice within the LGM literature. The 
primary focus of LGM is not latent psychometrics, but latent factors that represent the 
change in the outcome (Preacher et al. 2008).
Covariates o f Patriarchal Ideology: Relationship Violence
Table 6.2 also includes measures derived from 9 questions asked at all 3 waves 
that assessed relationship violence perpetration as well as another 9 items that assessed 
relationship violence victimization. Both the perpetration and victimization scale items 
contained 5 items regarding verbal aggression and 4 regarding physical aggression. The 
individual items were ordinal in that respondents were asked, “How often have these 
things happened during the last year?” Responses were: 0- 0 times, 1 - Once, 2- 2-5 
times, 3-6-10 times, 4- more than 10 times6.
6 These responses reflect the current coding scheme. They were re-coded from the 
original scheme of 0- No Response, 1- 0, 2- Once, 3- 2-5 times, 4- 6-10, 5- More than 10 
times. This was done for ease in interpretation so that 0 would reflect never, 1 would 
reflect 1, and then the subsequent numeric values would represent their respective 
categories.
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LGM requires that outcome variables and their covariates be continuous.
Ignoring the censored-nature of ordinal variables by combining them into composite 
scales produces highly skewed variables and over exaggerates less-serious 
ideologies/behaviors (Osgood et al. 2002). Nonetheless, two variables for each wave 
were created in which the ordinal nature was ignored and all 9 items were combined. 
These scales for relationship violence were known by their variable names of 
Relationship Violence Perpetration (at times shortened for space and/or clarity to RVP, 
followed by numeric values of either 2, 3, or 4 for each respective time point) and 
Relationship Violence Victimization (at times shortened to R W , followed by the 
appropriate value for the respective time point). As expected, these items were positively 
skewed. In order to reduce their skew, the In function of each was computed (+1 due to 
“0” starting point). These newly computed variables can also be found in Table 6.2 (i.e. 
RVP21n, RVP31n, RVP41n, RW21n, RW31n, RVV41n). The reason for treating these 
measures as continuous was done in an exploratory sense in order to see how these items 
would perform in the subsequent LGMs since no prior research has assessed individual 
patriarchal ideology over time while controlling for the covariance of relationship 
violence variables. A third pair of variables were created for each wave in regards to 
perpetration that were similar to those created in the previous chapter in which the 9 
items were dichotomized (0- Never, 1- Ever) then summed into one composite scale. 
Hindelang et al. (1981) found this to be reliable when dealing with skewed self-reported 
delinquency since: it induced normality, the higher values reflected more serious offenses
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(ideologies in the present case), and it avoided potential problems with assigning metric 
values to ordered categories. These variables actually remained non-normal (skewness 
statistic > 1.0 , albeit less skewed than the original measures) after items were 
dichotomized. Because these variables did not meet the assumptions o f normality, they 
were not included in any of the analyses. They are mentioned here because it was one 
possible alternative to the In transformation, which ignored the ordinal nature of these 
variables (i.e. RVPln and RVVln variables). However, the variables that ignored the 
ordinal nature of these variables were preferred because it is far less biased than including 
non-normal measures. All composite scales for relationship violence perpetration and 
victimization across all waves were indicative of reliability (Cronbach’s a  > .80).
Time- Variant Measures
The descriptive statistics for the time-variant measures described below can be 
found in Table 6.3.
Dating Frequency. Respondent’s frequency in which they dated was captured 
over each wave of data with the question, “Which of the following best describes your 
dating behavior during the past school year? By a date we mean a planned activity with a 
specific person.” Responses ranged from: 0- Never dated to 4- Dated Frequently7. This 
variable label was “Frequent Dater” so that positive values would indicate a higher
7 See previous note regarding the coding of this variable.
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frequency in dating. At times, this variable is presented simply as “Dating” due to space 
limitations (e.g. Table 6 .6 ).
Relationship Status. Relationship status was captured over three waves. As 
expected, most respondents were either single or in some form of a relationship (e.g. 
dating someone exclusively, engaged, married, divorced/separated/widowed). Thus, this 
variable was dichotomized (0- Not Single, 1 - Single) and was simply called: “Single” so 
that positive values would reflect one’s single-status.
Sexual Assault Program Attendance. Respondents were asked whether or not 
they had ever attended a sexual assault awareness program. The responses were 
dichotomized (0- No, 1-Yes). In reality, the only change one would expect in this 
variable (if any) would occur from “No” responses to a “Yes.” Respondents cannot undo 
the fact that they had attended a sexual assault program. Nonetheless, some respondent’s 
changed their responses from “Yes” to “No.” The decision was made to accept these 
changes under the assumption that a respondent that changed their answer from a yes to a 
no had not fully understood what a sexual assault program was in earlier waves of data 
collection. However, it is equally likely that they thought the question was in reference 
to the past year (despite no change in the wording of the question) or that they forgot 
about their earlier attendance. Statistically speaking, t-test results showed no significant 
differences in the average number of respondents attending a sexual assault program from 
wave to wave, justifying the assumption and not re-coding the variable. This variable 
name was, “Sex Assault Program” but at times is shortened due to space and/or clarity 
reasons to “SAP” (followed by a numeric value for each respective wave).
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Time-Invariant Predictors
The following predictors’ descriptive statistics can be found in Table 6.4.
Race. Respondent’s race was dichotomized (0 -Other, 1-White). Other racial 
groups were present in the original surveys, but since so few respondents were non-white 
dichotomizing the race variable seemed appropriate. “White” was given as a label since 
white was coded as 1 .
Witnessed Domestic Violence. Whether or not the respondent ever witnessed 
domestic violence between their parents was captured with the question, “For an average 
month, indicate how often one of your parents or stepparents delivered physical blows to 
the other.” Responses were ordinal: 1- Never, 2- One to five times, 3-Six to ten times, 4- 
11 to 20 times, 5- Over 20 times. Due to an expected skew and the difficulty SEM and 
LGM have with ordinal variables, this variable was dichotomized (0- Never witnessed 
domestic violence, 1- Witnessed domestic violence). For simplification, this variable was 
labeled, “Witnessed D. Violence.” At times, due to space limitations and/or clarity 
purposes, this variable is labeled “WitnessDV.”
Childhood Abuse Experiences. Whether or not the respondent was abused by a 
parent was asked with the question, “Physical blows (like hitting, kicking, throwing 
someone down) sometimes occur between family members. For an average month, when 
you were growing up (i.e., ages to years), indicate how often one of your parents did this 
to you.” Responses were ordinal: 1- Never, 2- One to five times, 3- Six to ten times, 4- 
11 to 20 times, 5- Over 20 times. It was hypothesized that in a sample of college 
students, most would not have experienced child abuse. This was supported in that this 
variable had a positive skew. Because of the skew and the difficulty SEM and LGM has
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with ordinal variables, this variable was dichotomized: 0- No, 1- Yes. This variable is 
labeled in most figures as “Victim of Child Abuse”, but at times, in some tables (e.g. 
Table 6 .6 ) is shortened for clarity and/or space to “CAbuse.
Religiosity. Religiosity was captured over three waves of data with the question, 
“How much of an influence would you say religion has on the way you choose to spend 
your time each day during this school year i.e. August to the present?” Responses ranged 
from: 0- No influence to 3- A great deal o f influence8. While religiosity was originally 
hypothesized to be time-variant, a paired samples t-test showed that the mean at each 
wave (Religiosity2, x = 1.04; Religiosity3 x = 1.05; Religiosity4 x = 1.04) was not 
significantly different from Wave 2 to Wave 3 nor from Wave 3 to Wave 4 (p > .05).
The lack of variability in the mean of religiosity justified the inclusion of it as an 
exogenous predictor variable, which was continuous.
Rapist Best Friend. Borrowing from the Koss et al. (1987) “Sexual Experiences 
Survey” there were 10 items assessing the respondent’s best friend’s use of attempted or 
completed coerced sex. Participants were asked how often (0- No, 1- One time, 2- Two 
times, 3- three to five times, 4- More than five times) their best friend engaged in various
8 The original variable was coded with the same responses ranging from 1 -4, but were 
changed in order to stay consistent with other variables, whose starting points were also 
0 .
Table 6.2. Descriptive Statistics of Key Outcome Variables
Variable Wave 2
(Coding)________________ n Mean (SD) skew
Patriarchal Ideology
(Range 0-24) 397 5.53 (6.43) 1.34
Patriarchal Ideologyln 397 1.38(1.03) 0.07
Rel. Viol. Perpetration
(Range 0-36) 557 2.72 (3.90) 2.49
Rel. Viol. Perpetration 567 0.91 (0.87) 0.49
Rel. Viol. Victimization
(Range 0-36) 566 3.55(5.07) 2.45
Rel. Viol. Victimizationln____ 566______ 1.04(0.96) 0.40
Wave 3 
n Mean (SD) skew
Wave 4 
n Mean (SD) skew
450 4.20(6.02) 1.76
450 1.07(1.06) 0.48
445 3.61 (4.99) 2.18
445 1.05(0.97) 0.37
445 3.57 (4.89) 2.27
445 1.07(0.95) 0.34
297 3.45(6.29) 2.11
297 0.78(1.10) 0.96
292 3.06 (4.49) 2.45
292 0.96(0.91) 0.47
295 3.88 (5.47) 2.24
295 1.09(0.98) 0.39
00-j
Table 6.3. Descriptive Statistics of Time-Variant Measures
Variable Wave 2
(Range/Coding)________  n Mean (SD) skew
Frequent Dater 
(Range 0-4) 569 3.16(0.97) -0.74
Single
(0-Not Single, 1-Single) 575 0.66(0.48) -0.67
Sex Assault Program 
Attendance
(0-No, 1-Yes) 557 0.19(0.40) 1.55
Wave 3 Wave 4
n Mean (SD) skew n Mean (SD) skew
447 2.33(1.31) 0.22
455 0.63 (0.48) -0.52
444 0.15(0.36) 1.93
296 3.27(0.96) -1.06
299 0.53 (0.50) -0.11
297 0.26(0.44) 1.13
00
00
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Table 6.4. Descriptive Statistics of Predictors
Variable Description n Percentage
White Other Racial Group or White
0- Other
1- White
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388
32.8
67.2
Witness D. Violence
0- No
1- Yes 
Victim of Child 
Abuse
Ever witness domestic violence between 
parents
Ever physically abused by parent
527
36
93.6
6.4
0-No 412 73.2
1-Yes 
Patriarchal Best 
Friend Best friend ever attempt sexual assault
151 26.8
0- No 341 76.3
1- Yes 106 23.7
n x (SD)
Religiosity
Influence of religion in day to day life 
(0- No Influence, 1 - Some Amount, 2- 
Fair Amount, 3- Great Deal). 
Collected at each wave (Range 0-4), 
then combined into one overall 
religiosity scale (Range 0-9).
296 3.09 (2.65)
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coercive sexual acts since the age of 149. Responses ranged from: “Has he engaged in 
sex play (fondling, kissing or petting but not intercourse with a woman when she didn’t 
want to by overwhelming her with continual arguments and pressure?” to “Has he 
engaged in sex acts (oral or anal intercourse or penetration by objects other than the 
penis) with a woman when she didn’t want to by threatening or using some degree of 
physical force (twisting her arm, holding her down, etc.)?”
Because the 10 responses reflected extreme forms of delinquency (i.e. attempted 
sexual assaults and completed sexual assaults), it was no surprise that these variables all 
had a positive skew. Since the measures were ordinal, the decision was made to use the 
technique previously employed in this chapter that Hindelang et al. (1981) found to be 
reliable regarding the combination of skewed, ordinal variables. Thus, all 10 items were 
dichotomized into (0- No, 1- Yes) and combined to form a composite variable of 
patriarchal best friend (a = .821). This variable also had a positive skew (albeit not as
9 These items were asked during Wave 3. Their retrospective nature makes them 
appropriate to use as a constant variable. It was not known what the respondent’s best 
friend’s experiences with sexual assault were at the initial wave (Wave 2), nor was it 
known if more respondent’s friends engaged in sexual assault from Wave 3 to Wave 4. 
Thus, it was possible that more respondent’s best friend’s attempted or completed a 
sexual assault than what is captured here. However, this increase is not expected to be 
drastic since this retrospective measure is going all the way back to when their best friend 
was 14.
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skewed as the original 10-item scale). Thus, the decision was made to go one step 
beyond the Hindelang et al. (1981) technique in order to best account for the lack of 
normality by dichotomizing the composite scale (0 - non-rapist best friend, 1 - rapist best 
friend). While this reduced the variation in this concept, it served as a proxy measure for 
an individual’s differential association with patriarchal male peers10. Based on the 
positive coding of this dichotomous measure, this variable was labeled “Rapist Best 
Friend.” Some tables were limited regarding space (e.g. Table 6 .6 ) therefore, “RapeBF” 
was used.
Although this proxy measure of patriarchal peer support is not what is 
traditionally used, it does provide some alternative benefits to assessing this relationship. 
Mainly, one’s best friend is thought to have a greater likelihood of influencing their 
patriarchal ideology since the relationship is more intense than other peer associations.
10 Although this is admittedly not the best indicator of male peer support, it was the only 
one available in the data that had enough valid responses for the data points currently 
used. As noted in Chapter 3, male peer support for violence against women has been one 
of the more developed theoretical concepts that should be included in a theory o f violence 
against women. Thus, a proxy measure is preferred over no measure. Furthermore, 
treating this measure as a constant might be problematic because male peer support is 
thought to be dynamic, not static (Schwartz and DeKeseredy 1997). Nonetheless, 
patriarchal male peer support has never been considered as an independent variable 
predictive of individual patriarchal ideology and its inclusion can be the starting point for 
future research in this area.
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Intensity of the relationship is a crucial component to social learning theory (see Akers 
2009). Traditional measures of patriarchal male peers may be capturing the intensity of 
the relationships (assuming one’s best friend is among the peer group) and the frequency 
of exposure to male peer groups but the former is just an assumption. While the current 
measure used herein is measuring the frequency in which the respondent’s best friend did 
various patriarchal/sexually assaultive acts, the frequency of contact/learning from these 
best friends is not known. The fact that the questions are about one’s best friend, 
however, ensures the intensity of the relationship.
BIVARIATE STATISTICS
Paired-Samples -Test
Table 6.5 shows the means comparisons for time-variant measures, which used 
paired-samples t-tests for repeated measures. These analyses compared each variable 
from Wave 2 to Wave 3, Wave 3 to Wave 4, and Wave 2 to Wave 4. A limitation in t- 
tests with multiple data points is that they only account for changes at two data points. 
Despite this, this preliminary test gave a decent understanding of the relationships to 
expect in the more complex multivariate analyses in Chapter 7. While wave to wave 
comparisons make the most inherent sense, the Wave 2 to Wave 4 comparisons help 
show differences from the beginning data point to the end data point.
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Table 6.5. Results of Paired Samples T-Tests for Mean Differences in Repeated
Measures
Wave
Variable Comparison M (SD) N t df AM (SD)
Wave 2 - 
Wave 3
1.40(1.00)
0.74(1.08) 273 9.28 272 0.66***(1.17)
Patriarchal
Ideologyln
Wave 3 - 
Wave 4
1.15(1.08)
0.78(1.10) 292 4.77 291 0.37***(1.32)
Wave 2 - 
Wave 4
1.42(1.05)
0.82(1.12) 176 5.94 175 0.60***(1.34)
Relationship
Violence
Perpetrationln
Wave 2 - 
Wave 3 
Wave 3 - 
Wave 4 
Wave 2 - 
Wave 4
0.89 (0.88) 
1.05(0.96) 
1.07 (0.97) 
0.97 (0.92) 
0.85 (0.86) 
0.96 (0.92)
436
286
285
-3.3
1.68
-1.87
435
285
284
-0.15***(0.97)
0.10(0.97) 
-0.11 (1.0 2 )a
Relationship
Violence
Victimizationln
Wave 2 - 
Wave 3 
Wave 3 - 
Wave 4 
Wave 2 - 
Wave 4
1.02 (0.97)
1.06 (0.94)
1.07 (0.96) 
1.10(0.98) 
0.98 (0.96) 
1.10(0.98)
436
289
287
-.80
-.41
-1.8
435
288
286
-0.04 (0.96) 
-0 .0 2 (1.0 1 ) 
-0.12  (1.10)b
Wave 2 - 
Wave 3
3.12(0.98)
2.33(1.31) 441 11.86 440 0.80***(1.41)
Frequent Dater Wave 3 - Wave 4
2.39(1.31) 
3.29 (0.95) 289 -11.03 288 -0.89***(1.38)
Wave 2 - 
Wave 4
3.10(1.00) 
3.26 (0.97) 291 -2.53 290 -0.16** (1.09)
Wave 2 - 
Wave 3
0.33 (0.47) 
0.37 (0.48) 452 -1.55 451 -0.04 (0.58)
Single Wave 3 - Wave 4
0.39 (0.49) 
0.47 (0.50) 297 -2.28 296 -0.08* (0.58)
Wave 2 - 
Wave 4
0.33 (0.47) 
0.47 (0.50) 297 -4.07 296 -0.14*** (0.60)
Sex Assault
Program
Attendance
Wave 2 - 
Wave 3
0.20 (0.40) 
0.15(0.36) 431 1.93 430 0.05* (0.52)
Wave 3 - 
Wave 4 
Wave 2 - 
Wave 4
0.15(0.36) 
0.25 (0.43) 
0.17(0.38) 
0.26 (0.44)
290
288
-3.51
-3.00
289
287
-0.10** (0.49) 
-0.08** (0.47)
***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05
Notes: Listwise deletion used for missing cases (analysis-by-analysis). aApproaches 
significance (p = .06). bApproaches significance (p = .07).
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Inter-Item Correlations
Table 6 .6  provides inter-item correlations (i.e. Pearson’s r) o f all of the key 
variables of interest. Previously discussed measures that were not normally distributed 
are absent from the table. Like the t-tests, these help in understanding some of the basic 
relationships before controlling for more in multivariate analyses.
ANALYTIC STRATEGY: USING LATENT GROWTH CURVE MODELING TO 
ASSESS PATRIARCHAL IDEOLOGY OVER TIME
Byrne’s (2010:304-309) research served as a guideline for the latent growth curve 
models. LGM was used within the Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) framework 
using AMOS 21 for Windows. Maximum-likelihood (ML) estimation was used for 
missing values.
The LGM technique allowed for the assessment o f change in patriarchal ideology 
within individuals (e.g. Level-1, intra-individual) as well as between individuals (e.g. 
level-2, inter-individual) (see Willett and Sayer 1994). Multi-level modeling can also be 
performed using hierarchical linear modeling (HLM). While it is typically one’s personal 
preference for using either HLM or SEM for multi-level modeling, there are unique 
instances in which one should be used over the other. In the present case, since data was 
collected for each participant at the same point in time (for each cohort that is), the SEM 
technique was appropriate. Moreover, the SEM approach was preferred since it can 
estimate covariance structures (see Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). Covariance, after all,
Table 6.6. Pearson’s r  Correlations for All Variables
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0 11 1 2 13 14
1. White 1 .0 0
2.WitnessDV .05 1 .0 0
3.C Abuse -.03 .23*** 1 .0 0
4.RapistBF .0 1 .05 .0 1 1 .0 0
5.Religiosity2 -.1 1 * - .0 1 -.1 0 * .0 1  1 .0 0
6.Religiosity3 -.16*** -.04 -.1 1 * -.04 .76*** 1 .0 0
7.Religiosity4 -.08 .05 - .0 1 .01 .70*** .74*** 1 .0 0
8.Dating2 -.03 -.03 .04 .08 -.05 -.03 -.06 1 .0 0
9.Dating3 -.18*** .0 1 - .0 1 .01 -.03 -.06 -.04 .27*** 1 .0 0
10.Dating4 .06 .0 2 .03 - .0 1  - . 0 0 .08 .06 .39*** .29*** 1 .0 0
11 .Single2 .0 0 .03 .0 2 .07 -.05 -.05 -.07 .09 .2 0 ** 1 .0 0
12.Single3 -.08 .05 -.05 .01 -.03 - . 0 2 .0 2 .23*** .25*** .33*** .27*** 1 .0 0
13.Single4 .0 1 .03 - .0 1 .0 2  .06 .07 .07 24*** .19** .52*** .24*** .30*** 1 .0 0
14.SAP2 .0 2 -.03 .0 2 .03 -.07 -.03 - . 1 0 .06 .18** .07 .0 2 .04 .1 0 1 .0 0
15.SAP3 - .0 1 - .0 1 - .0 1 .04 -.16*** -.16*** -.24*** .03 -.1 1 * -.05 .04 -.07 -.14* .06
16.SAP4 .0 1 - .0 1 - .0 1 .05 -.06 -.07 -.06 .09 .17** .08 -.05 .06 -.04 .34***
17.PIDln2 ,32*** .08 .05 .20** -.03 - . 0 2 - .0 1 -.05 -.30*** .04 .0 2 - . 1 2 -.08 - . 0 0
18.PIDln3 .13*** .09 .09 .2 0 ** .0 1 -.04 -.03 .03 .2 2 *** .05 -.04 .0 1 .03 .07
19.PIDln4 -.06 .0 1 .03 .14* -.02 - 1 0 -.09 -.03 -.03 -.07 -.05 - . 0 2 - . 1 1 -.04
20.RVPln2 .08* .13** .16*** .25** -.10* -.07 -.03 29*** .1 2 * .14* .26*** .0 1 .07 - . 0 2
21.RVPln3 .07 .08 .07 .16** -.09 -.1 2 * - .1 1 .25*** -.05 .08 .26*** 2 i*** .04 -.09
22.RVPln4 .08 .0 2 .0 2 .2 0 ** - . 1 1 -.15** -.13* .07 .08 .17** .1 2 * .15** .15* .0 0
23.RVVln2 .09* .09* .14** .2 2 ** -.1 2 ** -.07 -.04 .31*** .1 1 * .18** .23*** .05 .05 .0 2
24.RVVln3 .03 .08 .1 0 * .15** -.11* -.1 2 * - .1 1 .24*** .13** .15* .25*** .24*** .1 2 * -.05
25.RVVln4 .05 .05 .06 .20** -.14* -.17** -.09 .1 0 .08 .24*** .13* .16** .17** .05
***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05
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Table 6.6. (Continued)
Variable 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
1. White
2.WitnessDV
3.C Abuse
4.RapistBF
5.Religiosity2
6.Religiosity3
7.Religiosity4
8.Dating2
9.Dating3 
10.Dating4 
ll.Single2 
12.Single3 
13.Single4 
14.SAP2
15.SAP3 1 .0 0
16.SAP4 .25*** 1 .0 0
17.PIDln2 -.03 .03 1 .0 0
18.PIDln3 -.08 .0 2 3 7 *** 1 .0 0
19.PIDln4 .05 .03 .25*** .27*** 1 .0 0
20.RVPln2 .04 - . 0 2 .16*** .18*** .08 1 .0 0
21.RVPln3 .05 -.07 .1 0 .1 1 * .1 1 .45*** 1 .0 0
22.RVPln4 .03 .04 .09 .18** 17** 3^ 4 *** 4 7 *** 1 .0 0
23.RVVln2 .05 .07 .1 2 * .1 2 ** .08 ,84*** 4 7 *** 32*** 1 .0 0
24.RVVln3 .03 -.03 .1 0 17*** .1 2 .45*** .85*** .47*** ,4 9 ***
25.RVVln4 .03 .03 .1 0 .1 2 * .2 0 *** .35*** .42*** .85*** .36***
***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05
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is a crucial component of a theory of patriarchal ideology and violence against women 
since patriarchal ideology and relationship violence experiences were thought to 
change/vary together.This contradicts with much of the literature that suggests that 
relationship violence should predict patriarchal ideology. Recall, however, that the exact 
causal order is not well understood, with little to no research considering the feedback 
effects between relationship violence and patriarchal ideology. In such cases, then, 
covariates are preferred since they make no assumptions regarding a relationship’s 
direction.
Single-Domain Growth Curve Models
The first set of growth-curve models assessed the significance and the direction of 
change in the three key outcome variables o f interest: patriarchal ideology, relationship 
violence perpetration, and relationship violence victimization. The models that assessed 
patriarchal ideology provided answers to two of the general research questions presented 
at the beginning of this chapter:
Q2: Does patriarchal ideology change over time?
Q3: If patriarchal ideology does change, in what direction does it change (i.e. 
what is the trajectory o f patriarchal ideology over time)?
The expected growth was assumed to be linear (a common assumption when using LGM, 
see Byrne 2010)". Figure 6.1 represents the hypothesized LGM for patriarchal ideology
11 In order to challenge this assumption, a quadratic factor could be added to any of these 
models, but unfortunately quadratic LGMs need a minimum of four data points.
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(In variables used), which was the same structural model used for the relationship 
violence perpetration and victimization variables. Although the key variable o f interest is 
patriarchal ideology, it is important to independently assess the trajectories of relationship 
violence experiences in order to provide context for later analyses when they are 
simultaneously assessed. Essentially, the 5 key components of Figure 6.1 are:
1) Mi, the mean of the intercept (i.e. the average initial level of each construct at 
the first wave of data to end of one’s freshman year).
2) Di, the variance of the intercept (i.e. the amount o f variation in the average 
initial level for each construct).
3) Ms, the mean of the slope (i.e. the average rate o f change from the average 
initial level).
4) D s, The variance of the slope (i.e. the amount of variance in the average rate of 
change).
5) cov, The covariance between the slope and the mean (i.e. assessing whether or 
not individuals who have high initial levels experience higher rates of change).
The 1 ’s in Figure 6.1 from the latent intercept to each repeated manifest variable 
represent the constant intercept value for all three data points. The parameters from the 
latent slope factor labeled 0 , 1, 2  represent each time point (0  -  baseline/end of freshman 
year, 1 -  end of second/sophomore year of college, 2 - end of third/junior year o f college). 
The two-headed arrow from the latent intercept factor and the latent slope factor 
represents the covariance between the latent intercept and latent slope.
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Figure 6.1. Hypothesized LGM for Patriarchal Ideology
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Notes: The same structural model was used for Relationship Violence Perpetration and 
Relationship Violence Victimization. All three models used the In versions o f the 
observed variables.
Figure 6.2. Multiple-Domain Latent Growth Curve Model
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Conditional Model(s)
After the multiple-domain LGMs, the analytic strategy was to then account for the 
expected variation in any of the key outcome variables by introducing predictor variables 
(e.g. time-invariant, exogenous measures), also known as conditional models. No figure 
is provided here since the exact model was not known until the results of the previous 
multiple-domain analysis was known. Essentially, these exogenous variables (i.e. White, 
Witness D. Violence, Victim of Child Abuse, Rapist Best Friend) were added to the 
multiple domain model in which all four variables co-varied with one another and each 
had regression parameters directly predicting the intercept and slope of each latent 
variable. In order to assess the covariance between these latent factors (which is not 
possible once predictors were added to the model), residual terms are added to each latent 
factor and covariances between the residuals serve as “proxies” for the variance of the 
latent factor intercepts and slopes (see Byrne 2010).
Time-Variant Covariates
After the multiple-domain LGM, either more time-variant measures could have 
been added to the model (as covariates, making no assumptions regarding temporal 
order) or the time-invariant predictors could be assessed. The analytic strategy was to do 
the latter because these exogenous variables were thought to account for inter-individual 
change. Also, time-variant measures add quite a bit of complexity to these models (i.e. 
one time-variant measure means 3 new manifest variables to the model), which increases 
the likelihood that the model fit indicators would suggest rejecting the models. Because 
of this, time-variant measures were assessed in an exploratory sense, with specifics
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discussed in Chapter 7. Also, because o f the exploratory nature of introducing time- 
variant covariates to the model and because the conditional model would determine the 
initial, best-fitting model, there is no hypothesized figure included here.
LIMITATIONS
There are some limitations with the data as well as with the analyses in this 
chapter. The data are limited in that the initial data point is the end of the respondent’s 
freshman year. There may have been influences of patriarchal ideology that occurred 
during that first year of college that are unknown in these analyses because pre-college 
measures of patriarchal ideology are missing. Additionally, the items that represent 
patriarchal ideology are a proxy measure or, at worst, just one dimension of patriarchal 
ideology. These limitations are duly noted, which is why it is important to re-iterate that 
some of the shortcomings in this Chapter are accounted for in Chapter 4 and vice versa. 
Both chapters, however, cannot account for the fact that this data is dated. It is important 
to acknowledge that findings could reflect male college students at this particular 
historical time period (1991-1995). Related to this, this sample is a convenience sample 
and findings could be a reflection of one particular group of male college students in one 
particular region of the country. Since no prior studies have looked at individual 
patriarchal ideology and how they change over time, this research should serve as the 
baseline to studying them. Thus, the only way to know whether or not the findings are a 
reflection of this historical time period or this particular social setting is to replicate the 
research and draw from more generalizeable samples in the future.
203
One way to account for time-period effects is to use a cohort-sequential (Baltes, 
Cornelius, and Nesselroade 1979) LGM that uses calendar year as the wave of 
assessment rather than year in college. The data could easily be reorganized to create this 
alternative metric of time, while controlling for age, however, doing so would make little 
theoretical sense. As Baltes et al. (1979:85) note, “The issue of trifactorial age-cohort­
time of measurement confounds is only relevant if  one assigns theoretical status to all 
factors.” The developmental model used throughout this chapter is based on the fact that 
participants are homogenous regarding age and that year o f data collection (i.e. cohort) is 
less relevant than year in college (time period).
The LGM analyses have some limitations as well. These coincide with data 
limitations regarding sample size. That is, the complex models that include time- 
invariant and time-variant predictors o f patriarchal ideology and relationship violence 
will include too many parameter estimates for this sample size. Some researchers believe 
the ratio in sample size to parameter estimates should be 20:1 (Jackson 2003), whereas 
others feel 10:1 is satisfactory (see Kline 2011). Thus, the LGMs will need to introduce 
certain variables one at a time rather than all at once while remaining cognizant o f the 
relevant parameters needing to be estimated in relation to sample size and model fit.
Missing data creates some issues as well with LGM. Most missing cases are 
either missing by design (i.e. absence of baseline measures for Cohort 1) or attrition in 
subsequent waves. For these cases, ML will be used to estimate these responses, a 
technique that has been reliable for SEM in general and LGM specifically (Allison 2002; 
Preacher et al. 2008). The key outcome variable, however, is the only variable missing 
by design at the initial wave (for Cohort 1). This can create problems with internal
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consistency when the data are not collected at the same occasion for all individuals 
(Preacher et al. 2008). The combination of all cohorts actually does meet the assumption 
that all individuals are measured at the same occasion (end of each academic school 
year). This is a redundant point that must be emphasized yet again since this dataset is 
quite complex regarding multiple cohorts, multiple waves, and multiple years. It also 
meets the assumption that “planned missingness” items be treated as MCAR (thus ML is 
appropriate) since this is a type of missing data that can be controlled (Duncan et al.
2006).
The ML function for the missing by design items at the baseline meets the 
assumptions of LGM and SEM, but the estimates could still be biased. For this reason, 
MGSEM will be used in which one group includes Cohorts 2 and 3 (complete data) and 
another group includes Cohort 1 (missing by design) (for a review see Duncan et al.
2006; Preacher et al. 2008). Doing this provides the best fitting model for both groups 
simultaneously. Keeping with this same technique, as a sensitivity analysis, all 3 cohorts 
will be partitioned using the MGSEM approach in order to check for potential cohort 
interactions. Cohort effects would suggest that the developmental model o f patriarchal 
ideology proposed is insufficient and interactive, contextual, and ecological models are 
perhaps more explanatory than micro-level variables (Baltes et al. 1979).
CONCLUSION
This chapter provides an overview of how patriarchal ideology is operationalized 
in studying its change over time. Analyses are described that will use LGM to assess 
what the trajectories of patriarchal ideology look like over time. Additionally, details are
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given regarding the appropriate LGM that will assess the covariation of individual 
patriarchal ideology and relationship violence perpetration and victimization. The last 
group of analyses involves an assessment of potential predictors of these key outcome 
variables using time-variant and time-invariant predictors. As is typical with SEM, the 
later models are less detailed and relatively unknown for now because SEM requires that 
the hypothesized, baseline model be trimmed in order to create the most parsimonious 
model. The results of the analyses in this chapter, in conjunction with those in Chapter 4, 
should provide a holistic understanding to how individual patriarchal ideology changes 
over time and what may account for these changes. These analyses will contribute to the 
theoretical development o f patriarchal ideology in a theory of violence against women.
CHAPTER VII
RESULTS: INDIVIDUAL PATRIARCHAL IDEOLOGY OVER TIME, A LATENT 
GROWTH CURVE MODELING APPROACH
This chapter presents the results o f latent growth curve models (LGM) aimed to 
assess the change in patriarchal ideology over three waves o f data. The analyses 
performed had three major goals: 1) to assess the trajectory o f patriarchal ideology and 
relationship violence experiences (independently and simultaneously), 2 ) to evaluate the 
rate in which individuals change over time regarding these variables, and 3) to evaluate 
potential predictors of these trajectories.
SINGLE-DOMAIN GROWTH CURVES
Patriarchal Ideology Trajectory
The first latent growth curve model assessed the average initial level of 
patriarchal ideology and how these levels changed across each data point. The results of 
this model can be found in Figure 7.1. As seen in the figure, the model fit indicators 
suggest this model fit the data extremely well (%2 = .520 [df = 1, p = .47]).
207
Figure 7.1. Results of Single Domain LGM for Patriarchal Ideology
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Notes: NS = Not statistically significant (p > .05). Values in bold are significant (p < 
.05). Ellipses for error terms are absent and values represent variance of each (all p < 
.05). All values are unstandardized except for r. Model Fit Indicators: %2 = .002 (df = 1, 
p = .965); CFI = 1.0; RMSEA = .00.
The mean of the intercept of patriarchal ideology (M i) was 1.44 (SE = .05, p < 
.001), which represents the average initial level of patriarchal ideology. The intercept 
variance was significant (Di = .49, SE = .14, p < .001), indicating significant individual 
differences in initial levels of patriarchal ideology. The mean of the slope (M s) represents 
the average rate of change in patriarchal ideology, which was -.36 (SE = .04, p < .001). 
The significance of the mean o f the slope provides an answer to Q2, simply stated: 
patriarchal ideology does change significantly overtime. The negative value indicates the 
answer to Q3 would be: the direction of change for patriarchal ideology is negative for 
the whole sample. More specifically, levels of patriarchal ideology declined over time at 
an average rate of .36 units. However, the slope variance (Ds = .08, SE = .08) was not- 
significant (p = .31) indicating there were no significant inter-individual differences in 
the rate of change in patriarchal ideology over time. Additionally, the covariance 
between the latent intercept and latent slope of patriarchal ideology was not significant 
[cov = -.11 (r = -.57), SE = .09, p = .21)]. This indicates the rate o f change in patriarchal 
ideology was homogenous for the whole sample. In sum, the trajectory of patriarchal 
ideology was negative and moderate over time for the whole sample, regardless of how 
high or low initial levels o f patriarchal ideology were.
Relationship Violence Perpetration Trajectory
The results for the growth curve for relationship violence perpetration can be seen 
in Figure 7.2. As seen in the diagram, the model fit indicators were somewhat mixed.
This was expected, with the RMSEA =.11, which is likely to show poor model fit with 
simple models that have few degrees o f freedom (Steiger and Lind 1980, as cited in
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Arbuckle 2012). In these cases, the CFI is preferred, which suggested this model fit the 
data quite well (CFI = .958). The %2 was, however, showing poor model fit (x2 = 8.12 [df 
= 1, p = .004]). The x2, however, is not as reliable as the CFI, since relatively small 
sample sizes (at least for the second and third data points) are likely to produce non­
significant x2 values.
Figure 7.2 also shows the mean o f the intercept (M i) for relationship violence 
perpetration was .93 (SE = .04, p < .001), which represents the average initial level o f 
relationship violence perpetration. The intercept variance was significant (Di =.49, SE = 
.08, p < .0 0 1 ), indicating there were individual differences in initial levels of relationship 
violence perpetration. The mean of the slope (M s) represents the average rate of change 
in relationship violence perpetration, which was .04 (SE = .03, p = .125). This indicates 
little change in relationship violence perpetration on average over time. Additionally, 
significance in the slope variance (D s =  .13, SE = .04, p < .001) suggests there were 
individual differences in the rate of change in relationship violence perpetration over time 
(i.e. inter-individual differences over time). Lastly, the covariance between the latent 
factors was significant [cov = -.11 (r = -.46), SE = .09, p < .05), suggesting individuals 
whose initial levels of relationship violence perpetration were high experienced higher 
rates of decline than individuals whose initial relationship violence perpetration levels 
were not high. In sum, the trajectory of relationship violence perpetration was stable over 
time for the sample as a whole, although some individual trajectories did change, 
specifically those whose initial levels were high (in which case they declined at higher 
rates than others).
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Figure 7.2. Results of Single Domain LGM for Relationship Violence Perpetration
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.05). All values are unstandardized except for r. Model Fit Indicators: %2 -  .002 (df = 1, 
p = .965); CFI = 1.0; RMSEA = .00.
2 1 1
Relationship Violence Victimization Trajectory
The last single-domain growth curve model assessed relationship violence 
victimization. Like the previous two models, the In of relationship violence victimization 
was used due to a positive skew. The results o f this model are presented in Figure 7.3.
As seen in the diagram, the x2 statistic suggested excellent model fit (x2 = .002, df = 1, p 
= .965). Because this model was “just-identified”, the CFI and RMSEA were not 
computed.
Figure 7.3 also shows that the mean of the intercept (Mi) for relationship violence 
victimization was 1.04 (SE = .04, p < .0 0 1 ). The intercept variance was significant (Di = 
.55, SE =  .09, p < .001), indicating there were individual differences in initial levels of 
relationship violence victimization. The mean o f the slope (M s) represents the average 
rate of change in relationship violence victimization, which was .03 (SE =  .03, p = .27). 
This indicates little change in relationship violence victimization on average over time. 
Additionally, significance in the slope variance (Ds = . 10, SE = .05, p < .001 ) suggests 
there were individual differences in the rate of change in relationship violence 
victimization over time (i.e. inter-individual differences over time). Lastly, the 
covariance between the latent factors was significant [cov =- . 1 1  (r = -.46 ), SE = .09, p < 
.05), suggesting individuals whose initial levels o f relationship violence victimization 
were high experienced higher rates of decline than individuals whose initial relationship 
violence victimization levels were not high. In sum, the trajectory of relationship 
violence victimization was stable over time for the sample as a whole, although some 
individual trajectories did change, specifically those whose initial levels were high (in 
which case they declined at higher rates than others).
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Figure 7.3. Results of Single Domain LGM for Relationship Violence Victimization
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Notes: NS = Not statistically significant (p > .05). Values in bold are significant (p < .05). 
Ellipses for error terms are absent and values represent variance of each (all p < .05). All 
values are unstandardized except for r. Model Fit Indicators: y 2 = .002 (df = 1, p = .965); 
CFI = 1.0; RMSEA = .00.
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MULTIPLE-DOMAIN GROWTH MODELS
The multiple-domain latent growth models were to originally include the three 
previously used variables simultaneously. A full multiple-domain model with all three, 
however, could not be performed. When the growth-curve model was assessed that 
included all three variables, fully-identifying all covariates (recall Figure 6.2 from the 
previous chapter) the y2 could not be computed because the correlation matrix was “not 
positive definite.” The most likely reason for this was the highly correlated relationship 
violence variables. This was not a surprise considering the previous chapter’s correlation 
matrix suggested very strong correlations among the perpetration and victimization 
variables too (r > .84 at all three time points). Considering the use of the CTS to capture 
relationship violence perpetration and victimization, this was expected. The solution of 
combining two highly correlated variables into one higher-order composite variable (i.e. 
2nd-Order Factor) might be one way to include both domains in such an analysis. 
Unfortunately, in this case, creating a broad variable called “relationship violence 
experiences” would have created too general of a concept and interpretation would have 
been quite difficult. Instead, the choice was made to drop the relationship violence 
victimization variable and keep the perpetration variable. While the CTS measures might 
minimize men’s use of violence because they focus primarily on physical assaults, the 
victimization measures o f the CTS tend to decontextualize men’s “victimization”
(Dobash and Dobash 1992; DeKeseredy forthcoming-, Stark 2007). In other words, 
men’s “victimization” is taken out o f context since their reports do not distinguish 
between women’s use of violence as primary aggressors (which is uncommon) versus 
women’s use of violence as a form of self-defense (which is much more common).
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After removing the victimization variable, the multiple-domain growth curve 
assessed the growth o f two domains: patriarchal ideology and relationship violence 
perpetration, simultaneously. The initial model fully identified (not-pictured, but similar 
to the hypothesized model from Figure 6.2 , with the removal of the victimization 
domain) all covariances between the four latent factors (i.e. two latent intercepts and two 
latent slopes) and met the necessary criteria for good model fit with the data (%2 = 11.64  
[df = 7, p = .113]; CFI = .981, RMSEA = .03). Despite good model fit, however, only 
two of the covariances (cov of the ideology intercept <-» violence perpetration intercept; 
cov of violence perpetration intercept <-> violence perpetration slope) were statistically 
significant (p < .01). Thus, the non-significant covariances were trimmed from the 
model. However, one non-significant covariance remained. Due to the importance of the 
within-domain covariance between the slope and intercept of patriarchal ideology, and 
because deleting non-significant covariates is not a necessity in linear growth-curve 
models (see Byrne 2010), this was the only non-significant covariate that remained in the 
model (see Figure 7.4 ., with results). The trimmed model had even better model fit than 
the fully-identified model (x 2=  13.34 [d f= 10, p = .205], CFI = .987, RMSEA = .02).
Figure 7.4. Results of Trimmed Multiple-Domain Latent Growth Curve Model
.58 (.14)
1
.77 (.07)
l1
.87 (.15)
l
.26 (.07)
l
.55 (.05)
l I
.27 (.09)
l
Patriarchal Patriarchal Patriarchal Rel. Viol. Rel. Viol. Rel. Viol.
Ideology2 Ideology3 Ideology4 Perpetration2 Perpetration3 Perpetration4
Ms =-.35 (.04)
Patriarchal 
Ideology 
Slope
Ds=.06NS (.08)
-.09 (.09) 
r = -.55
Mi = 1.44 (.05)
NsS/ Patriarchal 
Ideology 
y \ Intercept
Di = .47 (.13)
.14 (.03) 
r  -  .29
Mi =.93(.04) \ M S= ,04NS(.03)
Relationship \  y  /  Relationship \  ^
Violence \ / Violence
Perpetration I \ Perpetration
Intercept \  Slope
Di = .55 (.08) ^
^  ^  Ds= .13 (.04)
.12 (.05) 
r = -.47
Notes: NS = Not significant (p > .05); All other values (in bold) p < .05. All values are unstandardized (SE) except for r. Model Fit 
Indicators: x2 = 13.34 (df;= 10, p = .205); CFI = .987; RMSEA = .02.
2 1 6
The results of the multiple-domain model can be seen in Figure 7.4. Regarding 
means estimates, all four were statistically significant (p < .05). The mean of the 
intercept (Mi) for patriarchal ideology and the mean for the slope of patriarchal ideology 
(Ms) were almost identical to the previous single-domain model. The mean of the 
intercept (Mi) for relationship violence perpetration and the mean for the slope (Ms) of 
relationship violence perpetration also had nearly identical estimates to its previous 
single-domain model (see Figure 7.2). The similarity in estimates is expected in LGM. 
More important, for now, are the goodness-of-fit statistics, which do suggest that the 
simultaneous assessment of the trajectories of both of these concepts is appropriate.
Regarding covariances, the within-domain covariances were almost identical to 
the prior single-domain estimates. That is, the covariance between the intercept and the 
slope of patriarchal ideology remained non-significant (p > .05). This, again, suggests 
that those with high levels of patriarchal ideology did not experience significantly higher 
rates of change. The covariance between the intercept and the slope o f relationship 
violence perpetration (cov = -.12 , SE =  .05; r = -.46 ) remained significant (p < .05). This 
suggests that individuals whose initial levels of patriarchal ideology were high 
experienced higher rates of decline from these initial levels.
The only cross-domain covariance in the multiple-domain model was between the 
mean intercept of patriarchal ideology and the mean intercept of relationship violence 
perpetration. The covariance among the intercept mean (Mi) of patriarchal ideology and 
the intercept mean (Mi) of relationship violence perpetration was .14 (SE  =  .03; r = .29) 
and it was statistically significant (p < .001 ). Based on the size of the standardized 
coefficient, this suggests there is a positive relationship that is moderate in strength
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between average initial level o f patriarchal ideology and average initial level of 
relationship violence perpetration.
In response to research question Q4: the average level o f patriarchal ideology and 
the average level o f relationship violence perpetration are related at the initial wave o f  
data, but from there, the trajectories are unrelated to one another. More specifically, the 
cross-domain LGM suggests very little difference in individual growth curves for both 
concepts, compared to their previous, independent/single-domain LGM. The cross­
domain covariance that was significant suggested initial average levels o f both concepts 
were related, but the change in each was not related to cross-domain avg. initial levels or 
cross-domain rate of change.
Predictors o f Change
The next step in the analytic strategy was to introduce time-invariant exogenous 
variables into the multiple-domain model (i.e. conditional LGM). The purpose of 
introducing time-invariant measures is to try and account for the variation in the key 
variables of interest (mainly slope variance). However, since the slope variance of 
patriarchal ideology was not significant, this means such models would not be very 
useful. However, there was significant variation in the slope of relationship violence 
perpetration. Thus, time-invariant predictors of change can be added to the multiple- 
domain model to explain the heterogeneity in relationship violence perpetration over 
time, while controlling for the trajectory of patriarchal ideology over time.
The first conditional model (not pictured) found that religiosity was not a 
significant predictor of the intercepts and slopes for both patriarchal ideology and
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relationship violence perpetration. Therefore, religiosity was excluded from the final 
conditional model used, which included all four o f the other predictor variables, 
predicting the intercepts and slopes of patriarchal ideology and relationship violence 
perpetration. Figure 7.5 shows the results of the conditional model. As noted therein, all 
of the predictor variables had regression parameters predicting the intercept and slope of 
patriarchal ideology and the intercept and slope of relationship violence perpetration (4 
parameters per variable, fully identified). However, as the figure also notes, only the 
significant parameters are drawn in the model for clarity purposes. Additionally, all of 
the exogenous variables had covariance estimates among them, which are also left out of 
the figure for the sake of clarity. Further attempts to trim the model pictured in Figure 
7.5 either did not improve the model fit statistics, made the model fit worse, or created 
models that made little theoretical sense. Thus figure 7.5 is the most parsimonious, 
theoretically significant predictor model.
As seen in Figure 7.5, the multiple-domain LGM with predictor variables had 
similar results to the previous non-predictor variable model regarding cross-domain 
covariances. The covariance between the residuals of the patriarchal ideology intercept 
and the relationship violence perpetration intercept showed that initial levels o f both were 
positively and moderately related to one another (cov = .09, SE = .03, r = .22). This 
means that individuals with higher initial levels o f patriarchal ideology had higher initial 
levels of relationship violence perpetration, a finding similar to the previous non­
conditional model.
Figure 7.5. Conditional LGM with Domains: Patriarchal Ideology and Relationship Violence Perpetration
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Predictor Variables. Whites had average initial levels of patriarchal ideology that 
were 46% (B = .69, SE = .10, b = .46) higher than non-whites (p < .05), while controlling 
for the effects of patriarchal best friend, child abuse, and witnessing domestic violence. 
Additionally, the rapist best friend variable significantly predicted the average initial 
level of patriarchal ideology (B = .26, SE = .08, b = .25). In other words, having a 
patriarchal male peer for a best friend meant one’s average initial level of patriarchal 
ideology was 25% higher than those individuals who did not have a patriarchal best 
friend, while controlling for child abuse, witnessing domestic violence, and race.
Like earlier models, there was no significance in the slope variance of patriarchal 
ideology (residual variance = .03, SE = .07, p > .05). Essentially this means the rate of 
change was the same for the whole sample (as found earlier). The only significant 
predictor of the slope in patriarchal ideology was race (B = -.40, SE = .08, b = -.73), 
which was unexpected. That is, because the variance was not significant, this suggests 
there were no inter-individual differences in the average rate of change in patriarchal 
ideology, but the significant predictor o f race on the slope suggests inter-individual 
differences. This creates some confusion since a variable is essentially predicting 
variable change, when the variation is not significant. This is one of the reasons why 
Byrne (2010) notes it would not make much sense to proceed with time-invariant models 
unless one is presented with evidence o f inter-individual variability in the non­
conditional models. In the current study, there was no inter-individual variability in the
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slope of patriarchal ideology1. So, this significant parameter is not very useful. Keep in 
mind, however, that although earlier tests revealed non-significance in the rate o f change 
of patriarchal ideology, it was still valuable to assess the growth of the concept 
simultaneously with relationship violence perpetration while assessing other key 
parameters o f interest2. Also, since the conditional models were to address Q5, regarding 
predictors ofpatriarchal ideology over time, the simple answer is: the lack o f  significant 
variance regarding the slope o f  patriarchal ideology suggests predictors o f  individual 
change are not possible since there is no evidence o f  individual change in the first place.
Three of the predictor variables significantly predicted the average level of 
relationship violence at the baseline (p < .05). Experiencing child abuse was one of these 
(B = .26, SE = .08, b = .17). Individuals who were victims of child abuse had an average
1 Muthen (2002), however, suggests predictor variables are likely to produce better fitting 
models, showing significance in predictors. She too notes the confounding issues 
involved, but does not suggest the lack of significant variation in the slope means one 
should not proceed with conditional models.
2 Since there was evidence of variability regarding the intercept of patriarchal ideology, I 
made the decision to run a multiple-domain predictor variable model that included 
patriarchal ideology. This decision was made so that the key variables predicting change 
in relationship violence perpetration would be assessed while simultaneously the model 
would control for the significant covariance between initial levels of both of these key 
outcome variables (i.e. Mi of patriarchal ideology and Mi of relationship violence 
perpetration).
2 2 2
initial level of relationship violence perpetration that was 17% higher than those that 
were not victims of child abuse, while holding constant race, witnessing domestic 
violence, and patriarchal best friend. Witnessing domestic violence as a child meant one 
was 11 % higher in their average initial level of relationship violence perpetration than 
those that did not witness domestic violence (B = .32, SE = .15, b = .11), while 
controlling for race, patriarchal male peers, and child abuse. Rapist best friend 
significantly predicted average initial level of relationship violence perpetration (B = .37, 
SE = .09, b = .22), where individuals who had patriarchal best friends were 22% higher in 
their average initial levels of relationship violence perpetration than those that did not 
have patriarchal best friends, while holding constant child abuse, witnessing domestic 
violence, and race. Race was the only exogenous variable that did not significantly 
predict the average initial level o f relationship violence perpetration (p > .05).
None of the three significant predictors o f average initial level of relationship 
violence perpetration significantly predicted the rate of change in these values (p > .05). 
However, the one exogenous variable that did not predict average initial level of 
relationship violence was the only predictor that significantly predicted (p < .05) the rate 
of change in these initial levels (B = .02, SE = .06, b = .02). Keep in mind, the rate o f 
change (i.e. slope residual) was statistically significant (.13, SE = .04). Although 
significant, the regression parameter was not very large. Thus, whites were 2% faster in 
their rate of change in relationship violence perpetration than non-whites while 
controlling for child abuse victimization, patriarchal male peers, and witnessing domestic 
violence. Also, regarding change in relationship violence perpetration, the covariance 
between the residuals of the intercept and slope of relationship violence perpetration was
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-.10 (SE = .05, r -  -.44, p < .05). Keep in mind that race did not predict initial level o f 
relationship violence perpetration, just the rate o f change. Thus, there was no significant 
variation in the average initial level of relationship violence perpetration between whites 
and non-whites, but over time, whites experienced a rate o f change in relationship 
violence 2 % higher than non-whites while controlling for child abuse, witnessing 
domestic violence, patriarchal best friend, and the average initial level of patriarchal 
ideology.
Introducing Time-Variant Covariates as Predictors
The introduction of time variant measures included the addition of the variables: 
Dating, Single, and sexual assault program attendance into the conditional model. This 
model, however, makes for one very complicated SEM, which can be problematic in 
general, but this is especially true when the sample size in comparison to the number of 
parameters to be estimated is beyond the 10:1 ratio (Kline 2006). The addition of time- 
varying models, as a result of these issues, produced very poor fitting models. One way 
around this was to introduce each of these one at a time, but that, too, produced poor 
fitting models. Time-varying measures were not included in any of the LGMs.
Alternative procedures were used.
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UNDERSTANDING THE DIRECTIONALITY OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
PATRIARCHAL IDEOLOGY AND RELATIONSHIP VIOLENCE
Autoregressive Structural Models
Because of the exploratory nature of these analyses, alternative models were 
created in order to get a better understanding of the directionality of the associations 
between patriarchal ideology and relationship violence. Essentially, if it could be 
determined that one has a stronger effect on the other in a non-recursive model, this could 
help justify the inclusion of a LGM that treats one of these two key outcomes as an 
endogenous variable and the other as a predictor. It is entirely possible that patriarchal 
ideology is a better predictor of relationship violence perpetration than the other way 
around, considering the lack of variation in the rate of change observed for patriarchal 
ideology.
The first non-recursive model freely estimated the autocorrelations for the 
repeated measures of the two key variables o f interest: patriarchal ideology and 
relationship violence. This model, with results, can be found in Figure 7.6. This is 
immediately followed by Figure 7.7, which placed equality constraints on the 
autoregressive parameters for each respective measure (pi, P2), since the assumption of 
stability was supported in the significance of the model from Figure 7.6. The likelihood 
ratio tests for the y2, CFI, and RMSEA all suggested the constrained model fit the data 
better than the unconstrained model Ay2.
Figure 7.6. Fully Unconstrained Autoregressive SEM for Patriarchal Ideology and Relationship Violence Perpetration across 3 Waves
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> .05) parameters. Significant parameters are highlighted in bold.
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Figure 7.7. Autoregressive SEM for Patriarchal Ideology and Relationship Violence Perpetration across 3 Waves (Constrained 
Autocorrelations)
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In short, there does not appear to be a reciprocal relationship between patriarchal 
ideology and relationship violence perpetration. This is evidenced in the non­
significance (p > .05) of patriarchal ideology —> relationship violence at Wave 3 (second 
data point) and the non-significance (p > .05) of relationship violence —> patriarchal 
ideology at Wave 4 (last data point). At each wave, the opposite relationship is 
significant. These inconsistent findings in the non-recursive model as well as the LGMs 
suggested the need for further sensitivity checks with this data. The biggest o f these was 
to reassess the two key outcomes and test the assumption of sample homogeneity.
LIMITATIONS
Many of the broader limitations to the data described in Chapter 5 are applicable 
to the analyses in this chapter. One consistency is the potential cohort interactions. One 
way to check for these interactions was to conduct a simple one-way ANOVA for each 
cohort at each data point for the key outcome variables.
Cohort Interactions using One-Way ANOVA
The original researchers used a cohort sequential design (i.e. accelerated 
longitudinal design) in which all of the cohorts were measured at the same time point 
(year), but at different levels of schooling (college class). The researchers made the 
assumption that the cohorts were homogenous because they were combined into one 
large dataset, which assumed the time-related change was college class. Even though 
past research has found true longitudinal designs produce similar results to cohort- 
sequential designs (Duncan et al. 2006), this does not mean every study should assume
homogeneity nor should they assume one hypothesized moment o f change is the only 
period of variation. Thus, in order to test the assumption of homogeneity, two analyses 
were performed. First, patriarchal ideology and relationship violence were examined 
regarding significant variation in their means across cohorts using one-way ANOVAs. 
The second check reconsidered the data point for change from college class to year. That 
is, each wave or data point was changed from second year in college, third year in 
college, fourth year in college to 1992, 1993, and 1994 respectively. It may seem 
backwards to go from a much more reliable analysis of variance technique in the use of 
SEM to an ANOVA. In fact a multi-group SEM (MGSEM) would have been an 
excellent way to assess cohort interactions. However, this was not possible because o f 
the lack of measures at Wave 2 for Cohort 1. MGSEM can use ML for missing cases, but 
when an entire wave of data is missing, MGSEM is not possible. This was why the 
ANOVA was used to see if there was evidence to suggest cohort interactions were 
present.
Table 7.1 shows the results of the ANOVA for patriarchal ideology and 
relationship violence perpetration regarding significant mean variation across cohorts. 
Essentially, Waves 2 and 3 (i.e. first two data points) suggest significant cohort 
differences in mean values for patriarchal ideology, but no differences at Wave 4 (final 
data point). Relationship violence perpetration showed significant cohort variation in the 
mean of patriarchal ideology at the middle wave, whereas Wave 2 and Wave 4 were 
homogenous. These results are enough to suggest there were cohort effects regarding 
these two key variables of interest.
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The second ANOVA, which reorganized the data in which the time period of 
interest, was year rather than college course is not presented. Rearranging the data in this 
manner was useless. That is, the ANOVA had many confounding issues, and the later 
LGMs used to assess change in these outcome variables at these new data points 
produced very poor fitting models. So the ANOVA, along with other analyses 
throughout this chapter, tell us two things: 1) patriarchal ideology is likely variable from 
cohort to cohort and 2 ) the cohort sequential design was a reliable longitudinal technique 
to assess patriarchal ideologies over time.
This brings me to the first limitation from the LGM analyses: the inability to 
conduct LGMs on each cohort independently. For Cohort 1, this was obviously not 
possible since there were only two data points. However, Cohort 2 and Cohort 3 would 
not produce acceptable models of fit where the LGMs could even be conducted. Even 
after the data was rearranged to reflect calendar year, rather than college class as the 
metric of time these models fit poorly with this data (see Bollen and Curran 2006: 73-86 
for a review on rearranging data for alternative metrics o f time)3.
3 These two data points address period and cohort. The third most common time metric 
of age so closely aligns with cohort/college class in this sample (and in college 
populations) there is nothing to gain by re-arranging along this time metric. Moreover, as 
Baltes et al. (1979: 85) note, “The issue of trifactorial age-cohort-time of measurement 
confounds is only relevant if one assigns theoretical status to all factors.”
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Table 7.1. One-Way ANOVA Assessing Cohort Differences in Patriarchal Ideology and 
Relationship Violence Perpetration (RVP)
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F
Patriarchal
Ideologyln2
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total
54.95
363.26
418.21
1
395
396
54.95
.92 59.75***
Patriarchal
Ideologyln3
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total
74.96
426.69
501.65
2
447
449
37.48
0.96 39.26***
Patriarchal
Ideologyln4
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total
2.60
353.33
355.93
2
294
296
1.30
1.20 1.08NS
Between Groups 3.34 2 1.67
RVPln2 Within Groups 423.44 564 0.75 2.23ns
Total 426.78 566
Between Groups 15.32 2 7.66
RVPln3 Within Groups 397.73 442 0.90 8.51***
Total 413.05 444
Between Groups 3.76 2 1.88
RVPln4 Within Groups 239.28 289 0.83 2.27NS
Total 243.04 291
***p< .001
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While there are a variety of reasons why these models fit poorly, the most likely reasons 
are the fairly small sample size and the somewhat high levels of attrition from Wave 2 
(69% retention from Wave 1) to Wave 3 (64% retention from Wave 2) for cohorts 2 and 
3.
Considering alternative metrics o f time as a sensitivity check (but also as an 
alternative theoretical explanation for change among the key outcomes) can add value to 
a study. However, the inability to produce appropriate models of fit for these alternative 
models does not negate the analyses performed in this chapter. In fact, poor model fit is 
not just the result of missing data. That is, poor-fitting models that considered year for 
each metric of time could have yielded poor model fit because this metric o f time created 
even more heterogeneity than using the metric o f time college class. After all, the 
empirical data did produce model fit that was acceptable for the college class metric. The 
next step would be to keep the original time metric, but use the aforementioned multi­
group LGM approach for each cohort. As noted earlier, however, this leaves us with the 
earlier dilemma because we still have issues with the sample size o f each cohort. In sum, 
the inability to use a multi-group LGM to test cohort effects in the most robust manner is 
a limitation of the current study. There is still something that can be learned from the 
empirical heterogeneity from these results, a point further discussed in the next chapter.
CONCLUSION
This chapter provided the analyses that addressed patriarchal ideology over three- 
waves of data, primarily with the use of latent growth curve modeling (LGM). Initial 
analyses using single-domain LGM assessed intra- and inter- individual differences in
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average initial levels of patriarchal ideology and average rates of change across three- 
waves. This was followed by similar analyses assessing average initial levels and 
average rates of change regarding relationship violence perpetration. These two models 
were then combined, using multiple-domain LGM to simultaneously assess the growth in 
both constructs. In short, initial levels o f patriarchal ideology and relationship violence 
perpetration were related to one another, but over time the trajectories of each took on 
different, unrelated shapes. The rate of change in patriarchal ideology was significant 
over time, but the variance for the rate o f change was not, meaning there were no inter­
individual differences (i.e. everyone’s patriarchal ideology changed at the same average 
rate over time). Relationship violence perpetration declined over time, but the average 
rate of decline was not significant, while the variance for the rate o f change was 
significant, meaning there were inter-individual differences in relationship violence 
perpetration over time. Additionally, the covariance was significant between the 
intercept and slope of relationship violence perpetration, meaning those individuals 
whose initial levels of relationship violence perpetration were high experienced greater 
rates of decline.
Conditional LGM was used to determine what predicted the variance in 
relationship violence perpetration (while controlling for the covariance of the intercept 
and slope of patriarchal ideology). The only significant predictor of the variance of the 
rate of change in relationship violence perpetration was race, albeit a very small effect 
size (b = .0 2 ), indicating whites’ rate o f change in violence perpetration was 2 % higher 
than non-whites. Additional significant predictors of average initial level of patriarchal 
ideology and average initial level of relationship violence perpetration were found.
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However, the most significant finding was few exogenous variables explained the 
variation in the rate of change for relationship violence perpetration. Additional analyses 
found evidence of cohort interactions and mixed support for a reciprocal relationship 
between patriarchal ideology and relationship violence perpetration. The next chapter 
discusses the findings in this chapter along with those from the initial two-wave panel 
data, making broader connections across each.
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CHAPTER VIII 
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
This chapter discusses the findings from the previous four methods and analyses 
chapters. Discussions center on the major research questions addressed regarding: 
measurement of patriarchal ideology, predictors of patriarchal ideology, change/stability 
in patriarchal ideology, accounting for change/stability, and the covariation as well as the 
feedback effects of patriarchal ideology and relationship violence perpetration. Although 
data limitations were discussed in Chapter 4 and Chapter 6 , broader limitations and 
directions for future research are discussed at the end o f this chapter.
METHODOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS
The attempt was made in this research to operationalize individual patriarchal 
ideology in the most consistent and accurate way, a point covered in Chapter 3. This is 
certainly not the first study of its kind to use attitudinal measures o f patriarchal ideology 
(see Smith 1990, 1991). It is, however, one of the few studies to consider vignettes for 
measuring patriarchal ideology. Moreover, it is one of the few to use these measures in a 
longitudinal research design and is one of the only known studies to consider the origins 
of patriarchal ideology by including it as the main outcome variable o f interest in various 
statistical models. Although the evidence was not strong in some areas, overall, the 
various measures used for patriarchal ideology were reliable. Methodologically, this 
research has some noteworthy implications for future research.
Looking at the first set of analyses, attitudinal measures of patriarchal ideology 
showed signs of measurement reliability and had mixed findings regarding longitudinal
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measurement reliability. This lack of consistency in longitudinal measurement 
invariance was most likely due to one of three things. One reason could be that group- 
level influences affected the meaning and interpretation of the attitudinal measures over 
time for the whole sample. If so, the measures would need to be re-evaluated to see why 
the lack of consistency was found. However, the conceptualization in Chapter 3 was 
thorough and the measures were not entirely unique from past research (e.g. Smith 1990, 
1991).
The second, and better, explanation for the lack of consistency in measurement 
reliability is that method effects were present. One of the problems with using dated 
secondary data is that despite communication with the original principal investigator, 
unless changes to the research design are explicitly stated, we are left to assume. The fact 
that Cohort 2 had reliable measures at Wave 1 (1991) but not Wave 2 (1992) could have 
been due to changes in the research design. Although various items were added and 
deleted throughout this study by the original researchers, for some reason the introduction 
of the vignette-based measures of patriarchal ideology seem to have influenced the 
attitudinal measures. These items first appeared in 1992 when patriarchal attitudes first 
had indications of unreliability. In 1992, when it was Wave 3 for Cohort 1, the new 
patriarchal ideology-vignettes were only given to Cohorts 2 and 3 (Wave 2 and Wave 1 
respectively). Reliability in the attitudinal measures was lacking for Cohort 2 in 1992 as 
well as for Cohort 3. Thus, in 1992, the reliability of the vignette-based items was strong 
for each Cohort, separately and combined.
The third potential source for the lack of consistency regarding measurement 
invariance really relates to validity, experimenter bias or observer reliability. Since the
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original researchers were accepting of the outside studies during their day that concluded 
patriarchal ideology was not a significant predictor of “sexual coercion”, this could have 
impacted how these items were measured. They could have contaminated the items in 
some way, possibly by telling respondents to devote less time to them. They could have 
entered these items into their dataset inaccurately. Although there is no direct empirical 
support to these speculations, the principal investigator did mention that during the time 
of data collection, researchers accepted the assumption that attitudinal items were not 
important predictors for their outcome of sexual coercion1. Whether or not significant 
relationships were found in past research, however, should not have affected the 
independent measures’ internal reliability. Over time, if researchers were not as 
meticulous in presenting, collecting, or assessing the few attitudinal items about 
acceptance of violence against women, this may say more about researcher bias than any 
real problems with the long-term reliability of these indicators of patriarchal ideology.
This brings me to the first suggestion for future longitudinal research designs: 
when conducting longitudinal research over relatively short periods, or across relatively 
few data points, changes to the original testing measures should be minimal. The original
1 Jackie White, email correspondence, November 11, 2011. These researchers conducted 
their study in a thorough and detailed way with the utmost integrity. This discussion is 
merely provided to highlight the dilemmas researchers face in longitudinal studies. One 
of these involves decisions as far as altering measurement instruments so that we are 
collecting current concepts exogenous from the pre-test survey instruments, while also 
not giving up on the original measures or bombarding respondents with lengthy surveys.
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researchers cannot be blamed for the removal of these attitudinal items when they were 
not a main variable of interest for their purposes. However, the original inclusion of 
them should have meant the researchers deemed them important at one point. 
Additionally, none of the meta-analyses produced around the time the data was being 
collected mentioned longitudinal research. As Lieberson (1985) put it, “Cross-sectional 
data are certain to be relevant only under special circumstances [...] Conclusions based 
on cross-sectional data are not of equal merit to those based on longitudinal data 
(180, 181). This is especially important considering very few longitudinal studies on 
relationship violence existed from the inception o f domestic violence research until the 
1990s when the original research was conducted. Future research designs should use 
great caution when changing/removing portions from the initial design. Justifications for 
the removal of “non-significant” constructs should be critically assessed, whether they 
are made theoretically, empirically, or both.
One weakness of the current measures o f patriarchal ideology is that they were 
only tapping into portions of the concept. Chapter 3 made note that individual patriarchal 
ideology really consists of 4 major dimensions related to: dominance/power over women, 
hostile masculinity, rape myth acceptance, and acceptance of violence against women.
To illustrate these dimensions, Figure 8.1 is provided. Thus, the second major 
methodological suggestion for future research is that studies in this area should include at 
least one indicator of each concept with more complicated designs (e.g. SEM, HLM) 
using multiple measures from each.
Lastly, vignette-based measures o f patriarchal ideology consistent with rape myth 
acceptance/likelihood of rape are reliable proxy measures of patriarchal ideology. The
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third suggestion for future research is that they should consider the use of vignette items 
for multiple dimensions o f patriarchal ideology. This should be not just an alternative to 
attitudinal items, but as better measures for assessing ideology since context for the 
attitude/likely behavior is provided.
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS: UNDERSTANDING PATRIARCHAL IDEOLOGY 
IN A THEORY OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
The fact that patriarchal ideology declined for the entire sample at equal rates is 
really quite remarkable. There is no doubt that individual patriarchal ideology is a 
concept that is real, valid, and important as has been argued throughout this research. 
These findings concerning change really question the significance of individual 
patriarchal ideology in a theory of violence against women. Thus, institutional 
patriarchal ideology, or at the very least some sort of meso-level, group-based patriarchal 
ideology is perhaps more important for a theory of violence against women. To see equal 
rates of change in patriarchal ideology suggests, first, that this is a reflection of the social 
institution in which this sample was composed. In a sample conducted within a 
university setting, a place where progressive ideals are arguably stronger than in other 
social institutions, it may not be too shocking to see declines in the rate of patriarchal 
ideology.
Figure 8.1. Dimensions of Patriarchal Ideology
Individual
Patriarchal Ideology
Rape Myth 
Acceptance
Chivalry 
should be 
rewarded with 
sex
Rape is 
woman’s fault 
Sexual
promiscuity = 
entitlement
Acceptance of
Violence against 
Women
• For stepping 
outside of 
expected role
• For infidelity
• As way to 
obtain control
Hostile Masculinity
Distrustful of 
women 
Threatened by 
women’s gains 
Gratification in 
control of 
women
Dominance/Power 
over Women
Underlying
Power
Control linked 
to sexuality 
Need to assert
Note: Bullet points are examples of indicators consistent with each dimension.
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To others, however, this may be very shocking considering these results are essentially 
showing patriarchal ideology from the first, roughly 18 years of one’s life declines after 
just three years o f college. It was interesting to find that before-college patriarchal 
ideology had no effect on patriarchal ideology at the end o f one’s first year o f school.
Both longitudinally and cross-sectionally, some of the key relationships are discussed 
below.
Social Learning Theory and Patriarchal Ideology over Time
Many research studies (e.g. Brown 1987; Payne and Triplett 2009) have found 
childhood exposure to domestic violence as well as child abuse victimization to 
significantly predict adulthood domestic violence perpetration. These relationships are 
typically explained using social learning perspectives in that these boys are learning how 
to use violence within the family (DeKeseredy and MacLeod 1997; Payne and Gainey 
2009). These social learning perspectives, however, have been somewhat short-sighted 
(DeKeseredy 2011; White and Smith 2009). This is especially true if  we are considering 
the most noteworthy variant of social learning theory for criminologists, that which 
comes from Akers (2009). Unfortunately, the current research presents more questions 
and challenges than answers in regards to childhood exposure to domestic violence 
relating to patriarchal ideology and/or relationship violence. Nonetheless, these 
challenges are discussed below.
Many studies that assume adult batterers who come from violent households are 
“learning” how to be violent would find more specific support in the component of social 
learning theory of modeling/imitation. Thus, why do boys learn to imitate such violence,
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whereas girls leam that familial violence is normal? If the answer is boys and girls 
“learn” gender norms early in life and violence perpetration by men is one o f these many 
forms of gendered difference, then this is a weak explanation. For one, male violence 
against an intimate partner, while more common and more serious than female violence 
against an intimate partner, is not “normal.” It may be normal for men to be more violent 
than women or to repress emotions, but it is certainly not the norm for men to use 
violence against female intimate partners. Secondly, it cannot be concluded that 
“modeling” is taking place without a discussion o f reinforcement, or what Akers (2009) 
calls “differential reinforcement.” Without reinforcement, we are left to assume that 
coming from a violent household and being violent as an adult is a 1:1 ratio of 
equivalence and that individuals inevitably and blindly follow others.
It might be better to explain the learning process as part of “differential 
reinforcement.” This component of social learning theory notes that although 
reinforcement can vary in many ways, social reinforcers are the most salient component 
of differential reinforcement (Akers 2009). Thus, the link between witnessing domestic 
violence to becoming an adult batterer should not be framed within the context o f social 
learning theory if reinforcers are unknown. How exposure to domestic violence during 
childhood impacts one’s patriarchal ideology is more confounding since outcomes are not 
as directly observable.
These findings do add to the research that suggests that any negative impacts of 
childhood exposure to domestic violence can be overcome. Witnessing domestic 
violence and even being the victim of child abuse did not significantly influence 
patriarchal ideology in college (but was significant before college). This suggests that
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protective factors are available later in the life-course. Whatever these protective factors 
may be is still unclear but with the transition from one major social institution (the 
family) to another (higher education), the mere change in social settings may be enough 
to offset the negative effects of such childhood experiences.
Patriarchal Male Peers: Differential Association and Definitions
Social learning theory notes that learned “definitions” can be broad as far as 
having a general attitude favorable or unfavorable towards criminality, with Akers 
(2009:28-29) often using the terms “beliefs” and “ideologies” interchangeably with 
definitions. Thus, if definitions are learned through symbolic interaction with those from 
primary groups (e.g. close peer associations, parents), then patriarchal ideology should be 
learned in a similar manner having similar origins. Prior to the start of college, there 
appears to be some support to suggest parental (i.e. father) influence on patriarchal 
ideology exists, since witnessing domestic violence was a significant predictor o f having 
a higher level of patriarchal ideology. Once college begins, perhaps the increased 
frequency of differential associations with patriarchal male peers is why this variable 
significantly predicted the average level o f patriarchal ideology whereas witnessing 
domestic violence and childhood abuse did not. Perhaps these findings give more weight 
to the learning process of modeling because all three o f these variables predicted higher 
initial levels of relationship violence perpetration. The consistent dimension o f social 
learning theory in predicting patriarchal ideology and relationship violence perpetration is 
“differential association.”
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Recall that the operational measure for patriarchal male peer associations was a 
proxy measure and it was not clear the exact frequency or intensity of the male peer 
association(s). Perhaps this is why this variable was not predictive of patriarchal 
ideology. The growth-curve models used a measure for male patriarchal peer 
associations that was definitely high on intensity since it was the respondent’s best 
friend’s likelihood of committing rape. In the growth-curve models, patriarchal peer 
associations were the only significant predictors o f both patriarchal ideology and 
relationship violence perpetration. Thus, this study supports previous research findings 
(e.g. Schwartz and DeKeseredy 1997) suggesting male peer support influences violence 
against women. It adds to the research in providing support for male peer associations as 
one of the predictors of individual patriarchal ideology in college.
A final point on differential male peer associations regarding causal ordering is 
needed. Figure 5.4 from Chapter 5 showing the results o f the cross-lagged panel model 
might speak to the earlier discussion concerning the causal order o f male peers. The 
covariance of patriarchal attitudes and patriarchal peers and relationship violence was not 
significant at Wave 1, nor was the covariance of patriarchal peers with patriarchal 
attitudes. At Wave 2, these covariances were still not significant. However, the cross­
lagged coefficients showed that Wave 1 patriarchal peers predicted patriarchal attitudes at 
Wave 2 but not relationship violence perpetration. These findings suggest that 
patriarchal attitudes are not related to male peer associations until college. The 
aforementioned causal ordering of patriarchal male peer associations in a theory of 
violence against women noted the larger debates in criminology regarding the “birds o f a 
feather” argument compared to differential association perspectives for the origins of
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definitions, or in this case patriarchal ideology. It appears that as individuals begin 
college, their patriarchal ideology is no longer influenced by sources o f familial 
patriarchy (e.g. witnessing domestic violence) and instead these ideologies are influenced 
by social patriarchy (i.e. patriarchal male peers in college).
Race and Individual Patriarchy Ideology
The panel data using attitudinal measures o f patriarchal ideology found non­
whites had higher levels o f patriarchal ideology. This was contrary to the growth-curve 
models using vignettes, which discovered whites had higher levels o f patriarchal ideology 
over time. The panel data can perhaps best be interpreted within the context of social 
institutions. Connell and Messerschmidt (2005) argued individual patriarchal ideology is 
likely to vary in different social institutions, especially for racial minorities. The lack of 
power in various social institutions, mainly the economy and polity, might help explain 
why non-whites have higher levels o f patriarchal ideology when using attitudinal 
measures, whose origins lie in the family. In fact, hooks (2000) argues the family is the 
one institution black men can expect to have domination.
Some have argued many o f the negative stereotypes about black women in 
connection to familial patriarchy (e.g. “mammy”, “matriarch”) are created and 
maintained by dominant social institutions controlled by whites (Collins 2000). So while 
white institutions are likely to develop stereotypes about black women, individual white 
men are not likely to develop high levels o f patriarchal ideology when measurement 
dimensions include items connected to familial patriarchy. Because intimate 
relationships are most commonly intraracial, individual white males’ acceptance of
245
violence against women is likely capturing their acceptance o f violence in their own 
personal lives. The same is true for African Americans, hence their higher levels on the 
patriarchal attitudes items. So why would African Americans have higher levels of 
patriarchal ideology after the first year o f college, but not before? It is possible that once 
these individuals started at this new institution they were exposed to these negative 
stereotypes about black women, influencing their patriarchal ideology? The reason for 
this finding is not clear. Future research should consider patriarchal ideology as a multi­
dimensional construct over multiple waves of data (i.e. more than two).
The growth-curve models suggest the opposite when it comes to the relationship 
between race and patriarchal ideology. Whites had significantly higher average levels of 
patriarchal ideology across all three waves. Additionally, the only significant predictor of 
the change in patriarchal ideology over time was race, indicating the rate of change was 
slower for whites than it was for non-whites. One explanation for this is that whites may 
feel a higher sense of entitlement than other racial groups. Again, level-2 variables were 
not available in this dataset, so group-level interpretations are not possible. While future 
research should be conducted using aggregate variables, we can also use past research to 
perhaps better understand these relationships.
Sanday’s (2007) research found that some white fraternity members bonded 
together through sexism and racism, especially when they felt powerless. Her research 
also discovered that many young, white college fraternity members felt entitled to 
women’s bodies in various scenarios. Some individuals in her study even noted how in 
college they sought out male peers who could provide emotional support for the 
challenges presented in college, including support for when they failed to live up to their
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monikers of “powerful” and “successful” white men. It is possible that white males 
develop patriarchal ideologies higher than racial minorities before college, but that these 
ideologies are not positively reinforced in the same manner as they are by male peer 
groups in college. These peer groups are likely to be stronger and more influential since 
the family is less present in everyday life for these men, hence less frequent. Also, these 
men may have stronger patriarchal ideologies throughout college because o f backlash. 
That is, college is likely the most diverse institution to date these individuals have come 
in contact with. Perhaps patriarchal ideology is higher for whites because their sense of 
entitlement is challenged by women’s gains, something they become aware of once they 
are in college.
These findings may even support the earlier argument that vignettes, which can 
take into consideration context better than attitude-agreement items, are perhaps better at 
capturing ideology. This may explain why the current study’s findings are different from 
past research. Suarez and Gadalla’s (2010) meta-analysis on rape myth acceptance 
reported that among men research has found, overall, that non-whites have higher levels 
of rape myth acceptance than whites. Recall the discussion in Chapter 6 regarding Pease 
and Flood (2008) who were cited regarding their argument that ideology is rooted in 
“social conditions and social consciousness” (554). If ideologies are better captured by 
scenario-based vignettes that can contextualize various beliefs and attitudes rather than 
recording level of agreement with various statements, then perhaps this explains the 
differences from past research. Perhaps past studies assessing rape myth acceptance with 
attitudinal measures have fallen into the trap of “abstracted empiricism” (see Mills 1959). 
When these researchers find white males have lower rape-myth acceptance attitudes than
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minorities, these findings reinforce the “matrix o f domination” (see Collins 2000). 
Chapleau and Oswald (2013) found that white men were less accepting of rape myths in 
scenarios where victims were o f high status and perpetrators were of low-status. 
Historically, this can be seen in stereotypes of the “black male rapists” and aggressive 
prosecutions of black men accused of raping white women. Researchers need to consider 
context specific measures of rape-myth attitudes in order to better assess their purpose 
and their meanings, especially in regards to race. Beyond the ability to assess context in 
assessing rape-myths, a theory of violence against women should take the lead of 
Chapleau and Oswald (2013) in determining the purpose of these myths. While the 
current research treated these items as proxy measures, or a dimension of patriarchal 
ideology, they can also be used in a more general sense to address questions like: how are 
they used to reinforce the status quo in regards to violence against women?
Relationship Violence and Patriarchal Ideology
Chapter 3 reviewed and criticized the literature suggesting “patriarchal ideology” 
was not predictive of relationship violence perpetration. It was discussed that individual 
patriarchal ideology does not need to be directly predictive o f violence against women to 
have significance in a theory o f violence against women. Initial bivariate correlation 
coefficients for the two-wave panel design suggested positive, weak, but significant 
correlation coefficients for each time period regarding the links between patriarchal 
attitudes and violence perpetration. The growth-curve data suggested bivariate 
correlations between patriarchal ideology and relationship violence perpetration for each 
respective time period to also be positive, weak and significant. These effects, however,
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were absent when controls were considered in the MIMIC models. These preliminary 
findings suggested relationship violence was not predictive of patriarchal ideology. 
However, since these models were cross-sectional, it would be erroneous to assume this 
was the end of the story and that no relationship between the two existed. It was entirely 
possible that the time-lag, which was not known in the cross-sectional analyses, was too 
short to see any effect. Thus, the cross-lagged and reciprocal models tell us more about 
the lagged effects of relationship violence perpetration and patriarchal ideology than any 
previous study in this area.
Although findings suggested no reciprocal relationship between the two, results 
did show how the two were significantly correlated at the initial wave (i.e. end of 
freshman year). While controlling for their autocorrelations, the next wave of data 
suggested relationship violence was predictive of patriarchal attitudes, while the opposite 
was true in the final wave. This suggests a dynamic causal process may be taking place 
over time. While patriarchal ideology may not always predict relationship violence and 
relationship violence may not always predict patriarchal ideology, they definitely have 
direct and indirect effects on one another. Thus, the finding that these two had significant 
covariation in their average initial levels, but that their rates of decline were not 
significantly related to one another (and one had between individual declines while the 
other had within individual declines) means the simultaneous changes in each are still not 
accounted for. The goal for future research studies is to develop longitudinal growth- 
curve or hierarchical linear models that take into consideration the covariation of 
relationship violence perpetration and patriarchal ideology, while controlling for second- 
order predictors of each.
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PATRIARCHAL IDEOLOGY: CHANGE OVER TIME AND FEEDBACK EFFECTS
The major focus o f this study was the assessment of patriarchal ideology over 
time, using a sample of college males. Combining all analyses, change in patriarchal 
ideology can be summed up in the following:
1) Patriarchal ideology is stable from the beginning of the first year of college to 
the end of the first year of college.
2) Patriarchal ideology declines from the end of one’s freshman year o f college 
to the end of their junior year of college.
3) Despite significant differences within individuals, overall, the entire sample 
had the same rate of change in patriarchal ideology over time.
The results in regards to change in patriarchal ideology over time tell us first that 
individual patriarchal ideology is not a static “trait” as some role-theorists may believe. 
Despite the fact that only a short period of time was covered in this research, observed 
declines were still seen. It is entirely possible that these declines were reflective of the 
sample, college men. While certainly college men should not be reflective of all men, 
Chapter 4 did mention some of the unique qualities college male samples hold in 
considering various aspects related to violence against women. The fact is, we should 
expect patriarchal ideology to decline over time for college men, but the degree o f this 
seemingly inevitable outcome is likely to be small when not specifically targeted by 
college institutions. However, as the few institutional patriarchy examples illustrated in 
Chapter 2 showed, colleges and universities often employ symbolic change while lagging 
behind in any real, progressive reforms or policies aimed at changing patriarchy within 
the institution.
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The lack of inter-individual change in patriarchal ideology over time suggests 
group-level variables account for the observed declines rather than individual variables. 
Thus patriarchal ideology as a “pathological, static trait” as seen by some is not true. The 
exact source of the equal rates of decline is unknown since aggregate-level variables were 
not available in this research. Connell and Messerschmidt’s (2005) suggestion that 
micro-level psychological dynamics should be considered in their theory of hegemonic 
masculinity might need to be reassessed. While certainly individual traits can determine 
one’s patriarchal ideology, patriarchal ideology is far more likely to change at macro or 
meso levels rather than at micro levels.
Future research examining individual patriarchal ideology in a theory of violence 
against women would need to consider level-2 variables when it comes to their change 
over time. They might also benefit from considerations of level-2 variables that assess 
the origins of patriarchal ideology. These variables should consider important 
characteristics of the institution as well as general group-level factors important in all 
social institutions (e.g. percent minority, SES, regional characteristics). Institutional 
variables to consider for educational institutions would include controlling for various 
rates of violence against women as well as types o f and numbers of institutional programs 
that address violence against women, or more generally women’s subordination.
Solutions to violence against women that focus on attitudes towards women, 
patriarchal ideology, or just sexism in general almost always have the same policy 
solutions. Generally speaking, they typically note how the solution is to address these 
“learned” characteristics through some sort of education program. While these solutions 
are often appropriate, they fail to produce radical change because they treat violence
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against women or more generally “sexism” as individual problems. The fact that changes 
in individual patriarchal ideology occur at the group-level, not the individual level, 
suggests these solutions are perhaps misguided. Violence against women courses in 
universities do not treat these issues as individual problems, but the institutions that house 
such programs and course offerings do so by not making these mandatory.
Some researchers have suggested these programs become university requirements 
(Payne and Triplett 2009; York 2011). While most universities have some sort of 
freshman seminar course meant to ease students into college life, these courses pay very 
little attention to some of the most serious issues like violence against women. If not 
entire courses on violence against women, this should at least be a main topic covered in 
these mandated freshman seminar courses. Qualitative research with students enrolled in 
these courses has shown students have an interest in knowing more about experiences 
with alcohol and violence (Davig and Spain 2004). Others suggest combining alcohol 
abuse prevention programs (something widely discussed on college campuses) with 
sexual assault prevention programs (Payne, Ekhomu, and Carmody 2009). Sexual assault 
prevention programs in college have been shown to be effective (Langhinrichsen-Rohling 
et al. 2011)2. Yet, when these programs are not mandated, those who might need the
2 The current study had no significant findings in regards to sexual assault program 
attendance in reducing patriarchal ideology, but this was most likely a selection effect. 
That is, this question did not make it clear if  respondents attended a sexual assault 
awareness program out of obligation (e.g. course requirement, mandate from the 
university, a court mandate) or because they were generally concerned about this topic
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programs the most are highly unlikely to enroll on their own free will. Universities that 
mandate such courses send the message to young men that the institution and those in 
power take these issues seriously, as they should (for similar discussions, see Payne, et al. 
2007; Schwartz and DeKeseredy 1997). It may seem like it is asking much to mandate 
such courses, but as Payne and Triplett (2009) have pointed out, the state has no problem 
mandating training in programs like homeland security awareness, despite a very low 
likelihood of ever coming into contact with such social phenomenon. Certainly there are 
far more instances of men raping women on college campuses than there are o f any Al 
Qaeda-sponsored terrorist networks.
It is also important that the content of these courses remain woman-centered and 
that they keep the focus on the broader social impacts of patriarchal ideology and 
patriarchy in general. As hooks (2000) notes, men’s groups like those focusing on male- 
role strains, “run the risk o f overemphasizing personal change at the expense of political 
analysis and struggle” (74). Similarly, batterer intervention programs have been shown 
to be effective at reducing men’s future acts of violence. Although these programs have 
had significant decreases on men’s violence, these decreases have been minimal. Such 
programs tend to overemphasize individual pathology. Instead, group-based approaches 
that show individual offenders that violence against women is not just wrong, but that the 
wider society, including men, will not tolerate such behaviors, should be encouraged.
They are not likely to work, however, when men’s collective patriarchal ideology
(e.g. men that choose to attend a sexual assault awareness program are most likely to 
have lower levels of patriarchal ideology).
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disagrees. The starting point is to target men’s patriarchal ideology at the group level 
first.
CONCLUSION
This research has responded to recent calls by feminist researchers to “resurrect” 
patriarchy in theories of violence against women (Hunnicutt 2009). The case was made 
that patriarchal ideology has not been well-developed or well-understood in theories o f 
violence against women. Chapter 2 conceptualized and provided historical examples of 
institutional patriarchal ideology. Chapter 3 conceptualized individual patriarchal 
ideology and gave a review of the research relevant to violence against women that has 
largely ignored, misinterpreted, or failed to address the role individual patriarchal 
ideology plays in a theory of violence against women. Chapters 4 and 5 provided one of 
the few analyses to consider attitudinal measures o f individual patriarchal ideology 
longitudinally and as outcome variables using traditional test/re-test panel data and 
traditional, attitudinal operationalizations of patriarchal ideology. Chapters 6 and 7 used 
vignettes to operationalize patriarchal ideology, assessing how they change over time in 
various latent growth-curve models. The methods chapters (4 and 6) highlight the 
limitations to this study. This final chapter has attempted to make the most sense of the 
results, while noting the challenges faced with little precedence in this area since no prior 
research has considered longitudinal analyses of patriarchal ideology.
The conclusion of the opening chapter o f this research highlighted six main goals 
of this research. To repeat, they were:
1) To accurately conceptualize patriarchal ideology.
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2) To explore the reliability of operational measures of patriarchal ideology.
3) To investigate potential etiological variables related to patriarchal ideology.
4) To better understand how patriarchal ideology changes over time.
5) To uncover how patriarchal ideology fits in feminist theories o f violence
against women.
6) To consider potential social policies that might effectively target patriarchal
ideologies.
The front-end of this dissertation laid-out a clear definition o f patriarchy and patriarchal 
ideology, differentiating between institutional patriarchal ideology and individual 
patriarchal ideology. The operational use of attitudinal measures of patriarchal ideology 
had every indication of acceptable reliability, with the only evidence to the contrary 
leaning more towards research strategy rather than something inherently wrong with 
these measures. The vignette-based items, too, were reliable and might be preferred for 
future research going forward wanting to quantify any sort o f “ideology.” While there 
was not overwhelming support for the origins of patriarchal ideology, some findings 
suggest that they lie in demographic characteristics (i.e. race) as well as aspects of 
familial patriarchy (i.e. witnessing domestic violence). Patriarchal ideology appears to be 
fairly stable within individuals from before they start college to the end o f their first year 
of college. After that, patriarchal ideology declines over time at equal rates for this 
sample of college men. Feminist theories of violence against women should consider 
patriarchal ideology as a group-level variable, rather than a “trait” that resides within 
individuals. Thus, macro-level programs and policies that are aimed to reforming
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patriarchal ideology at the group level should be given precedence over those that target 
individual-level patriarchal ideology.
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